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Abstract 
 
This thesis critically examines the relationship between the protection of human rights 
and peace in ethnically divided, post conflict societies. It seeks to achieve this in two 
ways: on the one hand, it undertakes a theoretical analysis of the two key terms and 
on the other, it compares how protecting the rights to property and vote has affected 
peacebuilding efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Africa and Cyprus. Peace, as 
defined in the thesis, consists of three elements – security, justice and reconciliation; 
these sometimes reinforce and others contradict with each other. Theoretical 
arguments and real-life examples from the three case studies that confirm the 
existence of a positive relationship between human rights and peace are abundant. At 
the same time however, it is possible that the protection of human rights can also 
undermine peacebuilding efforts, whether inadvertendly or through their explicit 
demand. Human rights can, for example, promote security to the detriment of justice 
or reconciliation, thus negatively affectively the peacebuilding operation as a whole. 
 
In addition to the existence of a positive and negative relationship, it is also often the 
case that human rights are not connected to peace at all. This is particularly because in 
order for peace to be built, it is necessary to induce in the ethnically divided, post-
conflict society, legal, political, socio-economic and psychological changes. While 
however, human rights can make important contributions to the legal changes that 
have to take place, they are less effective in inducing the rest. This more nuanced 
understanding of the relationship between human rights and peace, calls for the 
enrichment of the liberal peacebuilding recipe that has human rights at its centrepiece. 
Policy makers should adopt an alternative strategy, which while valuing human rights, 
also addresses their limitations by supplementing them with other peacebuilding tools 
and mechanisms as well.  
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The promise and expectation in ethnically divided, post-conflict societies is that the 
protection of human rights is necessary – and sometimes even sufficient – for the 
building of peace in the country. Yet, despite the UN officials’ unwavering conviction 
of this, it is never made clear precisely in what way human rights can achieve such an 
objective. Furthermore, if one attempts to explain this seemingly uncontroversial 
expectation, she is likely to quickly stumble on a rather confusing and uncomfortable 
truth: attempts to protect human rights have not in fact always, or even often, resulted 
in peaceful societies. Therefore, this thesis challenges the expectation that peace and 
human rights are only positively connected and concludes instead that their 
relationship is more nuanced than originally assumed. In particular, it argues that 
there are ample theoretical arguments and real-life examples confirming the positive 
connections between the two terms. At the same time however, it is often the case that 
human rights protections undermine the success of peacebuilding operations or that 
the latter are more effectively promoted through mechanisms and tools that are not 
connected to the former at all. If one only focuses on the positive connections and 
ignores the other two facets of the relationship in question, she runs the risk of 
overestimating the peacebuilding potential of human rights. 
 
Developing our understanding of how the two terms connect is both necessary and 
important because of the increasing use of human rights as peacebuilding tools in 
different divided societies around the world. Moreover, it is timely since the political 
negotiations for the reunification of Cyprus – the divided society that was the 
inspiration for this thesis – are gradually coming to a close.1 If the conclusions of this 
                                               
1 The UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus, Mr. Espen Barth Eide, has warned the 
political leaders on several occasions in the last months that this round of negotiations is likely to be 
the last one; the implication is that the two sides will either reach a peace agreement soon or the island 
will be partititioned. This theme, that the negotiations are coming to a close, has also been picked up by 
academics and non-governmental organisations working on the Cypriot issue. (See for example, James 
Ker-Lindsay, Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution (London: I.B. Tauris & Co, 
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analysis are taken seriously, peacebuilders in Cyprus and elsewhere would to well to 
adopt a multifaceted approach towards human rights. They should push for their 
protection where this is likely to contribute to peace in the ethnically divided, post-
conflict society, but acknowledging their dangers and limitations, they should, on 
other occasions, spend their limited resources in other ways.2 It is therefore necessary 
to enrich the dominant peacebuilding strategy, which at the moment relies heavily on 
the protection of human rights, by supplementing it with additional peacebuilding 
tools and methods as well. 
 
2. The central question 
 
The central concern of this thesis is to clarify the relationship that exists between the 
protection of human rights and the building of peace in ethnically divided, post-
conflict societies. Peace, it is argued, is a balance of three elements – security, justice 
and reconciliation – that sometimes reinforce and other times contradict with each 
other. The peacebuilding potential of human rights depends on how much they can 
contribute to the promotion of each of these three elements. However, rather than 
adopting a critical stance on the extent of this contribution, international 
peacebuilders have assumed that a wholly positive relationship exists between the 
protection of rights on the one hand and the promotion of the elements on the other. 
Illustrative of this is Bertrand Ramcharan’s assertion, at a time when he was the 
Acting UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, that ‘[i]nternational human rights 
norms define the meaning of human security’.3 Similarly, Parlevliet unquestioningly 
accepts a positive relationship between human rights and the element of justice when 
she argues that ‘[h]uman rights actors [focus …] directly on justice as the foundation 
for a lasting peace.’4 Equally confident is the expectation that there is a positive 
connection between human rights and the element of reconciliation, with the UN 
Brahimi Report declaring that ‘reconciliation […] requires that past human rights 
                                                                                                                                      
2014) and International Crisis Group, 'Divided Cyprus: Coming to Terms on an Imperfect Reality', 
(Nicosia/Instabul/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014).) 
2 This is not to argue that human rights are not valuable in and of themselves; however, they should be 
protected as part of the peacebuilding process only to the extent that they can contribute to it. 
3 Bertrand Ramcharan, 'Human Rights and Human Security', Disarmament Forum, 3 (2004), 39 at 41.  
4 Michelle Parlevliet, 'Bridging the Divide: Exploring the Relationship between Human Rights and 
Conflict Management', Track Two Occasional Paper 11(1), (Cape Town: Centre for Conflict 
Resolution, 2002), 1 at 11. 
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violations be addressed’.5 Assuming that human rights can only make positive 
contributions to each of the three elements results in rather simplistic expectations 
about an equally positive relationship to peace. Thus, unqualified statements that ‘a 
peace that is not accompanied by strategies for the promotion and protection of 
human rights is unlikely to be a lasting one’ are commonplace in the literature.6  
 
Problematically however, this expectation for a positive relationship has not 
materialised in practice. Rather, a theoretical analysis of the key terms suggests that 
human rights are potentially, but not always helpful in promoting the three elements 
of peace. In particular, it becomes clear that feelings of security and justice are often 
promoted through the protection of human rights, but they might also require their 
limitation. For instance, protecting the right to property and empowering displaced 
people to return to their houses sends a powerful message that the war is over and that 
the society in question is becoming (more) secure; at the same time however, 
peacebuilders might disencourage the return of refugees due to fears that the 
interaction between ethnic groups might result in further violence. Similar 
conclusions can be reached about the connection between justice and human rights: 
justice might on the one hand, demand that displaced people receive restitution of 
their properties, but if a significant period of time has passed since their displacement, 
the protection of the right through the properties’ restitution might in itself create a 
new unjust situation. In addition to this dual – positive and negative – relationship, it 
is often the case that the protection of human rights is not connected to the peace 
elements at all. This is particularly true in relation to reconciliation, which is based on 
the meaningful cooperation between the members of different ethnic groups. The 
most effective way of achieving this is through mechanisms that address the people 
themselves; in this respect, the tendency of human rights to focus on laws and 
institutions offers an explanation for their rather limited reconciliation-promoting 
potential. 
 
This more nuanced relationship of peace and human rights, which consists of positive, 
negative or no connections between the two, is not only apparent from a theoretical 
                                               
5 Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations', 
(New York: United Nations, 2000) at [22]. (Henceforth, ‘Brahimi Report’.) 
6 Ramcharan, 'Human Rights and Human Security' at 44. 
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analysis of the key terms, but is also clear in the ethnically divided, post-conflict 
societies themselves. On the one hand, human rights provide the appropriate language 
and forums for the successful management of certain conflicts dividing the society 
and their protection can result in legal and institutional amendments necessary for the 
building of peace. On the other, this is only the best-case scenario since human rights 
decisions often remain unenforced. Even in cases where they are implemented 
however, their contribution is always limited: peacebuilders tend to ignore the fact 
that the most divisive and destructive conflicts cannot be successfully managed by the 
judiciary. Moreover, it is often not acknowledged that human rights protection cannot, 
on its own, lead to the political, socio-economic and psychological changes that 
divided societies must go through. Unless such changes take place however, simply 
enforcing human rights, no matter how successfully, can only result in a hollow 
peace: a society that looks secure and attractive from the outside, yet unreconciled 
and unstable from the inside. While in hindsight these are rather obvious conclusions 
to reach, peacebuilders on the ground do not seem to have taken them on board. Their 
blind trust in human rights focuses their attention only to the positive connection 
between the two concepts, which often has detrimental results for the overall 
objective of building peace.  
 
Arguably, these conclusions have much broader implications than merely determining 
the relationship between peace and human rights. Rather, they point to the need to 
abandon the liberal peacebuilding strategy currently used today and replace it with an 
alternative one instead. This will value the contributions of human rights – and the 
legal and institutional amendments they can induce – but will also acknowledge their 
limitations and the need to supplement, or even replace, them with alternative 
peacebuilding tools as well. These tools, which will be concerned with the people 
rather than the laws of the ethnically divided, post-conflict society, can vary. They 
can include top-down measures, such as the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, or bottom-up ones, like organising victim-led workshops between 
members of different ethnic groups. Such people-centred strategies form an important 
component of the alternative peacebuilding approach because only when the 
grassroots change their perceptions can feelings of security, justice and in particular 
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reconciliation, all of which are necessary for peace, be induced.7 In addition to 
expanding its areas of concern (more broadly social rather than merely legal) and the 
numbers of people it is addressing (the grassroots and not just the political elites), the 
alternative peacebuilding approach is expansive in one more way: it seeks 
contributions from and empowers not just lawyers, but other types of professionals as 
well, such as teachers, journalists, religious leaders and policemen. The concluding 
chapter of the thesis elaborates on these characteristics of the alternative approach, but 
also warns against the adoption of one-size-fits-all peacebuilding strategies for 
different ethnically divided, post-conflict societies. This need to adopt context-
specific approaches might make peacebuilding more difficult to achieve, but it also 
makes its effects more meaningful for the people in practice.  
 
3. The importance and interest of the subject 
 
It is because of its practical consequences for peacebuilding operations on the ground 
that there is an urgency in clarifying the relationship between peace and human rights. 
At the moment there is a perception that any failures of human rights and other liberal 
peacebuilding tools to promote peace are mainly due to their non-implementation or 
other exogenous factors such as underfunding or lack of cooperation between the 
peacebuilding actors.8 Failures are never because of the protection of human rights 
per se. Nevertheless, a belief that ‘a bit more human rights can never make things 
worse’ is dangerous because it necessarily ‘places blame for whatever goes wrong 
elsewhere’.9 Implementation and funding considerations are important, but they 
should not cloud the possibility that what we ask of human rights in peacebuilding 
operations might simply be too much.  
 
                                               
7 Kieran McEvoy, 'Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice', 
Journal of Law & Society, 34(4) (2007), 411. 
8 Roland Paris, 'Understanding the “coordination problem” in postwar statebuilding', in Roland Paris 
and Timothy D. Sisk (eds.), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of 
Postwar Peace Operations (London: Routledge, 2009), 53. This is further confirmed by statements 
from UN Secretary-General who identified the problem of peace operations as being an institutional 
one, with the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission providing the solution. (Address by United 
Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Fifty-sixth session of the Executive Committee of the 
High Commissioner's Programme (Geneva, 6 October 2005), on 
http://www.unhcr.org/43455d812.html [accessed 19 December 2014].) 
9 David Kennedy, 'The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?', Harvard Human 
Rights Journal, 15 (2002), 101 at 124 and 122 respectively. 
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Since the end of the Second World War, which marked the first modern attempts to 
build peace, and until today, peacebuilding operations have evolved and become 
much more sophisticated in their objectives and methods. Problematically however, at 
no point during this process, has the effectiveness of human rights as peacebuilding 
tools been seriously questioned. The emphasis that was placed on human rights during 
the early peacebuilding operations is reflected in the establishment of the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Tribunals, which were intended to prosecute perpetrators of serious human 
rights violations.10 International peacebuilding went into hibernation during the Cold 
War, but the fall of communism at the end of the 20th century led to the second stage 
of its development.11 Peacebuilding operations during this period – in South Africa, 
the ex-USSR bloc and Latin America – questioned a number of its key assumptions, 
such as whether the use of criminal trials was the best way to promote peace, or 
whether Truth and Reconciliation Commissions coupled with amnesties were more 
appropriate. However, the importance of human rights, either by punishing or being 
open about their violations, remained among the cornerstones of the peacebuilding 
efforts. The third, and current, stage places even more importance on human rights by 
making them a key tenet of the liberal peacebuilding recipe, which is being 
implemented, since the mid-1990s, by international and domestic peacebuilders 
around the world.12  
 
Liberal peacebuilding is based on the premise that peace in ethnically divided, post-
conflict societies can only be built and maintained in the context of democratic and 
free market societies. The expectation is that on the one hand, the competition that 
democracy and free markets entail can help channel ethnic conflicts and express them 
in non-violent ways.13 On the other, the vested interests that will stem from a 
democratic and prosperous society will eventually make war a less attractive choice. 
Whether these arguments are theoretically persuasive or empirically correct has 
attracted little attention;14 rather, the peacebuilders’ faith in political and economic 
                                               
10 Robert Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd edn.; 
Cambridge: CUP, 2012) at 109-19. 
11 Ruti G. Teitel, 'Transitional Justice Genealogy', Harvard Human Rights Journal, 16 (2003), 69. 
12 Oliver Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). 
13 UN Secretary-General, 'An Agenda for Democratization', (New York: United Nations, 1996) at [17] 
and [64]. 
14 The democratic peace thesis has been discussed extensively in inter-state conflicts, but the extent to 
which it applies within ethnically divided, post-conflict states remains uncertain. (Steve Chan, 'In 
  15 
liberalism has been the natural consequence of the outcome of the Cold War and the 
prevalence of Western values. Yet, this lack of a proper debate about the tenets of 
liberal peacebuilding has not stopped confident pronouncements that ‘there is an 
obvious connection between democratic practices […] and the achievement of true 
peace’15 or that ‘the key root cause of conflict is the failure of economic 
development’.16 It is in this context that the expectation about the peacebuilding 
potential of human rights has taken root and flourished: since the very existence of 
democracy and free markets is based on human rights – the rights to vote and property 
in particular – their protection becomes an important ingredient of the liberal 
peacebuilding recipe itself.  
 
The assumption in favour of the peacebuilding effects of human rights has been 
repeated time and again by academics and UN policy makers alike. For instance, the 
UN report An Agenda for Peace has recognised that ‘human rights monitors, electoral 
officials, refugee and humanitarian aid specialists’, in other words those professionals 
that are most directly concerned with the implementation of human rights, play a 
central role in peacebuilding operations.17 Similarly, the UN High-level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change has expressed its support for the integration of 
human rights throughout the work of the UN and the development of strong domestic 
human rights institutions, especially in countries emerging from conflict.18 Finally, 
the opening line of UN General Assembly Resolution 52/13 states that ‘the promotion 
of a culture of peace [is] based on the principles established in the Charter of the 
United Nations and on respect for human rights’.19 Echoing policy makers, academics 
have also endorsed the view that human rights are essential peacebuilding tools. For 
example, Bell concludes her detailed analysis of four peace agreements by stating that 
‘[t]he strength of the human rights protections and the unitary state are integrally 
                                                                                                                                      
Search for Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise', Mershon International Studies Review, 41 
(1997), 59.) 
15 UN Secretary-General, 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
Keeping: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting 
of the Security Council on 31 January 1992', (New York: United Nations, 1992) at [59]. 
16 Paul Collier and et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington: 
World Bank and OUP, 2003) at 53. 
17 UN Secretary-General, 'An Agenda for Peace' at [52]. 
18 High-Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, 'A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility', (New York: United Nations, 2004) at [284]. 
19 United Nations General Assembly Resolution (UNGAR) 52/13 (15 January 1998). 
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linked – they thrive or fail together’,20 while Barash and Webel,21 Little22 and 
Reychler23 all include human rights protections among their recommended 
peacebuilding tools.  
 
Moreover, the enthusiastic acceptance of human rights in policy reports and academic 
writings has influenced peacebuilding practices in ethnically divided, post-conflict 
societies themselves. Human rights protection mechanisms have been aptly described 
as ‘the universally recognised chic language in which to write peace agreements’ and 
they remain central to peacebuilding activities, even after negotiations have been 
concluded.24 Illustrative of this is the fact that the post-conflict Constitution of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina makes the country a member to 16 international human rights 
agreements.25 Also, the South African Constitution, which ended apartheid, contains 
one of the most robust Bills of Rights, with civil, political, economic, social, cultural 
and group protections.26 Finally, the Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement often 
refers to human rights, precisely because any impasse during the negotiations was 
overcome by resorting to the accepted standards of international law.27 Reflecting a 
more global tendency, the UN Peacebuilding Commission has so far spent 
approximately $70 million of its meagre budget on ‘projects that bolster good 
governance and promote national dialogue and reconciliation, including projects that 
promote human rights’.28  
 
These expectations about the peacebuilding potential of human rights can be justified 
in two ways. The first is based on the idea that the failure to protect human rights is 
likely to result in an eruption of violence. This justification is mentioned in the 
preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which considers them as 
                                               
20 Christine Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2000) at 294. 
21 David P. Barash and Charles P. Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies (2nd edn.; California: SAGE 
Publications, 2009). 
22 David Little, 'Peace, Justice and Religion', in Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller (eds.), What Is Just 
Peace? (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 149. 
23 Luc Reychler, Democratic Peace-Building and Conflict Prevention: The Devil Is in the Transition 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999). 
24 Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights at 298. 
25 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4 of the General Framework Agreement signed on 
14 December 1995 (henceforth, BiH Constitution), Annex I. 
26 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [No. 108 of 1996] (henceforth, SA Constitution), 
Sections 7-39. 
27 The Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, signed 
on 10 April 1998; Bell, Peace Agreements and Human Rights at 173. 
28 United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, http://www.unpbf.org/what-we-fund/ [accessed 6 June 2014]. 
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necessary for the prevention of the rebellion against tyranny, and in the Brahimi 
Report and An Agenda for Peace, which argue for the protection of minority rights as 
an effective conflict prevention method.29 Nevertheless, this argument is usually 
based on intuition rather than robust empirical evidence. There is, at most, some 
evidence that violations of civil and political rights, or of economic rights coupled 
with discrimination, are among the factors that can promote violence; uprisings are 
not necessary and unavoidable consequences of all human rights violations.30 
Moreover, even in cases where violence does erupt, it does not follow that human 
rights protections can stop the fighting after it has already broken out, which is what 
peacebuilding is concerned with. And even if it did, stopping violence is not 
synonymous with building peace; rather, a secure environment is just the first step of 
the overall objective. However, if peace requires something more than the absence of 
violence, it is not clear what that is and whether human rights can indeed contribute to 
its promotion.  
 
This leads to the second justification for their protection, namely, that if human rights 
violations caused the eruption of violence, safeguarding those rights can undo that and 
build peace. Thus, an Agenda for Peace states that ‘the sources of war are pervasive 
and deep’ and that in order to undo them, we must enhance our respect for human 
rights.31 However, one does not necessarily follow from the other. Large-scale human 
rights violations can cause deep personal, psychological, cultural, social, economic 
and political rifts. Protecting human rights might successfully address some of these 
problems, but not all. Yet, the Agenda does not provide any further explanation as to 
which of these problems can be resolved through human rights protections, how or 
why. It also remains unclear whether other peacebuilding tools that can deal with 
these additional problems should supplement human rights and what these are. Thus, 
neither of the two arguments provide clear reasons for the expected peacebuilding 
potential of human rights. In turn, the lack of a well-developed justification clouds the 
relationship between the two concepts. It is this gap in the literature, which directly 
affects peacebuilding practices on the ground that this thesis aims to fill.  
                                               
29 Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations', (New York: United Nations, 2000) (henceforth, ‘Brahimi Report’) at [29]; UN Secretary-
General, 'An Agenda for Peace' at [18]. 
30 Oskar N. Thoms and James Ron, 'Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict?', Human 
Rights Quarterly, 29 (2007), 674. 
31 UN Secretary-General, 'An Agenda for Peace' at [5]. 
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4. The methodology 
 
When examining the relationship between human rights and peace, I made a series of 
choices that have undoubtedly affected my conclusions and are therefore in need of an 
explanation. First, stemming from my belief that theory influences practice and vice-
versa, I decided to focus on both: simply analysing academic writings and UN reports 
would be an artificial exercise of little value, while only paying attention to the 
peacebuilding operations themselves could result in rather superficial findings. 
Second, I opted to examine two human rights – the rights to vote and property – rather 
than undertake a more general analysis of human rights as a whole. Most of my 
conclusions can be generalised, but a more detailed examination of the effects of 
other rights, such as freedom from discrimination, in ethnically divided societies 
would be valuable. Third, the term ‘peacebuilding’ has been used after occurrences of 
both inter and intra-state violence, and since the two give rise to varying challenges, I 
only concentrated on the latter; moreover, I became particularly interested in those 
countries where the intra-state violence erupted because of ethnic divisions. Finally, 
wishing to avoid context-specific conclusions, I opted for a comparative approach and 
focused on three – rather different – case studies: Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH); 
South Africa (SA); and Cyprus. This section elaborates on the thought process behind 
each of those choices.  
 
My first methodological choice concerns the decision to approach the question both 
from a theoretical and a practical point of view. A theoretical analysis of the key 
terms is essential because the precise meaning of ‘peace’ and ‘human rights’ must be 
clear before the relationship between them can be established. This is particularly 
important in relation to the definition of peace since it allows us to determine from the 
beginning, and independently of any practical limitations that may exist on the 
ground, what it is that ethnically divided, post-conflict societies should ideally be 
striving towards. Moreover, a theoretical analysis of the relationship is valuable 
because clarifying the nature and characteristics of the two terms, allows one to make 
room for the possibility that there are inherent reasons for the limited peacebuilding 
potential of human rights. However, merely looking at how the two terms connect in 
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theory is inadequate because this only sheds light on one side of the relationship. If 
one is to also identify practical explanations for any disappointing outcomes that 
might exist, it is necessary to rely on observations of peacebuilding operations on the 
ground as well.  
 
Thus, it is argued in Chapter 7 that one of the limitations of human rights is that they 
can induce legal and institutional amendments, but not the political or socio-economic 
changes that are also necessary for peace. The immediate response to this conclusion 
is that this is only a limitation of the peacebuilding potential of human rights, if 
peacebuilders are in fact expecting such changes to stem from their protection. The 
theoretical literature provides some evidence of such expectations,32 but the most 
persuasive proof arises from the fact that, in practice, peacebuilders have regularly 
failed to supplement human rights with other mechanisms that could induce such 
political or socio-economic changes.33 This suggests that peacebuilders on the ground 
perceive human rights to be, not only necessary tools for the building of peace, but 
also often sufficient ones. It is this latter expectation, which is almost always absent 
from policy reports, yet prevalent in ethnically divided, post-conflict societies 
themselves, that I seek to challenge in this thesis.  
 
My second methodological choice relates to my decision to focus on only two rights, 
namely, the right to property and the right to vote. On the one hand, if the objective of 
this thesis is to examine the relationship between peace and human rights in general, 
this might be criticised as being an unduly constraining choice of lens. On the other, 
the term ‘human rights’ has been used to describe so many different goods that we 
value in our societies that an analysis that sought to draw any robust conclusions 
would have to restrict the meaning of the term in some way. It would be both 
impossible and unhelpful to reach any conclusions about the relationship in question 
if by ‘human rights’ I meant something broad, unclear and contested. It is partly 
because of this consideration that I chose to not focus on the protection of socio-
                                               
32 For example, when Parlevliet argues that in order to build peace, it is necessary to ‘entrench respect 
for human rights in state institutions and the societal infrastructure’. (Michelle Parlevliet, 'Bridging the 
Divide: Exploring the Relationship between Human Rights and Conflict Management' at 12.) 
33 Detailed evidence of this, both in relation to the right to vote and the right to property, is provided in 
Chapter 7. 
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economic rights, such as the right to housing or education.34 An additional factor that 
influenced this decision is the fact that with the exception of SA, in very few, if any, 
ethnically-divided, post-conflict societies, have socio-economic rights resulted in 
significant case law. In any case, while I have only focused on two human rights, the 
rights to vote and property are connected to a range of political and socio-economic 
issues that peacebuilders in ethnically divided, post-conflict societies are likely to 
consider important. They are therefore likely to provide a representative sample of the 
types of contributions that human rights can make to the building of peace. 
 
In addition to the broad range of issues that they are concerned with, my choice to 
focus on the rights to property and vote was affected by several other considerations. 
On a superficial level, the two rights were preferred because BiH, SA and Cyprus 
have suffered or are suffering from serious forced displacement problems and 
political conflicts concerning their democratic structures. As a result, the two rights 
have been at the forefront of peacebuilding attempts and have generated case law in 
all three countries. The case law relates to a relatively narrow and specific range of 
problems, as opposed to other, much broader rights (such as freedom from 
discrimination), which are more difficult to compare. More significantly however, the 
two rights go to the heart of the liberal peacebuilding project that is under scrutiny 
here: they are directly connected and in fact essential to its two main pillars – 
democratisation and economic liberalisation. The right to vote is the cornerstone of 
democracy and no free market can operate properly without protecting the right to 
property. Illustrative of the former’s prominent role in peacebuilding operations is 
Alden’s observation that in the African context ‘the international community actively 
promoted electoral democracy as a panacea for everything from ethnic conflict to 
territorial disputes’.35 Thus, the choice of these rights allows me to not only examine 
                                               
34 There are, for instance, still disagreements as to whether socio-economic rights successfully address 
or merely sideline the needs of the victims. See, for instance, Marius Pieterse, 'Eating Socioeconomic 
Rights: The Usefulness of Rights Talk in Alleviating Social Hardship Revisited', Human Rights 
Quarterly, 29 (2007), 796. 
35 Chris Alden, Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State: From Negotiations to 
Nation Building (New York: Palgrave, 2001) at xvii. The same expectation was expressed in less 
absolute terms by the US Committee of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 
BiH, when it noted that ‘continuous elections, if held in as free and fair a manner as possible, have 
been viewed by the international community as a means to bring stability and recovery to a country 
divided by extreme nationalist political leaders’. (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(US), 'Elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina: September 12-13, 1998', (Washington: Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1998) at 1.) 
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their effects per se, but also observe how they relate to key peacebuilding objectives 
more generally. Finally, the two rights are not only of a particular interest to 
peacebuilders, but to the people on the ground as well. They acquire their elevated 
importance through their connection to power and legitimacy: property rights afford 
economic advantages to their right holders, while the right to vote is accompanied by 
a sense of political power and equality since it quite literally implies that every citizen 
counts.  
 
My third methodological choice was to focus on the relationship between peace and 
human rights in a specific context, namely that of ethnically divided, post-conflict 
societies. An analysis of the relationship between peace and human rights can include 
a number of scenarios: it could, for instance, focus on the effect of human rights in 
regional peacebuilding attempts following inter-state conflict. An example of this 
could be an assessment of how human rights protections through the Council of 
Europe promoted peace between the European states after the Second World War. 
Alternatively, it could concentrate on the effects of human rights following the 
occurrence of violence within a state; in turn, this intra-state violence can be caused 
either by political conflicts (such as the Communist revolution in Russia in 1917) or 
ethnic ones (such as the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s). This thesis focuses on the latter 
category of peacebuilding operations – those taking place within ethnically divided, 
post-conflict states – for three reasons: first, intra-state ethnic conflicts are today the 
most common and destructive type of conflict.36 They result in the highest number of 
civilian victims and, due to the very close proximity between the combating parties, 
they cause the greatest levels of insecurity among the population. Second, ethnically 
divided, post-conflict societies pose unique challenges to peacebuilders because of the 
vicious circle they find themselves trapped in: the violent conflict intensifies the 
ethnic divisions that are undermining peace, while the ethnic divisions themselves 
make it more likely that the society will resort back to violence. Third, these are the 
types of societies – among them Burundi, Liberia, Timor Leste, Bosnia, Afghanistan 
and Iraq – that have attracted the attention of the international community and have 
                                               
36 According to Choudhry, there were 146 intra-state conflicts resulting in more than 20 million deaths 
between 1945 and 1999. By contrast, the count for inter-state conflicts is 25 and 3 million respectively. 
(Sujit Choudhry, 'After the Rights Revolution: Bills of Rights in the Post-Conflict State', Annual 
Review of Law and Social Science 6 (2010), 301 at 308.) 
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been subject to the liberal peacebuilding assumptions that I seek to explore in more 
detail. 
 
Opting to concentrate on ethnically divided societies makes it necessary to be clear 
about their characteristics and the way these affect relationships between people. 
‘Empirically, it is relatively easy to determine which conflict is an ethnic one: one 
knows them when one sees them.’37 They erupt in societies divided by religion, 
language, culture, history or race. The ethnic groups within them are politically 
organised and have certain demands, usually relating to non-discrimination or greater 
recognition of their differences. These groups deem such demands to be necessary 
because they perceive their identities to be distinct and in many cases diametrically 
opposed to each other.38 This is what Miller calls ‘rival nationalities’: the groups see 
themselves as having an antagonistic relationship, partly because they define their 
identity as that which the other is not.39 Of course, not every ethnically divided 
society manifests its divisions violently; examples from Spain/Catalonia and 
Canada/Quebec testify to this. However, where violence does erupt, ethnicity 
becomes the most dominant characteristic of a person’s identity, ethnic groups tend to 
act cohesively on almost all political issues and, as a result, at least shortly after the 
war, the conflicts that arise between them are usually zero-sum in nature. Finally, 
since political threats are not easily distinguished from personal ones, ethnic 
characteristics in such societies determine not only who people vote for, but also who 
they socialise with and marry, who they work with or employ and ultimately, who 
they are afraid of and distrust. 
  
The most effective way of observing different ethnically divided, post-conflict 
societies is to compare them. Yet, very few comparisons of their laws and 
                                               
37 Stephan Wolff, 'Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts', in Ulrich Schneckener and Stephan Wolff 
(eds.), Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts: Pespectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, 
Africa and Asia (London: Hurst & Co Publishers, 2004), 1 at 1. 
38 Margaret Moore, 'Globalization, Cosmopolitanism and Minority Nationalism', in Michael Keating 
and John McGarry (eds.), Minority Nationalism and the Changing International Order (Oxford: OUP, 
2001), 44. 
39 David Miller, 'Nationality in Divided Societies', in Alain G. Gagnon and James Tully (eds.), 
Multinational Democracies (Cambridge: CUP, 2001), 299 at 303. 
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constitutions have actually been attempted.40 Instead, most comparisons of such case 
studies have stayed within the exclusive ambit of political science, and while these are 
useful in their own right, they are ill-suited to deal with any legal questions that might 
arise.41 This gap in the literature is both surprising and disappointing because different 
ethnically divided, post-conflict societies have in fact adopted similar constitutional 
provisions in order to deal with their shared problems. For instance, the Annan Plan, a 
peace agreement that was put to a referendum in Cyprus in 2004,42 is strikingly 
similar to the Dayton Agreement,43 the settlement that ended the Bosnian war in 
1995.44 Moreover, the lack of legal comparison among different ethnically divided 
societies is even more unexpected because it is incompatible with the general trend 
among lawyers to compare constitutions when addressing other questions, such as 
how a Bill of Rights is to be drafted.45 Thus, a comparative methodology is also in 
line with the practice of ‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ that already exists in 
contexts other than those of ethnically divided, post-conflict societies.46 As Harding 
and Leyland put it, ‘[t]he comparative dimension is now so ingrained that it is hard to 
imagine any constitution-building effort without it.’47 Finally, comparisons are 
valuable since confirmation of the conclusions from one case study by those of 
another makes them not only relevant to the country in question, but also more easy to 
generalise, broadly relevant and persuasive.  
 
My decision to follow a comparative approach resulted in the choice of three case 
studies: Bosnia-Herzegovina, South Africa and Cyprus.48 All three are ethnically 
                                               
40 Rare examples of this include Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (Oxford: 
OUP, 2004) and Yash Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-
Ethnic States (Cambridge: CUP, 2000). 
41 See for example, Sumantra Bose, Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus and 
Sri Lanka (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2007) and Donald Horowitz, Ethic Groups in 
Conflict (2nd edn.; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). 
42 The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, finalised on 31 March 2004 and put to a 
referendum on 24 April 2004. 
43 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed on 14 December 
1995. 
44 Bose, Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus and Sri Lanka at 100. 
45 Choudhry, 'After the Rights Revolution: Bills of Rights in the Post-Conflict State'. 
46 Jeffrey Goldsworth (ed.), Interpreting Constitutions: A Comparative Study (Oxford: OUP, 2007) at 
3. 
47 Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland, 'Comparative Law in Constitutional Contexts', in Esin Örücü 
and David Nelken (eds.), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart 
Publishing, 2007), 313 at 327. 
48 Additional background information about the conflicts in the three case studies is available in the 
Appendix. 
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divided, post-conflict societies that have relied heavily on the protection of human 
rights in order to resolve differences within their population and build peace. 
Cypriots, Bosnians and South Africans have suffered from serious displacement 
problems and their response to these has been to focus on the protection of the right to 
property. Similarly, ethnic groups in the three countries have been divided by political 
conflicts concerning their preferred democratic structures and processes, which the 
right to vote has sought to address. Unlike other ethnically divided societies, such as 
Northern Ireland for example, the three case studies share the characteristic that they 
are also sovereign states. This is an important consideration since if the political 
actors fail to deal with the conflicts that divide the ethnic groups they represent, these 
might result in the paralysis of the state and even its dissolution.49 A final similarity 
between the case studies concerns the fact that their case law and relevant legal 
literature are largely available in English, thus ensuring that any comparative work 
will not suffer from linguistic limitations.50  
 
Despite these similarities, BiH, SA and Cyprus are also demographically and 
geographically very different. SA, with its population of 52 million, is several times 
bigger than BiH (4 million) and Cyprus (approximately 1.5 million). The relative 
sizes of the ethnic groups also vary: while they are roughly equal in BiH, the Greek 
Cypriots in Cyprus and the Africans in SA make up the big majorities of their 
countries’ populations. Furthermore, Cyprus and SA are further distinguished by the 
fact that their ethnic groups are also divided along socio-economic lines, while this is 
less of a problem in BiH whose socialist past left most Bosnians in a roughly equal 
economic position. These differences arguably make the comparison between the 
three case studies more fruitful since they provide an opportunity to observe how 
different conditions influence the effect of human rights on peace. For instance, they 
illustrate how huge socio-economic differences in SA or a very small population in 
                                               
49 See, for example, arguments from (usually Bosnian Serb politicians) that the cumbersome 
democratic process and the consequent inability of the Bosnian government to reach decisions 
efficiently should result in the dissolution of the state. (Elvira M. Jukic, 'Bosnian Serb Chief Says 
Country Should Split', Balkan Insight, 20 November 2013.) Similarly, it was the inability (or 
unwillingness) of the Cypriot politicians to use the political processes outlined in the 1960 Constitution 
of the Republic of Cyprus in order to manage their disagreements that resulted in the withdrawal of the 
Turkish Cypriot representatives from government in 1963 and seriously deteriorated inter-ethnic 
relations. (Michális Stavrou Michael, Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2009 at Chapter 1). 
50 This was the reason that other potential case studies, which also suffer from displacement problems 
and dilemmas concerning the political process, such as Israel/Palestine, were ultimately rejected.    
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Cyprus can affect the peacebuilding potential of human rights. Moreover, the 
diversity in the three case studies has resulted in human rights operating alongside 
different peacebuilding tools; examples of these include the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in SA and the use of international aid to incentivise political cooperation 
in BiH. The way such tools and methods supplement the peacebuilding potential of 
human rights is worth examining. 
 
The geographic differences between the three case studies also result in varying 
influences from different regional institutions: while Cyprus is a member of the EU 
and the Council of Europe, BiH is only a member of the latter, while SA is a member 
of neither. This difference has affected the level of international involvement in the 
peacebuilding process more generally: conversely to Cyprus and BiH where the 
international community is playing an active role in the peacebuilding process, the SA 
transition has remained a mostly domestically controlled enterprise. Even this 
difference however, is a matter of degree. Since local stakeholders have received 
financial aid from a number of foreign countries and organisations which adhere to 
the liberal peacebuilding agenda, SA has also been affected by international 
peacebuilders’ assumptions.51 As a result, the three case studies, with their varying 
levels of international involvement, provide evidence of the extent to which the 
international community, rather than domestic actors, has contributed to 
peacebuilding efforts.  
 
An additional difference between three case studies concerns the level of development 
of the peacebuilding process in each of them: while the Cyprus conflict is still at a 
pre-negotiation stage, peace agreements were concluded in BiH and SA more than 20 
years ago. The fact that the Bosnian and South African peace processes have been 
underway for a much longer period of time than the Cypriot one provides two 
additional insights to the analysis undertaken here. First, it makes it possible to 
examine the extent to which human rights have varying strengths and weaknesses 
during different stages of the peacebuilding process. Indeed, as it will be argued in 
Chapter 5, the legal protection of human rights can contribute more during the latter 
parts of the peacebuilding process when the most divisive conflicts will have already 
                                               
51 Julie Hearn, 'Foreign Aid, Democratisation and Civil Society in Africa: A Study of South Africa, 
Ghana and Uganda', Discussion Paper 368 (Institute of Development Studies, 1999). 
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been managed through political negotiations. The second advantage of examining 
peace processes at different stages of their development is that the experiences in BiH 
and SA can be used as lessons for how the peacebuilders in Cyprus should act and 
what they should seek to avoid.  
 
The definition of peace elaborated in Chapter 2 has also been relevant when choosing 
the three case studies because each has prioritised security, justice and reconciliation 
to a different degree. In Cyprus, the physical division between the two ethnic groups 
was originally justified – and is still perceived by some – as a way of promoting the 
physical security of the island’s inhabitants; considerably less attention has been paid 
to efforts to promote justice and reconciliation.52 Conversely, in BiH, the international 
community’s security and reconciliation concerns are being dwarfed in comparison to 
the attention received by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, which is intended to promote justice in the area.53 Finally, as the 
existence of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission suggests, the greatest emphasis 
in SA, both on the rhetorical and practical level has been paid to reconciliation, with 
security and justice considerations falling further behind.54 
 
The varying emphasis on security, justice and reconciliation in the three case studies 
is noteworthy because it provides insights about the relationship of each with the 
more general objective of peace. In particular, it answers questions as to whether 
protecting only one of the elements is a good peacebuilding strategy and discusses the 
long-term effects of this in the ethnically divided, post-conflict societies themselves. 
Moreover, the fact that all three countries have protected human rights, while 
simultaneously having different primary considerations (security in Cyprus, justice in 
BiH and reconciliation in SA) allows us to draw conclusions about the relationship 
                                               
52 Referring to the disproportionate attention paid to the element of security, the UN Secretary-General 
aptly described the Cyprus conundrum in the following terms: ‘Each side felt vulnerable to a larger 
potential enemy – the Greek Cypriots feared the Turkish Goliath, the Turkish Cypriots feared the 
Greek Cypriot Goliath.’ (UN Secretary-General, 'Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of 
Good Offices in Cyprus', (1 April 2003) at [20]. 
53 Between 1993 and 2009, the official budget of the Tribunal amounted to $1.585.490.022. (Robert 
Cryer et al., An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd edn.; Cambridge: CUP, 
2012) at 135). 
54 The Act that created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is based on the premise that ‘the 
pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and peace require reconciliation 
between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of society’. (Promotion of National Security 
and Reconciliation Act [No. 34 of 1995].) Considerations of security and justice in the aftermath of 
apartheid have not received as much attention from the legislature.  
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between human rights and each of the three elements. These conclusions, which are 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, confirm that while security and justice can be 
promoted by human rights, they can also be undermined by them. At the same time, 
all three elements, and in particular reconciliation, are often promoted most 
effectively through peacebuilding tools that are not connected to human rights at all, 
thus pointing to the possible danger of rights over-reliance.  
 
5. The structure 
 
The thesis is divided between a theoretical and a practical analysis of the relationship 
between human rights and peace. Part 1, the theoretical section, defines the two key 
concepts and, bearing in mind the characteristics of each, concludes that we must 
adopt a more nuanced understanding of how they connect than the international 
community has done so far. In addition to the expected positive contributions that 
human rights can make, it should also be acknowledged that they are often not 
connected to peacebuilding attempts at all and that their protection can sometimes 
even have negative consequences. This conclusion is confirmed and its importance 
highlighted in Part 2, the practical section of the thesis, which examines the extent to 
which human rights have contributed to the building of peace in ethnically divided, 
post-conflict societies themselves. 
 
Chapter 2, which defines peace, argues that it is made up of three elements: security, 
justice and reconciliation. Security exists when the conditions on the ground prevent a 
sense of fear from war, internal conflict or serious crime. Justice demands that the 
injustices of the war are remedied and that they are prevented from being repeated in 
the future. Finally, reconciliation focuses on the creation of meaningful relationships 
of cooperation – on the personal and political levels – between former enemy parties. 
The three elements can promote each other, but they can also contradict, thus making 
it necessary to strike a balance between them. The longer they are present and 
balanced against each other in a given ethnically divided, post-conflict society, the 
more peaceful that society becomes. Chapter 3 defines human rights as legal 
mechanisms that protect fundamental interests, either on the domestic or the 
international level. This definition is quite narrow in that it excludes moral 
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conceptions of human rights and the contributions they can make to peacebuilding by 
incorporating them, for example, in school curriculums. It is nevertheless compatible 
with the existing policy decisions of peacebuilders themselves, since it is legal rights, 
rather than their moral counterparts that they seem to be focusing on in practice.  
 
Chapter 4 brings these two definitions together and examines the way in which human 
rights relate to peace. It argues that each of the elements of peace has a unique 
relationship with and is promoted in different ways and to varying extents by human 
rights. In particular, security and justice are positively connected to them since human 
rights protection ensures that the injustices and atrocities of the past will be punished 
and not be repeated again in the future. At the same time however, there is also a 
negative relationship at play since the protection of human rights might inadvertently 
compromise efforts to promote one of the elements of peace, or even explicitly 
require its limitation. Finally, all three elements, and in particular reconciliation, often 
make broader demands than what human rights can deliver, thus resulting in a 
situation where their protection, while valuable in itself, becomes an insufficient 
peacebuilding tool. Alluding to the practical significance of the question posed in this 
thesis, the chapter concludes by drawing the first conclusions about the use of human 
rights as part of the liberal peacebuilding strategy. In particular, it points to the need 
to adopt context-specific peacebuilding tools and strategies that supplement human 
rights by focusing on the people themselves, rather than just on the country’s laws and 
institutions.  
 
Part 2 of the thesis examines the relationship between human rights and peace on the 
ground by focusing on the peacebuilding operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cyprus and South Africa. It starts from the premise that what makes balancing the 
three elements against each other difficult is the existence of fundamental, zero-sum 
conflicts between the previously warring parties. Such conflicts, an example of which 
is whether the state should protect people as members of ethnic groups or as 
individual citizens, are not susceptible to compromise. Consequently, tensions on how 
they should be managed can undermine feelings of justice and reconciliation among 
the population, and in worst case scenarios even have detrimental consequences for 
security. While it is impossible, and indeed undesirable, to eliminate all conflicts, 
these detrimental consequences for peace make it necessary to transform such zero-
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sum disagreements into simpler, more practical ones. Conflicts that fall within this 
second category are more manageable, less disruptive to ethnic relations and more 
likely to result in a better balance between the three elements. Thus, the effectiveness 
of human rights in terms of building peace depends on the extent to which they can 
contribute to the transformation of one type of conflict to the other. It is in this light 
that the practical chapters discuss the strengths and weaknesses of human rights as 
peacebuilding tools in ethnically divided, post-conflict societies. 
 
Chapter 5, which is concerned with adjudication of human rights, argues that they can 
successfully manage small-scale practical disagreements between the ethnic groups, 
but that the judiciary is ill-suited as an institution to deal with the fundamental, zero-
sum conflicts that divide the society. Yet, it is these big questions, which human 
rights fail to address, that are undermining security, justice and reconciliation the 
most. It thus becomes necessary to strengthen the protection of human rights in 
relation to certain conflicts and, recognising their limitations, use alternative 
peacebuilding tools in order to manage the rest. Following this and focusing on post-
adjudication challenges, Chapter 6 argues that even in cases where human rights can 
manage the conflict in question, the judicial decision might not be implemented in 
practice. It is moreover, possible that a judgment that has been enforced will fail to 
have the desired peacebuilding effects because the resulting change in the law might 
protect the interests of the individual applicant, but have no, or even negative, effects 
on the society as a whole. Whether a human rights decision will be implemented and 
if the resulting legal and institutional amendments will positively contribute to peace, 
mostly depends on the existence of political willingness to move in that direction. 
Acknowledging that nothing can really make up for the absence of a peace-friendly 
political elite, the chapter suggests ways to work around the problem. 
 
Chapter 7 focuses on the final limitation of human rights, namely their inability to 
address what lies beneath the conflict. It argues that even where the conflict in 
question can be managed by adjudicating human rights and even if the Court’s 
decision has been implemented successfully, this is only likely to result in legal and 
institutional amendments. Such a step is crucial but insufficient because the law 
cannot induce political, socio-economic and psychological changes that must also 
take place in order for peace to be built. It thus becomes necessary to insist on the 
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protection of human rights, but not do it to the detriment of other peacebuilding tools 
that must also be adopted. This analysis perhaps points to the gravest danger of 
human rights: the fact that in practice they have tended to monopolise attention and 
resources to the detriment of other tools that could have also contributed to 
peacebuilding efforts. In turn, this has resulted in a perverted type of peace, one that 
looks much more attractive to the outsider observers than to the people living in the 
ethnically divided, post-conflict society itself. If this is to be avoided, we must adopt a 
more nuanced understanding of the relationship between human rights and peace and, 
in doing that, replace the liberal peacebuilding approach with one that is concerned 
with political, socio-economic and psychological changes, in addition to legislative 
ones.  
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PART 1: The theoretical relationship between human rights and 
peace 




Since the general purpose of this thesis is to examine the relationship between peace 
and the protection of human rights, the first necessary step is to settle on a definition 
of the two main concepts in question. The first one, focused on in this chapter, is 
peace. Peace is understood here in a very specific way; the definition is not concerned 
with issues such as global or inter-state peace or with finding peace within an 
individual’s personal domain. Rather, it focuses on peace within post-conflict, 
ethnically divided states. It is necessary to engage in a peace-defining exercise, not 
only because of the absence of a single accepted definition, but also due to the lack of 
a debate on the matter. Peace, it seems, is a ‘you know it when you see it’ type of 
concept. However, this lack of clarity about the term is problematic because it leaves 
unanswered questions, such as what peacebuilders are striving towards, whether they 
have achieved it and, if not, what kind of additional steps should be taken. These 
dangers are elaborated in more detail in Section 2. 
 
The most sophisticated theoretical attempt to define peace so far has been made by 
Johan Galtung who developed the ideas of positive and negative peace.55 As it is 
argued in Section 3, his suggested definition is initially appealing, but its broad and 
all-inclusive nature, ultimately makes it unworkable. Conversely, practical 
understandings of the definition of peace are guided by a belief that it can be built by 
adopting liberal institutions and practices, such as free and fair elections, a free 
market and an independent judiciary. Definitions deriving from this practical 
perspective are, however, also unsatisfactory, since they seem to be guided by nothing 
more theoretically robust than the urge to reproduce the trappings of already 
                                               
55 Johan Galtung, 'An Editorial', Journal of Peace Research, 1/1 (1964), 1. 
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developed and liberal societies. A combination of these two approaches results in a 
growing confidence among peacebuilders that their methods can produce the desired 
result, while the content of this desired result becomes ever broader and more vague. 
It is with this context in mind that the exercise of providing a definition for peace in 
ethnically divided societies acquires its stated urgency.  
 
The definition of peace suggested here seeks to address these problems and consists 
of three elements. The first element, security, exists when the conditions on the 
ground prevent a sense of fear from war, internal conflict or serious crime. The 
second, justice, demands that the injustices of the war are remedied and that they are 
prevented from being repeated in the future, while the final element, reconciliation, 
requires the creation of meaningful relationships of cooperation – on the personal and 
political levels – between former enemy parties. This definition of peace, which is 
discussed in detail in Section 4, looks at the concept both from the theoretical and the 
practical perspectives. On the one hand, it is theoretically sound because it offers 
arguments in favour of the different elements of peace rather than merely assumes 
their desirability. Moreover, it elaborates on the inter-relationship of these three 
elements: striking a balance between them is necessary, because in addition to 
promoting, they can also contradict with each other. On the other hand, the proposed 
definition draws from practice in that it is achievable and not all encompassing; it 
creates clear objectives that ethnically divided societies should be working towards 
and lays the foundations to explaining how different peacebuilding tools can 
contribute to their achievement. 
 
2. The limited definitional debate on the concept of peace 
 
The definition of peace can be approached from two directions: either from an 
abstract point of view which outlines the theoretical qualities of peace, or from a more 
practical one which examines different peacebuilding methods intended to create a 
peaceful society. Since this thesis aims to examine the relationship between peace and 
human rights in theory and practice, a combined theoretical and practical approach is 
needed to find an appropriate definition of peace. From the abstract point of view 
there have been very few contributions as to what we mean by the term. Most of the 
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literature is concerned with how to make peace technically possible rather than with 
the logically prior question of what do we mean by peace in the first place.56 Strazzari 
recognises this problem when he points out that the concept of ‘sustainable peace’ 
‘remains significantly under-theorized: few if any explicit attempts to conceptually 
discuss it have been recorded.’57 Similarly, Richmond expresses concern about ‘the 
fact that there is almost no debate upon peace, its nature, and achievement, other than 
in the indirect way that would emerge from any discussion about the ending of 
conflict’.58  
  
The limited theoretical analysis that does exist tends to contrast the Latin word for 
peace, ‘pax’, which is understood as the absence of war, with more holistic concepts 
such as the Greek ‘eirine’, the Arabic ‘salaam’ and the Hebrew ‘shalom’ which have 
connotations of well-being, wholeness and harmony.59 Both of these approaches are 
unhelpful. On the one hand, simply equating peace with the absence of war misses the 
positive characteristics of the concept and ignores any further action that has to be 
taken after the signing of the ceasefire agreement. To quote a seminal UN report, the 
absence of war ‘can only create a space in which peace can be built’ and is therefore 
insufficient on its own.60 On the other, the more inclusive concepts of peace, which 
have in the last years replaced those that only focus on the absence of war, quickly 
develop into a description of everything that is good. A typical example of this is 
Webel’s definition of peace as ‘both a means of personal and collective ethical 
transformation and an inspiration to cleanse the planet of human-inflicted 
                                               
56 For example, in Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) at 18, peace is defined as a situation in which ‘a single 
sovereignty, a Hobbesian Leviathan, has been re-established and exercises a legitimate monopoly of 
violence’ and at the same time there is at least ‘a minimal degree of political assent and participation’, 
but the definition of the term is not discussed further. Additionally, Mats Berdal, Building Peace after 
War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009) at 17-20 offers a definition of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ and 
discusses how best to deal with related issues such as disarmament and governmental legitimacy, but 
does not explain how we will know that peace has actually been built. Finally, Daniel Philpott and 
Gerard F. Powers (eds.), Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World (Oxford: OUP, 
2010) at 6-9 propose a ‘strategic peacebuilding’ approach which integrates a number of diverse actors 
and activities. The authors discuss in detail whether the UN peace operations can be considered 
‘successful’, yet offer no definition of that success. 
57 Francesco Strazzari, 'Between ‘Messy Aftermath’ and ‘Frozen Conflicts’: Chimeras and Realities of 
Sustainable Peace', Human Security Perspectives, 2 (2008), 45 at 51. 
58 Oliver Richmond, The Transformation of Peace (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) at 120. 
59 For a discussion of the differences between these concepts, see David P. Barash and Charles P. 
Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies (2nd edn.; California: SAGE Publications, 2009). 
60 Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations', (New York: United Nations, 2000) at [3]. (Henceforth, ‘Brahimi Report’.) 
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destruction.’61 However, the broad and idealistic nature of these definitions makes 
them unhelpful for the purposes of this thesis, which not only focuses on peace in 
theory, but also in practice. In any case, a wide-ranging definition is problematic even 
if one is solely concerned with a theoretical definition of peace since such broad 
objectives tend to mean both everything and nothing. Finally, Webel’s assertion that 
peace can only exist if human-inflicted destruction has been eradicated makes his 
definition a peculiar bedfellow of human rights, which seek to regulate rather than 
obliterate violence per se.62  
  
Of the few authors that have discussed the abstract concept of peace in more detail, 
Johan Galtung’s work on negative and positive peace stands out. Even though for 
reasons that are discussed in the next section this initially promising definition of 
peace should be rejected, Galtung’s theoretical work has been invaluable in making 
the once controversial, but now widely accepted argument, that peace cannot simply 
mean the absence of war.63 Another useful contribution to the definition of peace 
from a theoretical perspective comes from Pierre Allan, who ranks different types of 
peace and war along a happiness continuum, with 1 being ‘absolute hell’ and 10 being 
‘agape-paradise’.64 Although Allan’s work is less useful in terms of elucidating the 
content of peace, it is important because it persuasively illustrates that peace is a 
matter of degree and not an either/or value. Nevertheless, with the exception of these 
two contributions, the literature remains largely silent about the theoretical definition 
of the term. 
 
Similarly, despite the obvious interest peacebuilders should have in defining peace in 
practical terms, the issue is often left unaddressed, most likely because it is considered 
as self-explanatory. Typically, the literature engages with the concept only indirectly 
                                               
61 Charles Webel, 'Introduction: Toward a Philosophy and Metapsychology of Peace', in Charles Webel 
and Johan Galtung (eds.), The Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 3. 
62 Take for example Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), which does not 
consider death arising from the use ‘absolutely necessary’ force as being in violation of the right to life. 
63 Contrast for example, the 1962 accepted definition of peace as a condition of ‘more or less lasting 
suspension of violent modes of rivalry between political units’ (Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A 
Study of International Relations (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962) at 151, emphasis in the original) 
with the current definition of peacebuilding as ‘building on those foundations [of peace] something that 
is more than just the absence of war.’ (Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 'Brahimi Report' at 
[13].) 
64 Allan, 'Measuring International Ethics: A Moral Scale of War, Peace, Justice and Global Care'. 
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by elaborating on peacebuilding methods that are expected to lead to peace. For 
example, starting from the premise that ‘[t]he concept of peace is easy to grasp’, An 
Agenda for Peace defines post-conflict peacebuilding as consisting of ‘comprehensive 
efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace’.65 
However, no explanation is forthcoming about why or how such support structures 
will consolidate peace or what is meant by the term in the first place. Examples of 
such structures listed in the report include repatriating refugees, monitoring elections, 
advancing efforts to protect human rights and reforming and strengthening 
governmental institutions.66 The long list of peacebuilding methods also generally 
includes disarmament,67 the building of memorialisation sites,68 Truth Commissions,69 
criminal trials70 and other ‘peace enhancing structures’,71 such as the creation of a 
social free market and an effective and legitimate restorative justice system. Thus, 
while a lot has been written on peacebuilding methods, there has been no debate as to 
what qualities peace consists of, leaving peacebuilders with ‘no clear idea of what 
“success” or “failure” actually mean’.72 Consequently, there is no analysis as to 
whether and how these peacebuilding methods actually connect and contribute to the 
intended peace outcome.  
 
Even though authors concerned with practical peacebuilding methods have not 
directly participated in the definitional debate, they clearly have an implied 
understanding of peace. Richmond traces the development of the international 
community’s efforts to promote peace over the years and concludes that decisions as 
                                               
65 UN Secretary-General, 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
Keeping: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting 
of the Security Council on 31 January 1992', (New York: United Nations, 1992) at [12] and [55] 
respectively. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Joanna Spear, 'Disarmament and Demobilisation', in Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothschild and 
Elizabeth Cousens (eds.), Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements (Boulder, 
London: Lynne Reinner, 2002), 141. 
68 Brandon Hamber, Liz Ševčenko, and Ereshnee Naidu, 'Utopian Dreams or Practical Possibilities? 
The Challenges of Evaluating the Impact of Memorialization in Societies in Transition', International 
Journal of Transitional Justice, 4/3 (2010), 397. 
69 Priscilla B. Hayner, Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth 
Commissions (London: Routledge, 2011). 
70 Diane F. Orentlicher, 'Setting Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
Regime', Yale Law Journal, 100 (1991), 2537. 
71 Luc  Reychler, 'From Conflict to Sustainable Peacebuilding: Concepts and Analytical Tools', in Luc 
Reychler and Thania Paffenholz (eds.), Peace-Building: A Field Guide (Boulder, London: Lynne 
Rienner, 2001), 12 at 13. 
72 Keith Krause and Oliver Jütersonke, 'Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict 
Environments', Security Dialogue, 36/4 (2005), 447 at 448. 
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to what peacebuilding methods should be used have been affected by an implied 
appreciation of the term.73 Early peacekeeping operations used to focus on keeping 
combatants separate rather than resolving their differences, because at the time, peace 
was understood as the absence of violence.74 Conversely, the current focus on 
institution building reflects a changing understanding of peace that is essentially 
liberal in character: it is an embodiment of the expectation that if the institutions that 
resemble a liberal state are there, then this will necessarily also result in the actual 
promotion of liberal values.75 However, conceptualising peace as consisting of 
institutions rather than values means that ‘the question of what peace might be 
expected to look like from the inside (from within the conflict environment) is given 
less credence than the way the agents of intervention desire to see it from the 
outside’.76 Therefore, an institutional definition of peace is inappropriate for the 
purposes of this thesis for two reasons: first, despite the fact that it is couched in 
liberal terms, it ignores the undoubtedly important social and human consequences of 
peacebuilding. Second, the definition’s strong emphasis on institutions, including 
those promoting the protection of human rights, is particularly problematic if the aim 
is to examine the relationship between peace and rights in the first place. 
 
It seems that over time, peace studies pull in two different directions: on the one hand, 
the underdeveloped abstract concept of peace becomes more idealistic and utopian.  
On the other, the peacebuilders’ confidence that their undefined and unarticulated 
peace is achievable as long as a liberal recipe is followed, is increasing. Ultimately, 
peace is an ‘essentially contested concept’, meaning that there are internally complex 
disagreements about some of its key aspects.77 The best one can do is to advocate a 
conception of peace and by defending it against rival conceptions, to advance the 
quality of argumentation about it. It is this absence of argumentation that is the source 
of a number of problems. First, the lack of well-articulated conceptions of peace has 
created a tendency to use an adjective to briefly describe each author’s perception of 
                                               
73 Richmond, The Transformation of Peace. 
74 Ibid., at 89-90. 
75 Roland Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: CUP, 2004). 
76 Oliver Richmond, 'The UN and Liberal Peacebuilding: Consensus and Challenges', in John Darby 
and Roger Mac Ginty (eds.), Contemporary Peacemaking (2nd edn.; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), 257 at 261 (emphasis in the original). 
77 Walter Bryce Gallie, 'Essentially Contested Concepts', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 56 
(1955-1956), 167-198. 
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peace. The literature now consists of references to stable,78 (self-) sustainable,79 just,80 
liberal,81 and real peace.82 This however, has not been coupled with an appreciation of 
how each adjective changes what is meant by peace: do, for example, the adjectives 
‘sustainable’ and ‘stable’ describe the same desirable characteristics of the concept in 
practice? This is a matter of practical importance since at different places in the UN 
Brahimi Report there are references to stable and to sustainable peace.83 Furthermore, 
it is unclear on a theoretical level whether these adjectives refer to different 
characteristics of the same conception of peace, or whether they signify the existence 
of different conceptions.  
  
The second danger created by the absence of proper argumentation about the 
definition of peace is that peacebuilding measures, such as human rights protection, 
could be promoting a different type of peace than the one peacebuilders are assuming 
they are working towards. Third, even if peacebuilding measures are contributing to 
the intended outcomes, if the ultimate objective is not well defined, then it is unclear 
whether it has in fact been achieved or whether further measures are needed for its 
completion. It therefore transpires that the lack of a proper definition of peace leaves 
the whole peacebuilding literature poorer and makes the objective of determining the 
relationship between it and human rights impossible. The following section examines 
the best-developed attempt to define peace in the literature and offers arguments to 
explain why, despite its promising starting point, it should be rejected. 
 
3. Galtung’s peace and the difficulties of applying it in practice 
 
The main thesis advocated by Johan Galtung is that peace cannot simply mean the 
absence of war (what he calls ‘negative peace’) because such a definition does not 
                                               
78 Kenneth Ewart Boulding, Stable Peace (Austin; London: University of Texas Press, 1978). 
79 Strazzari, 'Between ‘Messy Aftermath’ and ‘Frozen Conflicts’: Chimeras and Realities of 
Sustainable Peace'. 
80 Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller (eds.), What Is Just Peace? (Oxford: OUP, 2006). 
81 This is currently the most popular characterization of peace. Despite the fact that the UN does not 
explicitly characterise the peace it is working towards as ‘liberal’, this is suggested by the 
peacebuilding methods it has adopted since the end of the Cold War. (See, Paris, At War's End: 
Building Peace after Civil Conflict; Richmond, The Transformation of Peace; Philpott and Powers 
(eds.), Strategies of Peace: Transforming Conflict in a Violent World.). 
82 Richard Nixon, Real Peace (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983). 
83 Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 'Brahimi Report' at [87] and [22] respectively. 
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adequately capture the whole range of issues that peace studies should be concerned 
with.84 In addition, we should focus on ‘positive peace’, a concept that was developed 
over time to mean the building of positive relationships between previously warring 
parties. Thus, for Galtung, peace consists of both negative and positive peace. The 
fact that part of his theory rests on the elimination of violence makes it intuitively 
appealing since that is every peacebuilder’s primary goal. At the same time, its 
broader emphasis on positive relations adds sophistication, a characteristic that is 
missing from wholly negative accounts. Most scholars, accepting Galtung’s as the 
most authoritative account of peace, adopt it without much analysis or criticism, thus 
partly explaining the lack of a definitional debate on the concept.85 
  
Galtung defined peace as the absence of violence and argued that violence is present 
when an individual cannot achieve his full potential due to his surrounding 
conditions.86 The most obvious example of violence is physical, or ‘direct violence’, 
which is the intentional causing of harm from one person to the other. Clearly, if a 
person’s potential is to live approximately to the age of 80, but he is killed during a 
war when he is 25, his ‘potential realizations’ have been limited.87 Originally, Galtung 
argued that the absence of direct violence was negative peace, but that a complete 
theory of peace also required the absence of structural and cultural violence, what he 
called ‘positive peace’.88 Structural violence is caused indirectly if a person limits 
another’s potential simply by doing the job prescribed to him by an unfair structure. 
An example of such a structure was apartheid South Africa, where discrimination 
against blacks considerably reduced their potential to achieve what they wanted. The 
third type of violence, cultural violence, exists when people use their history, trauma 
and myths to excuse or justify direct or structural violence.89 A classic example of this 
is nationalistic propaganda portraying the ‘other’ as less than human. Such attitudes 
are violent both because they are harmful in themselves and because they excuse or 
justify the other two types of violence, thus making their occurrence even more likely. 
                                               
84 Galtung, 'An Editorial'. 
85 See for example, Barash and Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies (2nd ed.). Also see, Pierre Allan, 
'Measuring International Ethics: A Moral Scale of War, Peace, Justice and Global Care', in Pierre Allan 
and Alexis Keller (eds.), What Is Just Peace? (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 90. 
86 Johan Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research', Journal of Peace Research, 6/3 (1969), 167 at 
168. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid., at 183.  
89 Johan Galtung, 'Cultural Violence', Journal of Peace Research, 27/3 (1990), 291. 
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Through this expanded definition of violence, Galtung persuasively illustrated that 
peace was absent in societies, which were not suffering from considerable physical 
violence, yet were only superficially calm. 
 
The problem with defining positive peace as the absence of structural and cultural 
violence is that this is not really a positive conception of peace at all, but rather, a 
sophisticated account of negative peace. Thus, even though Galtung did not explicitly 
reject his previous definition of peace, he gradually came to view positive peace as 
the creation of direct peace, cultural peace and structural peace.90 Now, negative 
peace was the absence of all kinds of violence and positive peace consisted of these 
more positive values.91 Galtung contended that violence resulted from untransformed 
conflicts within a society: incompatible goals between groups can lead to them 
becoming blocked, which then results into frustration and polarisation between the 
parties.92 Unless that polarisation is dealt with, it leads to the dehumanisation of the 
other and eventually to violence. As soon as one type of violence erupts, the other two 
become even more likely, thus creating a vicious cycle of violence. In order for this to 
stop, it is both necessary to eliminate violence (negative peace) and to introduce 
positive values which will make society capable of transforming future conflicts and 
preventing violence (positive peace). 
 
Galtung’s theory is persuasive because it acknowledges that physical violence does 
not simply start without any underlying problems. This leads to the correct conclusion 
that merely stopping physical violence will be inadequate since if the underlying 
problems remain unaddressed, they will eventually resurface again. Ultimately 
however, Galtung’s theory should be rejected because its lack of clarity about a 
number of key assertions makes its practical application impossible. In particular, the 
conceptualisation of negative peace is problematic for two reasons: first, it is unclear 
                                               
90 The articles in which Galtung originally developed his theory were still cited in Johan Galtung, 
'Peace, Positive and Negative', in Daniel J. Christie (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Peace Psychology 
(Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 758. 
91 Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization 
(London: Sage, 1996) at 32. 
92 Johan Galtung, 'Introduction: Peace by Peaceful Conflict Transformation – the TRASCEND 
Approach', in Charles Webel and Johan Galtung (eds.), The Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 14. While Galtung’s final conclusions are ultimately 
rejected, his starting point – that peace is based on successful conflict management – is persuasive and 
is taken up again in Chapter 5, Section 2. 
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whether it requires the complete elimination or simply the reduction of violence; and 
second, determining whether structural violence exists is complicated by Galtung’s 
unsatisfactory definition of the term. Equally problematic is Galtung’s understanding 
of positive peace, which rests on a number of undefined values, which have not been 
sufficiently linked to peacebuilding measures on the ground. Finally, questions are 
raised as to whether the concepts of negative and positive peace are as distinct as 
Galtung asserts and whether anything is achieved by maintaining this distinction 
today. 
 
Galtung frequently refers to the ‘absence of violence’ as a necessary condition for 
negative peace, but it is unclear whether this requires the elimination or the reduction 
of violence.93 While in 1969 he urged readers to ‘imagine we were able to calculate 
the losses incurred by the two forms of violence […] if they could be eliminated’,94 in 
1985 he referred to peace as the ‘reduction of violence’.95 More recently, Galtung 
defined negative peace as consisting of ‘processes of violence reduction’,96 yet in the 
same text and almost immediately after, he concluded that ‘Negative peace is the 
absence of violence of all kinds.’97 On the one hand, the choice of the word ‘absence’ 
suggests that negative peace requires the complete elimination of violence, something 
supported by the fact that Galtung never describes or mentions a threshold under 
which violence has been adequately reduced to make the society a peaceful one. On 
the other, requiring the complete elimination of violence is impossible, since different 
types of violence can be reduced by using potentially conflicting methods. For 
instance, direct violence could potentially be eradicated by convicting someone of a 
crime without an opportunity to defend himself or obtaining evidence through torture. 
However, even if this reduced direct violence, it would have been achieved by 
increasing structural violence, thus undermining Galtung’s main thesis that peace 
should be achieved through peaceful means. The danger of this approach was 
acknowledged by Galtung himself. He pointed out that attempting to control violence 
                                               
93 Galtung, 'An Editorial' at 2; Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research' at 167, 168 and 172; 
Johan Galtung, 'Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research', Journal of Peace Research, 22/2 (1985), 141 at 
145. 
94 Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research' at 182 (emphasis in the original). The reference to 
‘two forms of violence’ is because he only introduced the concept of cultural violence later, in 1990. 
95 Galtung, 'Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research' at 151 (my emphasis).  
96 Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization at 30. 
97 Ibid., at 31 (emphasis in the original). 
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in this way could easily turn into a political disaster.98 Thus, despite some evidence to 
the contrary, when Galtung refers to the absence of violence, he arguably means 
reducing and keeping it under control rather than eliminating it completely. Yet, his 
theory offers no way of knowing when violence has been sufficiently reduced and 
peace has been built, thus making it difficult to apply in practice. 
 
The second problem with Galtung’s negative peace is that the definition of structural 
violence remains ambiguous. A situation is structurally violent if it reduces a person’s 
‘potential realizations’, yet it is unclear what that means exactly. Galtung argues that 
there are two types of potential realisations: somatic and mental realisations. 
Presumably, a person’s somatic realisations are undermined if he is physically 
detained, has to stay in bed due to an illness or does not have enough to eat. However, 
a person’s mental realisations are harder to define; Galtung states that in order for 
something to be considered a mental realisation, its value must be ‘fairly consensual’ 
and accepts that this test might be difficult to apply because of disagreements as to 
consensus.99 For example, even though the value of literacy is accepted as important 
almost everywhere, the value of being a Christian is not. However, it is not clear why 
the ‘fairly consensual’ test should play such an important role in determining what is 
a mental realisation. Imagine a society ruled by a dictator who does not allow any 
political dissent, but makes sure that his people live comfortably. Consequently, most 
of his subjects agree that they are willing to sacrifice their freedom of speech; there is 
in other words, a fairly consensual decision that freedom of speech is not valuable in 
their society. Is it the case then that this dictatorship is not structurally violent? 
 
The definition of positive peace is equally unclear since it consists of a number of 
positive values, which however remain undefined and without a clear link to the 
peacebuilding measures on the ground. Galtung argues that positive peace is achieved 
through ‘processes of life enhancement’100 and more specifically, a ‘culture of peace, 
confirming and stimulating an equitable economy and an equal polity.’101 However, it 
is unclear what each of these phrases means. Galtung simply states that the field of 
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99 Galtung, 'Violence, Peace and Peace Research' at 169. 
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‘equity of the economy’ is theoretically and practically very undeveloped, with the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights being a step towards 
its achievement. Alternatively, ‘equality of the polity’ is where democracy and human 
rights enter, not only within countries, but also among them.102 Yet, the broadness and 
vagueness of these definitions leave the reader wondering what exactly needs to be 
done in order to promote positive peace on the ground. Moreover, it is unclear how 
these positive values can be achieved and how they connect to peace exactly. For 
example, Galtung states that direct positive peace consists of ‘verbal and physical 
kindness’, the epitome of which is love, ‘a union of bodies, minds and spirits.’103 
However, arguably such feelings are impossible among strangers generally, let alone 
between enemy groups in post-conflict societies. Similarly, Galtung associates 
structural positive peace with values such as integration, solidarity and participation 
and cultural positive peace with democracy, human rights, peace education and peace 
journalism.104 Again though, he does not explain how these general principles can be 
promoted by peacebuilding measures on the ground and in what way exactly. It seems 
therefore that despite Galtung’s assertions that peace should ‘refer to something 
attainable and also in fact attained, not to something utopian’, his is mainly an 
idealistic account of peace, with little application in practice.105 
 
The broadness and lack of clarity of Galtung’s definitions raise questions as to where 
negative peace stops and positive peace begins – and, indeed, whether the distinction 
between the two is still helpful today. Galtung lists a number of necessary steps for 
the achievement of negative peace, including forging a dialogue in order for parties to 
bridge their legitimate goals and creating a peace structure consisting of equality, 
equity and reciprocity among people.106 He then contends that when such steps are 
taken, there will be negative peace, but positive peace will still be missing, thus 
raising questions about the peacebuilding measures he has in mind for each type of 
peace. Arguably, promoting equality or starting a dialogue between the parties are 
positive steps towards promoting peaceful relations among the ex-combatants, rather 
than simply ensuring the elimination of violence between them. In other words, it is 
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unclear why these methods are intended to achieve negative, but not positive peace 
and, indeed, why such a distinction is still valuable. A definition of peace that focuses 
on six objectives (the achievement of negative and positive peace with a direct, 
structural and cultural component for each) and which includes different methods for 
achieving each of them is unnecessarily complex. While a definition of peace should 
be theoretically coherent, its true value comes from its application on the ground, thus 
suggesting that Galtung’s unclear and vague definition should be rejected.  
 
4. Forging a new definition of peace 
 
Having rejected Galtung’s theory, this chapter offers an alternative definition of 
peace, consisting of security, justice and reconciliation, which is easier to apply in 
practice. These concepts will be discussed in detail in the three following sub-
sections, but a brief summary of each is necessary at this stage. Security exists when 
the conditions on the ground prevent a sense of fear from war, internal conflict or 
serious crime. Justice, the second element of peace, demands that the injustices of the 
war are remedied and that they are prevented from being repeated in the future. 
Finally, reconciliation requires the creation of meaningful relationships of cooperation 
– on the personal and political levels – between former enemy parties. The longer 
these elements exist together, the more peaceful the society becomes.  
 
The definition of peace consisting of these three elements has been derived from a 
careful examination of the theoretical literature and of the peacebuilding practice in 
ethnically divided, post-conflict societies. For example, the importance of security has 
been highlighted in the literature on disarmament107 and police reform108 and has also 
been acknowledged by Boulding who argues that ‘stable peace is a situation in which 
the probability of war is so small that it does not really enter the calculations of the 
people involved’.109 At the same time, its significance is illustrated in practice through 
the passing of international treaties, such as the Anti-Personnel Landmines 
Convention 1997 and the emphasis paid to security operations in various post-conflict 
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countries. For instance, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP), one of the longest-standing UN operations in the world, has been 
stationed in Cyprus since 1964 in order to preserve security and prevent further 
violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.110 
 
The second element of peace, justice, is also frequently mentioned as being key in the 
literature. For example, Allan argues that we should be working towards ‘Just Peace’, 
which he defines as ‘stable peace with justice’,111 and numerous authors have 
attempted to define what we mean by justice in post-conflict contexts.112 The 
justification behind such attempts has generally been that ‘the absence of justice is 
often the primary reason for the absence of peace’.113 In practice, the emphasis on 
justice has been reflected through the creation of the International Criminal Court and 
other special international criminal tribunals, the remedying of people displaced from 
their homes and the emphasis on reforming judicial systems. Finally, the third 
element of peace, reconciliation, is considered increasingly important and has resulted 
in a rich literature discussing how truth commissions114 and other reconciliation 
methods, such as peace education115 and peace journalism,116 can promote peace. The 
growing literature on reconciliation also includes discussions of related theoretical 
concepts, such as trust,117 forgiveness,118 empathy and the rehumanisation of the 
enemy.119 Examples of its practical importance in ethnically divided, post-conflict 
societies include the workings of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South 
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Africa and the adoption of inter-ethnic workshops and joint community projects in 
Bosnia and Cyprus. 
 
The elements’ importance is also confirmed when they are compared with Galtung’s 
three types of violence. Although the two definitions are different, there is a clear 
connection between the element of security and the absence of direct violence, the 
element of justice and the absence of structural violence and the element of 
reconciliation and the absence of cultural violence. These connections 
notwithstanding, the proposed definition’s main distinguishing feature from Galtung’s 
is that it leaves space for the positive qualities that a peaceful society must possess, 
while simultaneously remaining achievable. For example, security varies from the 
absence of direct violence because in order to be achieved, it requires additional steps, 
such as effective disarmament of ex-combatants and the proper training of the police. 
Similarly, justice is a different concept than the absence of structural violence because 
it also imposes positive, but realistic obligations on the state: remedying past 
injustices and ensuring that they are not repeated in the future. Finally, a divided 
society is not reconciled simply because negative feelings against other ethnic groups 
are not uttered out loud (the absence of cultural violence). Reconciliation, which 
involves building positive relationships between people, requires cooperation among 
parties, which does not naturally occur even when cultural violence is eliminated. 
Nevertheless, while the three elements are broader than negative peace, they also 
avoid the lack of clarity, broadness and utopian nature of Galtung’s positive peace. 
 
Attention has been paid to security, justice and reconciliation both in the literature and 
in practical peacebuilding mechanisms, but there has not been a concerted effort to 
examine how the three elements connect together to create peaceful societies. 
However, understanding one of the elements independently from the other two and 
discussing what peacebuilding mechanisms can promote each of them in isolation is 
unsatisfactory because it ignores key links between the elements themselves and 
between them and the ultimate aim of peace. Security, justice and reconciliation are 
distinct, and different methods and tools are available to peacebuilders for their 
achievement. Nonetheless, they are also connected in that the promotion of one could 
make the achievement of the others more likely. For example, as the situation in a 
post-conflict society becomes more secure, justice becomes easier to administer, since 
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cases can be decided on their merits, rather than the power of the parties. This was the 
case in Bosnia, where shortly after the war, the domestic judiciary was reluctant to 
find that the dominant ethnic group in each entity was still acting in a discriminatory 
manner against the members of the other two.120 Twenty years after the war, and with 
the possibility of returning back to violence being a distant one, judges have become 
more willing to decide cases neutrally.121 Similarly, justice and reconciliation are 
connected because remedying past injustices and ensuring that they will not be 
repeated in the future makes the climate for reconciliation more hospitable. Equally 
important is the positive relationship between security and reconciliation because only 
if the people can leave the fear of the conflict behind them can they start trusting and 
cooperating with the other. As the Brahimi Report well put it, a ‘relatively less 
dangerous environment […] is a fairly forgiving one.’122 
 
However, while these connections between the different elements should be made 
explicit, the definition of peace also largely rests on the possible tension between 
them, hence the need to balance them against each other.123 For instance, justice 
might demand that all perpetrators are punished for their actions, which could in turn, 
result in increased tension between the two communities and even lead to renewed 
violence. Similarly, trials, which by their nature result in clear winners and losers, can 
also damage reconciliation efforts. This undermining of reconciliation through 
attempts to promote justice is vividly illustrated through the effects of the 
International Criminal Tribunal in Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Bosnia: nationalist 
politicians have hijacked the Tribunal’s judgments and used them as ‘evidence’ that 
the international community is biased against them and favours the ‘others’.124 The 
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need to find an equilibrium between the elements of peace has also been recognised 
by the UN, which argued that ‘[a]t times, the goals of justice and reconciliation 
compete with each other. Each society needs to form a view about how to strike the 
right balance between them.’125  
 
As a result of the possible tension between the three elements, absolute security, 
justice and reconciliation are unattainable and unnecessary for peace to be built. 
Instead, all three must meet a certain threshold and, after that is satisfied, they should 
be balanced against each other so that the maximum of each can be achieved without 
undermining the other elements. It is always hard to abstractly define how much of 
each element is enough, but, upon inspection, it is possible to determine whether a 
given society is sufficiently secure, just or reconciled based on the facts on the 
ground. When the balance between the three elements has been struck, the longer it is 
maintained the more peaceful that society becomes for two reasons.126 First, peace 
itself increases the resilience of a peaceful society. Although soon after the war the 
parties might feel they can benefit more if they continue fighting, the longer peace 
persists, the more likely they are to want to continue enjoying the benefits conferred 
by it, to which they are now accustomed. Second, peace becomes more durable 
because over time the society in question will have successfully resolved a number of 
divisive conflicts, thus making the management of subsequent ones easier to achieve.  
 
The importance of balancing the three elements and maintaining a satisfactory 
threshold of each in post-conflict, ethnically divided societies is illustrated through 
the case of Cyprus. Despite the relatively secure conditions on the island, Cyprus is 
not peaceful because security has been achieved to the detriment of the other two 
elements. The physical separation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots reduces the 
possibility of violence between them, but also prevents inter-community 
communication and undermines reconciliation. Moreover, although the two sides 
maintain security by refraining from violence, they undermine justice because neither 
has taken effective steps to remedy the injustices of the war and prevent future ones 
from materialising. Peace in Cyprus will be achieved when the two communities pay 
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sufficient attention to reconciliation and justice, even if steps in this direction 
undermine security to a certain degree. This happed to a certain extent during the 
opening of the Green Line, the de facto border that separates the two communities, in 
2003: the mixing of the ethnic groups for the first time in 40 years raised concerns 
about violent skirmishes, which were nevertheless, overshadowed by reconciliation-
promoting stories of warm encounters between old friends and neighbours.   
 
The definition offered here results in a dynamic conception of peace. It promotes a 
balance between the three elements by appreciating that peace is not a state of bliss, 
but exists in a society where manageable conflicts are dealt with. No diverse society, 
let alone an ethnically divided one, is conflict-free; what is important therefore is not 
that disagreements are eliminated, but that they are handled in a way that respects the 
interests of the different groups. This is made easier by the fact that the proposed 
definition draws a clear line between peace, its elements and the peacebuilding 
measures that promote them. Where different elements of peace contradict, difficult 
decisions will still have to be made, but at least, they will be made transparently. 
Furthermore, the specific balance that will have to be struck between the three 
elements changes depending on the context in which the tension arises. It might for 
example be the case that in a conflict between security and justice in Cyprus, the latter 
should be given priority, but where such a conflict arises in South Africa, with its high 
crime rates, a different decision should be taken. Thus, an additional advantage of this 
definition is that it acknowledges that the context of different post-conflict societies 
affects the peacebuilding decisions that will have to be taken for each. This is in 
contrast to the current peacebuilding practices, which assume that all post-conflict 
societies can be ‘saved’ by using the same liberal recipe of democratisation and 
economic liberalisation. 
 
The lack of a satisfactory definition of peace has left peacebuilders in the dark about 
what it is that they are working towards, whether they can in fact achieve it and what 
steps they should adopt to get there. This section has attempted to fill this gap by 
arguing that peace consists of three elements – security, justice and reconciliation – 
which sometimes reinforce and sometimes contradict with each other. This definition 
is advantageous over the one other serious attempt that has been made to describe 
peace because unlike it, it is clear, practically achievable and relevant to different 
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societies around the world. The aim of the following sub-sections is not to give an 
exhaustive definition of each of the three elements, but to explain how they link to 
peace in ethnically divided, post-conflict societies and identify some methods and 
tools that can be used to promote them. 
 
(a) Security as the first element of peace 
The first element within the proposed definition of peace is security, which exists 
when the conditions on the ground prevent feelings of fear from war, internal conflict 
or serious crime. Security from physical threats is essential to any definition of peace 
because people’s first concern during and after a conflict is their physical well-being. 
As Doyle and Sambanis put it, ‘The first step is security. A secure environment is 
the sine qua non of the new beginning of peace.’127 Illustrative of this is the case of 
Cyprus: violent conflict has not broken out on the island during the last 40 years and 
has even been avoided during the decade when the Green Line was opened and 
members of both communities made contact with each other for the first time since 
the 1960s. Yet, despite these relatively secure conditions, more than 70% of Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots believe that security should be the ‘highest priority item’ during 
the peace negotiations.128 Lack of security makes it impossible for people to plan their 
future and put the conflict behind them due to concerns that any attempts to do so will 
be undermined by more violence in the near future. Even today, a decisive factor in 
important decisions for Cyprus’ future is Turkey’s likely reaction and the extent to 
which this is likely to undermine security on the island.129 A society, which operates 
under such constant threats, is always in a state of emergency and until they are 
dismissed, it cannot be entirely peaceful.  
 
Until the end of the Cold War, the clear answer to whom security was for, was the 
state, since an assumption was made that if the state was secure, so were its 
subjects.130 This traditional understanding of the concept was rightly challenged in a 
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1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Report which argued in 
favour of a new, ‘human security’ ideal that focused on individuals instead of 
states.131 The report rejected the traditional approach since threats to people’s security 
come, not only from other states, but also from non-state actors or the state itself. 
Making the state more secure and powerful does not always result in the increased 
protection of its subjects and can even have the reverse effect. The human security 
definition is particularly important when defining security as one of the elements of 
peace in post-conflict, ethnically divided societies, where the state was at least until 
recently trying to protect only some of its citizens and was turning against the rest. 
Thus, a necessary element for peace is the security of all the individuals residing in 
the state, irrespective of their ethnic group or connections with the government. 
 
Perhaps the question that has generated the most debate in the security literature 
concerns the types of threats people must be protected from. The UNDP Report 
adopted an excessively broad approach arguing that the notion of security is ‘all-
encompassing’ and that ‘most’ of the threats that fall under the heading of human 
security can be considered under seven categories: (i) economic security (freedom 
from poverty); (ii) food security (physical and economic access to food); (iii) health 
security; (iv) environmental security; (v) personal security (physical safety); (vi) 
community security (survival of traditional cultures and ethnic groups); and (vii) 
political security (enjoyment of civil and political rights).132 The Report states that the 
categories are interconnected since a threat of one type can influence all forms of 
human security. However, such a broad definition is problematic because the causes 
of and ways to deal with physical threats are very different from those concerning 
other dangers. The only reason for including different types of threats under the single 
concept of security was to send the message that governments should prioritise other 
policy areas, aside from physical security, as well. Nevertheless, the very broadness 
of the term defeats this purpose because by prioritising everything, we are prioritising 
nothing.133 Furthermore, an all-inclusive definition of security suggests that there are 
no limits to the concept’s expansion, illustrated by the fact that despite the UNDP’s 
broad definition, scholars have suggested additional threats that should be dealt with 
                                               
131 UNDP, 'Human Development Report: Annual Report', (New York: UNDP, 1994). 
132 Ibid., at 24. 
133 Keith Krause, 'The Key to a Powerful Agenda, If Properly Delimited', Security Dialogue, 35/3 
(2004), 367. 
  51 
under the security label. For example, Reed and Tehranian also argue for the 
protection of psychological security (involving conditions establishing respectful, 
loving and humane interpersonal relations) and communication security (concerning 
freedom and balance in information flows).134 However, ‘the broad vision of human 
security is ultimately nothing more than a shopping list. […] At a certain point, 
human security becomes a loose synonym for “bad things that can happen”’, thus 
losing its useful purpose as a single concept.135 
 
Instead, a narrower definition of human security, which focuses on protecting people 
only from physical threats, should be adopted. Such threats could be the result of war, 
internal conflict or serious crime such as gang violence, which tends to increase after 
the war has ended.136 Physical security should be singled out from the seven UNDP 
categories first, because it is the most directly related to post-conflict contexts and 
second, because a narrower definition of the term makes it more practically useful. 
The importance of physical security was highlighted by the UNDP itself which stated 
that ‘[p]erhaps no other aspect of human security is so vital for people as their 
security from physical violence.’137 Furthermore, the broad nature of the UNDP’s 
definition was even criticised by Canada, one of the most enthusiastic supporters of 
the concept of human security, for undermining the importance of human insecurity 
resulting from violent conflict.138 An all-inclusive definition could imply that physical 
security is almost easy to guarantee, especially when compared to categories such as 
environmental or health security which are not completely within human control. In 
contrast, a narrow definition allows policy makers to clearly identify the issues that 
must be dealt with for security to be achieved and connect them with peacebuilding 
policies on the ground. This leads to the next question, namely, the type of policies 
that have to be adopted in order to promote security in real-life terms. 
 
Security is not achieved simply because the war has stopped; it can still be 
undermined due to several reasons: because further violence is likely, as was the case 
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in Bosnia shortly after the war; because there has been an increase in crime rates, such 
as in South Africa; or because of a popular belief that the enemy may still pose a 
threat, as is the case in Cyprus. As a result, different societies are likely to need 
different security-promoting measures. Dilemmas as to how to achieve security in 
practice exist both in the short and the long-term after a conflict. A short-term security 
dilemma concerns the process and timing of disarmament; this is a delicate decision 
because on the one hand, ex-combatants should be disarmed early on in order to make 
people feel safe. On the other, disarmament should not take place too soon because 
ex-fighters might be afraid that they are losing their power with nothing in return, thus 
being encouraged to act as spoilers.139 The stakes are high because if the process fails, 
citizens may suffer from ‘microinsecurity’, where individuals fear that they will be 
the victims of crimes perpetrated by former soldiers, or ‘macroinsecurity’ which is the 
fear that the state might be overthrown by insurrection.140 On the other hand, an 
example of a long-term security dilemma is the reform of the police, not always a 
priority issue in post-conflict societies, but one that can still affect the peacebuilding 
efforts. A legitimate and properly working police force is more likely to make people 
feel confident that physical threats will be dealt with and that the police themselves 
will not cause further unrest.  
 
The final question that has to be asked with regards to security relates to the 
mechanics of the definition of peace proposed here and is concerned with how much 
security is necessary in a given society and at what cost. It is wrong to assume that 
little security is really no security; rather, security is a matter of degree and 
peacebuilders should be concerned with how much of it is enough.141 This is because 
security has a cost, not only in financial terms, an important factor in post-conflict 
societies, but also in terms of undermining justice and reconciliation. A minimum 
level of security is needed, but how much is desirable beyond that depends on how 
much already exists in a given society. So, if people are relatively secure, they might 
prefer to spend their energy and resources on something else, even if investing in 
security could have increased it a bit more.142 Therefore, optimum security is 
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achieved when physical safety exists to the greatest degree that is practically possible 
without compromising justice and reconciliation.  
 
(b) Justice as the second element of peace 
 
Justice, the second element of peace, is defined here in a very specific way; it is not 
about the most just way in which an individual can act, nor does it concern issues 
such as global justice. Instead, it is concerned with remedying past injustices that 
were caused before or during the conflict and ensuring that they will not be repeated 
again in the future. Although this type of post-conflict justice is connected to the way 
justice in developed and liberal societies is understood, the two differ in significant 
ways. The first is that while issues such as access to courts and social justice are 
relevant to both types of societies, post-conflict justice is primarily concerned with 
them to the extent that they have to do with the remedying of past or preventing of 
future injustices. Second, justice-promoting institutions in post-conflict societies often 
have to deal with issues that are not so widespread in mostly liberal contexts, such as 
the remedying of large numbers of displaced people. As time passes the concerns of 
post-conflict justice become less important and are replaced by those of ordinary 
justice;143 however, this thesis is only concerned with the former. Importantly, since 
justice is something that people feel, rather than simply observe around them, its 
definition focuses not only on the structure of the institutions, but also on the effects 
of these institutions in real-life terms. 
 
Justice in post-conflict societies has been deemed important since the early inception 
of peacebuilding, with practically every human rights treaty stressing in its preamble 
the need for ‘peace and justice in the world’.144 These two concepts seem to have 
been connected in the literature in two ways: first, ethnic conflicts are usually fuelled 
by feelings of injustice. Leaving such injustices unremedied and allowing them to 
continue after the end of the conflict sends people the message that nothing has 
changed. This, in turn, is likely to result in frustration and eventually violence until 
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the victims of the injustice obtain what they believe they are entitled to.145 It is for this 
reason that justice requires not only the existence of institutions dealing with past 
grievances, but also that the applicants, in fact, feel that these have been addressed.146 
Second, the promotion of justice legitimises the peace agreement and the new state of 
affairs by distinguishing the actions of the new regime from the illegitimate acts 
caused during the conflict. The impact of justice on legitimacy was highlighted by 
Boulding who argued that a ‘system of peace which is perceived by increasing 
numbers of its participants to have elements of injustice will be subject to increasing 
strain. […] The sense of injustice ultimately erodes the whole legitimacy of the 
system and it collapses.’147  
 
Perhaps the clearest indication of the importance of justice for peace is the rich and 
growing literature that exists on ‘transitional justice’. Despite the important lessons 
that can be learned from this literature however, the term ‘transitional justice’ will not 
be used here as it carries with it baggage that is best avoided. For instance, its 
supporters take for granted that the transformation of the post-conflict society to its 
liberal, improved version will take place shortly after the conflict has ended and that 
this ‘transitional period’ can somehow be distinguished from the end result. Rather, 
the conception of post-conflict justice advocated here accepts that the peacebuilding 
process will be a long and slow one, especially since justice might be set back 
because of the conflicting demands of the other two elements of peace. Moreover, 
transitional justice scholars have generally placed emphasis on violent crimes rather 
than other types of injustices: the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South 
Africa focused on ‘gross human rights violations’,148 while the ICTY is concerned 
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with grave violations of international criminal law.149 This bias has resulted in a 
consistent lack of emphasis on violations of property and other socio-economic rights, 
thus providing a skewed understanding of justice in post-conflict societies. Finally 
and perhaps most problematically, transitional justice is deemed to have been 
delivered when the relevant institutions have been set up; conversely, the definition 
advocated here considers institution-building as an important first step, but as 
ultimately incapable of exhausting justice’s demands.  
 
Moreover, the term ‘transitional justice’ has been defined in such a way that it can 
mean almost nothing. For example, in her much-cited book, Ruti Teitel argues that 
the main purpose of transitional justice is to assist in the change from a less to a more 
liberal society through a ‘collective public ritual’, irrespective of that ritual’s 
content.150 Transitional justice can consist of both ‘amnesties and punishment [which] 
are two sides of the same coin: [they are] legal rites that visibly and forcefully 
demonstrate the change in sovereignty that makes for political transition.’151 
However, this definition lacks even minimum justice criteria; ultimately anything can 
be part of transitional justice as long as it signifies change in some way. This broad 
but shallow definition is problematic because it compromises justice for the sake of 
transition; such a compromise should be viewed with suspicion, not least because of 
the lack of a general agreement as to what it is we are (and we should be) 
transitioning to. In fact, the perception of transition as something that should swiftly 
lead to a peaceful society, especially when that is achieved at the detriment of, rather 
than through, justice, could explain the low success rates of peacebuilding operations.  
 
A further limitation of Teitel’s account is that if everything that helps in the transition 
is part of transitional justice, this leaves little or no content for the other two elements 
of peace. This is not only problematic because it is descriptively inaccurate, but also 
because by classifying all peacebuilding measures as transitional justice, one is left 
unable to decide between potentially conflicting approaches. For example, some 
argue that transitional justice may require the forgiveness rather than punishment of 
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war criminals,152 while others contend that only by punishing the perpetrators can 
society move forward.153 However, by conceptualising both alternatives as 
‘transitional justice’, a choice between them becomes arbitrary. Conversely, a 
narrower definition of justice as the remedying of past injustices provides a clear 
answer to this dilemma by offering reasons for the punishment of criminals. This is 
not to argue that amnesties are never appropriate in post-conflict contexts; they might 
be necessary to appease a still powerful and armed opposition (thus promoting 
security) or because forgiving the perpetrators might be the best way to achieve 
reconciliation. Yet, in such cases, amnesties are used not because of justice’s 
requirements, but despite them; contrary to justice’s demands, protecting security or 
reconciliation is considered more pressing in the circumstances.  
 
Having explained the reasons for abandoning the term transitional justice in favour of 
the post-conflict justice envisioned here, it becomes easier to explain what the latter 
actually means. Post-conflict justice is concerned with undoing or remedying the 
injustices of the past and ensuring that they will not be repeated in the future. Such 
injustices can vary from society to society, thus signifying the need to adopt different 
and content-specific justice-promoting measures. Despite such differences however, 
undoing and remedying injustices always requires that attention is paid to both the 
perpetrators and the victims. Perpetrators must be identified – and ideally punished – 
because it would perpetuate a sense of injustice if, following their crimes, they did not 
pay for them. While amnesties acknowledge the existence of perpetrators (since in 
order for an amnesty to be given, a crime must have been committed), this 
acknowledgment might be perceived as empty, thus unable to appeal to the sense of 
justice of the people. For example, while the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission is generally considered to be among the most successful of its kind, one 
of the most powerful critiques against it, is the fact that it granted absolute amnesty to 
perpetrators, thus encouraged justice in only a superficial and empty sense.154 
 
At the same time, undoing past injustices requires that the victims feel remedied to the 
greatest possible extent for the harm they have suffered. If the injustice is in the form 
                                               
152 Ibid. 
153 Orentlicher, 'Setting Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime'. 
154 Mahmood Mamdani, 'Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC)', Diacritics, 32/3/4 (2002), 32. 
  57 
of physical harm to a person, it might be necessary to compensate him or his family. 
Alternatively, if the injustice concernes forced displacement, remedying it might 
require that the victim either receives restitution of his property or is fairly 
compensated for it. Moreover, victims often claim that an equally or even more 
important way of promoting post-conflict justice, is an apology from the state or the 
perpetrators for their unjust conduct.155 However, in addition to providing 
personalised remedies to individual victims, justice can also require the adoption of 
more holistic measures. Take, for instance, post-apartheid South Africa: decade-long 
discriminatory practices affected all areas of life for millions of people. The most 
effective way to remedy this injustice and reduce the huge socio-economic gap that 
was created as a result is, in addition to individual remedies, to adopt countrywide 
policies that provide better educational, housing and economic opportunities to the 
non-white communities.  
 
In addition to remedying past injustices, it is also necessary to ensure that they will 
not be repeated in the future. Various steps can be taken in this direction, such as the 
reform of the judiciary and the police service. Moreover, a step that is almost always 
taken in order to prevent the repetition of past injustices is the reform of the 
constitution and the addition of safeguards to ensure that people are fairly represented 
and their wishes are acted upon. However, such constitutional reforms are often 
controversial because ‘fair representation’ tends to be subject to conflicting 
interpretations depending on the context and the interests of different ethnic groups. 
For instance, fair representation in South Africa is ensured by respecting the principle 
of one person-one vote, while the Bosnian Constitution largely rests on group 
representation. This issue is still controversial in Cyprus with Greek Cypriots insisting 
on as few group protections as possible and Turkish Cypriots having the opposite 
view. Both types of representation, and others that try to bridge the gap between them, 
have arguments for and against them, making it impossible to conclude with certainty 
on the single best choice.156 Ultimately, what post-conflict justice requires in order to 
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prevent future injustices might vary from society to society or according to each 
ethnic group’s perception. Despite the difficulties of devising institutions respectful of 
the principle of fair representation however, this does not exhaust the steps that must 
be taken to prevent future injustices; the most effective way to achieve this objective 
is to make unjust conduct culturally, and not only legally, unacceptable.  
 
Like with security and reconciliation, the requirements of justice will often not be 
fully respected in ethnically divided, post-conflict societies. Practical difficulties, such 
as the passage of time, the unreliability of evidence, the large numbers of victims and 
perpetrators and the difficulties in distinguishing between the two categories during 
times of intense violence, suggest that the injustices of the past will often not be fully 
remedied. Moreover, the sometimes-unavoidable need to compromise with nationalist 
hardliners suggests that constitutions of post-conflict states are not always as injustice 
proof as ideal justice would have required. However, what is important for the 
building of peace is that justice is present to a satisfactory rather than full extent and 
that it is sufficiently balanced with the other two elements. This takes us to the last 
element of peace in need of a definition – reconciliation.  
 
(c) Reconciliation as the third element of peace 
 
The third element of peace is reconciliation and like the other two, its definition has 
been contested; there are, for example, disagreements as to whether it involves 
personal or political reconciliation and whether it should be understood as a process 
or an outcome. This section defines reconciliation both in terms of the final outcome 
it is intended to promote and in terms of the methods used to achieve this. It argues 
that the final outcome of this process is meaningful cooperation between members of 
different ethnic groups on both a personal and a political level. Willingness to 
cooperate on a personal level is likely to encourage political cooperation because 
whether political parties from different ethnic groups are prepared to work together, at 
least partly depends on the attitudes of the people they represent. On the other hand, 
political cooperation promotes good personal relations since these are more likely to 
be undermined by politicians who create animosity in order to win easy ethnic votes. 
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The outcome of meaningful personal and political cooperation is achieved when a 
certain process is followed. In particular, people must start trusting each other again, 
which in turn requires that they no longer dehumanise each other.  
 
The trust and rehumanisation of the enemy that are necessary for reconciliation can be 
promoted by removing the hurdles that prevent former enemies being perceived as 
people.157 During the conflict, negative stereotyping, propaganda against and fear of 
the other side usually make people view members of the opposing group as less than 
human. The fact that members of the other group could be feeling scared, victimised 
or ashamed for the actions of their fellow group members or that all sides caused 
atrocities during a war is completely lost on most people. For instance, when 
interviewed, members of different ethnic groups in Bosnia expressed feelings that 
they were the biggest victims of the conflict and that while atrocities had been carried 
out by all sides, the ones committed by the opposing sides were premeditated, while 
those committed by their own people were just individual excesses.158 As negative 
stereotyping of the other becomes more common, the individuality of the stereotyped 
group’s members is lost and their dehumanisation becomes easier.159 This 
stereotyping, portraying whole groups of people as less than human, predatory and 
unreasonable in their personal and political relationships, is the biggest hurdle to 
meaningful cooperation and it is this that reconciliation methods should attempt to 
address.  
 
Two important distinctions should be made in order to clarify the meaning of 
reconciliation; the first is between meaningful cooperation and inter-group harmony. 
This is because despite the numerous hurdles in achieving the former, this is a much 
more modest aim than the arguably utopian goal of achieving the latter.160 As Govier 
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and Verwoerd put it, a ‘realistic goal in contexts of reconciliation is not total 
harmony; nor is it a state of blissfully enduring unity.’161 In order for harmony to 
exist, there must be a compatibility of the groups’ needs and interests, but competitive 
politics in divided societies operate by highlighting precisely this lack of 
compatibility. Moreover, had such compatibility existed, it is unlikely that the society 
would have become ethnically divided and resorted to war in the first place. Separate 
groups, characterised by such distinct identities, needs and interests, do not have to be 
assimilated in order for reconciliation to be achieved. Reconciliation does not require 
the elimination of differences, but the ability to live with these differences through 
cooperation. This cooperation can be achieved when there is an adequate amount of 
trust, a confident expectation that one will act in a manner which will not take 
advantage of the other’s vulnerability.162 
  
The second distinction that must be made is between meaningful cooperation and 
mere co-existence among members of different ethnic groups. If people are living 
next to each other without communicating, cooperating or having common goals, 
wishing that they did not have to mingle with the other group at all, there is no real 
reconciliation. It is just a brief pause before the racist perceptions of each group 
resurface and potentially even result in more violence. If the UN is right that divided 
societies need a ‘society wide system of values […] to put a premium on peace, to 
desire peace, to seek peace and to stand for peace’, then reconciliation has to mean 
more than simple co-existence.163 Rejecting this minimalist definition however does 
not mean that meaningful cooperation has to stem from altruistic goals of loving one’s 
enemy. It could result from the simple understanding that unless the members of 
different ethnic groups reconcile, the alternative will be catastrophic for all of them.164   
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An argument could be made that the definition of reconciliation as the meaningful 
cooperation between ethnic groups is too ambitious; a better (and more achievable) 
alternative is to focus instead on the need to respect the rights of others.165 In every 
society, whether ethnically divided or not, there are political conflicts about what 
should be the preferred course of action in a given situation. Unless political 
discussions can take place and ultimately lead to a negotiated outcome, these political 
conflicts can paralyse the country. Conceptualising reconciliation as the need to 
respect the rights of others avoids this danger because it provides a discourse and 
vocabulary in which political conflicts can be framed. Arguably however, this 
understanding of reconciliation is too restrictive because it ignores the fact that not 
every single political conflict can be expressed in rights terms. Moreover, in the likely 
scenario where the parties are not in agreement as to what each competing right 
actually entails, expressing the political conflict in rights terms, only rephrases, rather 
than manages, the problem. Finally, this definition of the term should be avoided 
because of its unsuitability in answering the question at hand: since our objective is to 
clarify the relationship between rights and peace (and consequently, between rights 
and reconciliation), any analysis becomes circular if reconciliation itself is defined as 
the respect of other people’s rights. 
 
Thus, reconciliation is best understood as having been achieved when hostile feelings 
are slowly transformed into a tendency not to dehumanise the members of the other 
groups and then into the development of trust and a willingness to cooperate. This is a 
process that, even in the most favourable conditions, takes years to complete; 
reconciliation does not occur naturally, it needs effort and time and it is rarely the 
result of a linear process.166 While positive attitudes between individuals from 
different groups might develop in the workplace, social pressures might prevent them 
from materialising in their personal lives. Further, such positive attitudes might 
increase or decrease depending on a number of external factors, such as economic 
crises or spoilers. Consequently, a number of reconciliation methods, bottom-up and 
top-down, and spanning different periods of time have to be used. Each method has 
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its strengths and weaknesses and might work with some people, but not with others, 
so a combined effort is preferable. The combination of the methods that should be 
used depends, among others, on the kind of conflict, the resources available and the 
cultures of the groups involved.167  
  
Common examples of reconciliation mechanisms include Truth Commissions and 
communication workshops. Truth Commissions, like the one that took place in South 
Africa, contribute towards reconciliation by providing evidence about the atrocities 
that took place during the conflict and helping to eliminate some of the myths that 
were circulated before and during its occurrence.168 Such myths, an outcome of 
negative stereotyping, include suggestions that only one side was the perpetrator of 
crimes and that every member of that ethnic group enthusiastically endorsed the 
violations. On the other hand, communication workshops can promote reconciliation 
by encouraging participants to listen to the other’s story in order to appreciate that he 
is not the monster that he was portrayed to be. Understanding a person’s motives in 
acting in a specific way or making a particular demand makes it more likely that this 
will be accepted as reasonable, and as a result, encourages cooperation. Thus, these 
reconciliation mechanisms suggest that while social engineering is impossible, there 
are ways in which the negative perceptions of people can be challenged, so that in the 
long term, trust between members of different groups is achieved and the divisions 




The purpose of this chapter was to clarify the ultimate aim of peacebuilding by 
defining the concept of peace in post-conflict, ethnically divided societies. It rejected 
Galtung’s idealist and all encompassing definition of peace in favour a more realistic 
one, which consists of the elements of security, justice and reconciliation. An 
advantage of this definition is that it draws a clear line connecting the different 
elements of peace and the methods that should be used to achieve them. This is not to 
imply that decisions about what peacebuilding tools should be used, when and in what 
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way are easy to reach; it does however make them more transparent. Elements of 
peace can promote each other, but they can also contradict, thus making it necessary 
to strike a balance between them. Often therefore, the decisions that concern the use 
of peacebuilding tools are about determining whether in specific circumstances their 
potential advantages outweigh the dangers they might create. It is this analysis that 
unfolds in the following chapters in relation to human rights, one of the most popular 
peacebuilding tools: will their protection, on balance, be beneficial or detrimental to 
security, justice and reconciliation?  
 
The proposed definition of peace already starts elucidating the relationship between it 
and human rights: the, sometimes conflicting, demands of the elements suggest that 
their connection to peace is not always positive. While the use of human rights will in 
some cases be a straightforward matter, readily promoting all three elements of peace, 
in others, it can be beneficial to one, but detrimental to another. Moreover, it is also 
possible that in addition to some elements being positively or negatively connected to 
human rights, others might have no relationship to them at all. It follows, that the 
overall relationship between the two concepts varies depending on the context of each 
ethinically divided, post-conflict society and the balance that is struck between the 
three elements as a result. Ultimately, the tripartite definition of peace reflects a 
relationship with human rights that, unsurprisingly, is rarely the simple and positive 
one assumed by the international community. Before elaborating on this relationship 
in more detail however, it becomes necessary to also clarify how peacebuilders 
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Much like the concept of peace, the term ‘human rights’ is in need of a definition, but 
for precisely the opposite reasons. While few attempts have been made in the 
literature to explain the meaning of peace, human rights have been the subject of an 
impressive number of academic debates that seek to define, justify and explain their 
content.169 Yet, when the Brahimi Report states that ‘the human rights component of a 
peace operation is indeed critical to effective peace-building’ but offers no definition 
of ‘human rights’, it creates the misleading impression that there is a clear 
understanding and consensus as to what the term means.170 This contributes to the 
international community’s rather simplistic assumptions about the existence of a 
necessarily and always positive relationship between human rights and peace, which 
this thesis aims to nuance. Consequently, it becomes necessary to derive a clear and 
workable definition of human rights that prevents conclusions of the sort of ‘all good 
things go together’.  
 
The definition that this chapter elaborates on is not intended to be ‘the best 
philosophical account of human rights’ or convince the reader that any alternative 
understanding of rights is somehow ‘wrong’ or less worthy of attention.171 It 
moreover, does not seek to make an exhaustive list of all the characteristics that 
human rights generally possess. Rather, I have settled on this definition because it 
most accurately describes what peacebuilders – whether they are writing reports for 
the UN or implementing strategies in the divided societies themselves – have in mind 
when they refer to the term ‘human rights’. Thus, it is likely to provide the most 
relevant answer to the question of what is the relationship between human rights and 
peace. While it might be criticised as being too narrow or artificially restricted 
(mainly because it exclusively focuses on legal human rights), an alternative account 
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would have achieved definitional inclusion to the detriment of accuracy as to what the 
term is understood to mean in practice.  
 
In order to arrive at the proposed definition of human rights, I make four choices 
between competing conceptions of the term: first, I argue that when deciding between 
human rights as empowering choices or protecting interests, the latter should be 
preferred. Second, these interests that human rights protect are fundamental, as 
opposed to merely ordinary ones. Fundamental interests are not singled out by 
identifying those of them that connect to a foundational principle such as personhood, 
but through a political process in which states determine their international 
obligations. Third, the fundamental interests that human rights protect are safeguarded 
in the legal rather than the moral domain. Fourth, despite there being an overlap 
between the domestic and international legal protections of these fundamental 
interests, a distinction should be made to highlight their differences. Thus, human 
rights are fundamental interests that can be legally protected on the domestic or 
international level. In deciding between these four sets of choices, I consider the 
theoretical persuasiveness of each alternative and the extent to which choosing it is 
appropriate for the specific question I am asking. Thus, my decision to focus both on 
the domestic and international protection of human rights is not an arbitrary one, but 
is based on the fact that the conflicts that are undermining peace in ethnically divided, 
post-conflict societies are, in practice, managed in both national and international 
forums.  
 
2. Human rights as protecting interests 
 
One of the most basic disagreements between human rights scholars concerns the 
question: ‘what are human rights for?’ This leads to a debate about the purpose of 
rights more generally and whether they are there to protect the right-holder’s choices 
or interests.172 On the one side of the debate, choice theorists argue that rights are 
tools whose purpose is to allow right-holders to have a choice and control over their 
relationships with other people and in particular, duty-bearers. On the other, interest 
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theorists believe that a right is afforded to right-holders when they have an interest in, 
or they are likely to benefit from, what is being protected. Of course, to the 
peacebuilder who is concerned with managing conflicts and crises day in and day out, 
it makes little difference if rights are perceived on the philosophical level as 
protecting choices or interests. Nevertheless, conceptual clarity can lead to better-
informed and justified explanations for what is happening in practice. Neither of the 
two theories of rights is completely persuasive, but the interest theory offers a more 
compelling account of how human rights operate on the ground and can, as a result, 
provide more meaningful insights about their relationship to peace in ethnically 
divided, post-conflict societies themselves. 
 
Choice theorists start from the premise that rights and duties go together and that 
where there is a right-holder, there is automatically and simultaneously a duty-bearer 
as well.173 The choice theory is based on the idea that having a right in something 
recognises that the right-holder controls his relationship with the duty-bearer in 
relation to the content of that particular right. Thus, by virtue of having a right, it is to 
the discretion of the right-holder whether to use it in the first place (and therefore 
demand from the duty-bearer to act or abstain from acting in a certain way) or choose 
to waive it. Moreover, if that right has been violated by the duty-bearer, the right-
holder, who in the words of Hart is a ‘small scale sovereign’, can choose whether and 
when to ask for a remedy for that violation.174 Thus, according to the choice theory 
‘rights exist only when people have such normative power over duties of others.’175 
The main advantage of the theory is that it captures the powerful link between 
individuals, the normative control they should exercise over their affairs and 
autonomy.176 One of the key tenets of liberalism is autonomy and the idea that people 
should judge for themselves what is in their best interest; the choice theory supports 
this idea in practice by empowering individuals to choose whether, how and when to 
use their rights as they see fit. 
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However, despite its intuitive appeal, the choice theory is suffering from two major 
drawbacks: first, that it has difficulties in treating some groups of people as right-
holders and second, that it cannot justify the existence of all the human rights we 
value. The first drawback was clearly and persuasively illustrated when Neil 
MacCormick showed how the choice theory fails to explain the existence of 
children’s rights.177 He argued that morally (and in most jurisdictions legally) 
speaking, every infant and child has the right to be nurtured and cared for until she is 
ready to take care of herself on her own. This is despite the fact that the child cannot 
relieve her parents of their duty to take care of her, which according to the choice 
theory would negate the existence of the right. Supporters of the choice theory could 
argue that the child’s inability to control the right does not necessarily imply the 
absence of such a right because it is sufficient for a third person acting on behalf of 
the child to do so. However, the people who are usually acting on behalf of the child 
are her parents, yet the law prevents them from waving their parental duties to take 
care of the child. Moreover, morally speaking there seems to be no reason to suppose 
that the child or anyone acting on her behalf should be permitted to waive such 
parental duties. In cases where parents are unable or unwilling to fulfill their duties to 
take care of the child the State takes over, but this is not due to the parent waiving the 
child’s right to be taken care of. Rather, this happens because such a step is in the 
interests of the child and it is for this reason that parents might also be punished for 
failing to fulfill their obligations to act accordingly. It might be true that in the 
majority of cases the right-holder is permitted to choose how to exercise his right. 
However, such powers are ‘essentially ancillary to, not constitutive of, rights’.178 
Rights tend to confer this control to right holders because of the liberal assumption 
that we are the best judges of what is in our best interest, rather than because they are 
necessarily about protecting personal choices.  
 
In fact, if we insist that a right exists only if the right-holder can choose how and 
whether to use it, it becomes impossible to justify the existence of all the rights that 
are considered fundamental in democratic societies. For instance, while the right to 
vote is among the most universally accepted rights, it is not completely compatible 
with the choice theory. In some jurisdictions it is legally mandatory to attend elections 
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and cast a vote, even though the right-holder can decide to invalidate her ballot. There 
are also moral arguments why citizens should always be required to vote, rather than 
have a choice in the matter, such as that everyone’s participation legitimises the 
outcome of elections to a greater extent or that it can encourage civic patriotism 
among the people. Thus, contrary to the choice theory’s assumptions, it is, at least in 
certain cases, impossible and undesirable to waive the right. Moreover, even though 
citizens undoubtedly have a right to vote, they do not have unlimited discretion as to 
how to use it. For instance, it is, and rightly so, always illegal to sell one’s vote, thus 
illustrating that the existence of the right does not and should not confer unlimited 
choices to the right-holder as to its use. Whatever the theoretical arguments in favour 
of the choice theory, it does not seem to reflect the reality of human rights on the 
ground. Since the objective of this definitional exercise is to identify the 
characteristics of human rights as understood and applied by the peacebuilders 
themselves, an alternative to the choice theory should be sought.  
 
The most popular alternative to the choice theory, and the one adopted here, is the 
interest theory of rights. This theory is based on the idea that a right is afforded to 
right-holders when they have an interest in, or they are likely to benefit from, what is 
being protected. Thus, according to the interest theory, ‘to ascribe to all members of a 
class C a right to treatment T is to presuppose that T is, in all normal circumstances, a 
good for every member of C, and that T is a good of such importance that it would be 
wrong to deny it to or withhold it from any member of C.’179 What matters for the 
interest theory is that we protect rights because of the interests they safeguard, rather 
than because they protect individuals’ choices. One of the most prominent interest 
theorists, Joseph Raz, has adopted a broad definition of the term ‘interest’ to include 
both individual and general interests (what he refers to as common goods).180 He 
argues that rights are protected because they safeguard individual interests, but they 
gain additional importance if they contribute to the common good.181 Raz gives the 
example of freedom of expression: the right primarily protects the individual interests 
of those who want to express their views or listen to the views of others. Nevertheless, 
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although these interests are important enough to justify the right’s existence on their 
own, it acquires added significance and deserves greater protection because it also 
serves the common goods of democracy and free exchange of information.182 
 
It has been argued that the importance Raz attaches to the interests of others or the 
common good results in his theory providing a less-than-satisfactory account of the 
stringency of rights.183 This criticism stems from a reading of Raz’s work which 
considers the common good as a fundamental element to the justification of human 
rights and which in turn implies that their existence is independent from the interests 
of the right holder. While some passages in The Morality of Freedom support this 
interpretation of the theory,184 in others Raz explicitly warns that his discussion of 
general interests should not ‘elevate them into a universal rule and claim that rights 
exist only when such considerations apply.’185 Such factors are ‘generally marginal’ 
and highlighting their importance should not obscure the fact that rights primarily 
represent concern for the interests of the individual.186 Irrespective of which reading 
of Raz’s theory one adopts, the lack of clarity about the extent of the general interests’ 
contribution in justifying rights, is a problem in itself. However, it is impossible to 
agree on a completely satisfactory account of rights. Despite this deficiency, Raz’s 
account offers a good explanation of the purpose of rights: to protect interests that are 
important enough to merit protection. 
 
Unlike the choice theory, the interest theory can satisfactorily explain both why 
children have rights and why the right to vote exists even though its right-holders do 
not have absolute discretion as to how to use it. It makes it clear that children enjoy 
rights and cannot waive their protection because it is in their interests to be protected. 
Such rights create duties on their parents to take care of them until they can do so 
themselves and if the parents fail to discharge their obligations, the right remains and 
the duty is transferred to the state. The interests that are protected by the right are both 
for the benefit of the children and for society at large since they will one day grow up 
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and become active citizens of that society. This theory is also preferable to the choice 
theory because it is premised on the fact that rights exist prior to duties, thus making it 
possible to argue that a change of circumstances can alter the duties created by a right 
or even the duty-bearer himself. Similarly, the theory can explain why the right to 
vote exists, despite limitations on how the right-holders can use it: it is because its 
protection is both in the interests of the right-holders themselves and society at large. 
The individual right-holder benefits because he has the power to influence the 
politicians and the policies of the country, while the equal exercise of the right by 
everyone also contributes to the common good of democracy. It is because of this 
second, more general interest that the selling of votes is prohibited.  
 
An additional advantage of the interest theory is that it provides the tools to explain 
how a right might be affected by more than one interest and how these interests can 
strengthen the protection of the right or require its limitations. Thus, the right to vote 
discussed in the previous paragraph offers an example of how different individual and 
general interests can come together to strengthen the right’s protection. On the other 
hand, different interests might conflict with each other, some offering reasons for the 
protection and others for the limitation of the right. Such balancing exercises in order 
to determine the content of a right are very common, and it is an advantage of the 
interest theory that it can accommodate and reflect them properly. (In contrast, the 
choice theory with its emphasis exclusively on the choices of the individual obscures 
this balancing exercise to a greater degree.) A typical example of conflicting interests 
affecting the content of the right to vote is offered by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) case of Ždanoka v. Latvia.187 In this case, the applicant, a senior 
member of the Communist Party before Latvia’s independence, was prevented from 
running in the 1998 Parliamentary elections because of her political affiliation. The 
facts of the case illustrate how the Court had to strike a balance between the 
individual interest of the applicant to participate in a democratic government and the 
general interest, protected by the State, of preventing dangerous and anti-democratic 
parties from coming to power. This potential of the theory to illuminate how a balance 
is being struck between different interests is highlighted by Raz who points out that a 
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right exists when there are interests providing justifications for the existence of the 
right on the one hand that outweigh any contrary considerations on the other.188  
 
The ability of the theory to strike a balance between the different interests that are at 
stake in a given scenario is particularly important for the purposes of determining the 
relationship between peace and human rights in ethnically divided societies. As the 
previous chapter argued, peace is made up of sometimes-conflicting elements; some 
of these will be promoted and others will be undermined through the protection of 
human rights. With this in mind, the interest theory of rights is better suited for the 
project undertaken here because it can accommodate this balancing exercise. This is 
in contrast to the choice theory, which states that a right should be protected simply 
when the right-holder insists so. If two right-holders claim the respect of their rights 
which are in conflict, one has to determine where to draw the line between them, yet 
the choice theory provides no clear indication on how this will be done. Returning to 
the case of Ždanoka v. Latvia, the interest theory of rights allows us to show how 
different elements of peace connect to different interests being balanced by the Court: 
the element of security (relating to the general interest of preventing the re-election of 
a dangerous party to power) was deemed more important than the element of 
reconciliation (which could have been promoted if the applicant was allowed to run 
for elections and other candidates used the opportunity to question her about her 
party’s past conduct).  
 
Ultimately therefore, on the most general level, rights have been conceptualised as 
protecting interests (and, as a result, creating duties). The idea that each human right 
protects different interests suggests that there is not just a single relationship between 
all human rights and peace. Rather, each human right can, depending on the ethnically 
divided society it operates in and the interests it protects, relate to the three elements 
of peace in a different way. This conclusion is revisited in the practical section of the 
thesis, where it is argued that protecting the right to vote and the right to property can 
affect peace in diverse ways depending on the context in which they are implemented.  
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3. Ordinary and fundamental rights 
 
Having established that the interest theory provides a satisfactory, albeit not perfect, 
account of the purpose of rights, this leads to the logically subsequent issue 
concerning the nature of the rights in question. If sufficient individual interests that 
outweigh contrary considerations can ground all rights, what kinds of interests and 
rights are we specifically referring to when we are talking about human rights? It is 
possible, for instance, to argue that there are sufficient individual interests to support 
the right that a contract should be enforced; it is not however the case that that right is 
also a human right. I argue in this section that human rights are a special category of 
rights, also referred to as fundamental, which have priority over all other rights. They 
are fundamental, not because they acquire their status from a foundational principle, 
but because they have been singled out through political processes as deserving a 
special type of protection by the Courts.189 Conversely, rights that do not fall within 
this special category are simple, ordinary legal rights that are not mentioned in the 
Constitution but are nevertheless protected by the Courts. (It can be assumed for now 
that human rights refer to ‘fundamental legal rights’, an assumption that will be 
justified in the next section.) 
 
There are two types of explanations as to why fundamental, or human, rights are 
singled out from ordinary ones. The traditional approach, supported by James Griffin 
argues that the distinction between ordinary and fundamental rights lies in the fact 
that the latter are rights ‘that a person has […] simply in virtue of being human.’190 
Although he does not use these terms, the aim of his theory is to define fundamental 
rights and distinguish them from ordinary ones in order to avoid an uncontrollable 
inflation in the numbers of the former. He argues that rights should be considered 
human rights when they satisfy two criteria: first, they must allow people to act as 
normative agents, which is an essential feature of personhood, and second, their 
content should meet certain practical considerations.191 He defines normative agency 
as consisting of autonomy and liberty, which respectively require that our decisions 
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must be informed and that we must have enough material provisions to support 
ourselves. By practical considerations Griffin has in mind things that could affect the 
content of the right, such as the characteristics of human nature or whether a right is 
too complicated to achieve the intended outcome successfully. These two criteria 
allow Griffin to devise a list of human or fundamental rights, which, for example, 
includes a right to education, but not the right to vote.192 
 
While the traditional approach sounds noble and intuitively correct – in that we think 
that there should be a connection between human rights and our humanity – it is 
ultimately unpersuasive because it does not include any real criteria to determine the 
content of human rights. As a result, any scholar could argue that rights she considers 
worthy enough are necessary for the protection of our personhood without the theory 
providing any tools to counter such claims. For example, Griffin extends his theory to 
argue that rights should not only protect autonomy and liberty, but also the conditions 
that will make these possible and in this way he justifies socio-economic rights, such 
as the right to education. However, the conditions that make liberty and autonomy 
possible (such as knowledge, resources and opportunities) are present at least to some 
degree in every human being by virtue of just being alive and non-comatose. When 
Griffin refers to the conditions that make our personhood possible, he arguably has a 
higher standard of protection in mind. Yet, he neither offers nor can offer any criteria 
to determine what this higher standard should be, thus making it possible for anyone 
reading his theory to arbitrarily draw the line of what is a fundamental right where she 
considers appropriate.  
 
Griffin’s theory of personhood is not the only attempt to explain what it means to 
have rights by virtue of being human. Some have relied on religious doctrines and the 
idea that we are all equal under God,193 while others have offered alternative secular 
accounts. An example of the latter is Alan Gewirth who has famously argued that 
‘[h]uman rights are based upon or derivative from human dignity. It is because 
                                               
192 For an application of Griffin’s theory to the right of democratic participation, see James Griffin, On 
Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2008) at Ch. 14. For a discussion of the right to education, see Griffin, 
'Discrepancies between the Best Philosophical Account of Human Rights and the International Law of 
Human Rights'. 
193 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Understanding Liberal Democracy (Oxford: OUP, 2012) at Ch. 7 and 8.  
  74 
humans have dignity that they have human rights.’194 The criticism that Griffin’s 
theory cannot provide any real criteria for the list and content of human rights applies 
to all foundational theories. Moreover, the existence of various theories, each 
emphasising a different foundational principle, begs the question of which is the 
‘correct’ one and how that can be determined. Why is, for example, personhood more 
important than dignity (or vice versa) and why is it the case that the only two 
necessary conditions for personhood are liberty and autonomy? The major problem 
with foundational theories is not that they do not provide answers to these questions, 
but that they cannot do so without relying on the subjectively held beliefs of their 
authors. 
 
These shortcomings of the traditional approach suggest that a different way of 
distinguishing between fundamental and ordinary rights is needed. The distinction 
should not exist because of any connection that fundamental rights necessarily have to 
our humanity or other foundational principles, whether religious or secular. Rather, 
and especially bearing in mind that the objective of this exercise is to understand what 
peacebuilders mean when they use the term, the distinction between fundamental and 
ordinary rights should be explained by focusing on the practice of human rights 
themselves. International institutions that create legal rights do not necessarily have a 
good grip on moral philosophy and in any case, they are not trying to mirror it exactly 
by creating legal rights that reflect a particular understanding of humanity. As one of 
the delegates to proceedings prior to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights put 
it, ‘Yes we agree about the rights but on condition that no one asks us why.’195 Thus, 
it should be accepted that states and international actors, including peacebuilders, 
engage in a political process of negotiation and compromise regarding their 
international obligations and it is through that process rather than philosophical 
reflection that some rights are singled out as fundamental.196 Of course this is not to 
argue that fundamental legal rights are not connected to fundamental moral rights in 
any way. After all, one of the advantages of the interest theory, which focuses on the 
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normative justifications of rights and not only their structure, is that it can make 
claims about both moral and legal rights and therefore show that the two are 
connected.197 In practice, when international bodies debate about the creation of a 
new right, they appreciate that that right is important because of its connection to our 
moral intuitions. However, it is one thing to acknowledge an intuitive connection 
between our humanity and fundamental legal rights, and quite another to argue that 
the latter are always and necessarily protected because they derive from a single 
moral principle.  
 
In acknowledging that a moral theory of rights cannot provide all the answers, Raz’s 
more modest political approach explains in a more persuasive manner the distinction 
between ordinary and fundamental rights: what ultimately separates fundamental legal 
rights from the rest is not their inherent connection to our humanity, but the fact that 
they were singled out by (international) institutions as special. Raz’s important 
contribution comes by arguing that legal fundamental rights ‘express values which 
should form a part of morally worthy political cultures’, but not feeling the need to 
pinpoint the content of such values or reduce them to a single foundational one.198 
However, the political approach is not completely reductionist. It also provides some 
criteria for the existence of fundamental rights by arguing that one of the reasons that 
they fall in this special category is the fact that they possess certain characteristics that 
generally make the judiciary, rather than politically accountable institutions, the more 
appropriate bodies to deal with them.  
 
The first characteristic that makes human rights appropriate for this ‘fundamental 
rights status’ is that there is a societal consensus about the importance of their 
protection and the second is that this consensus is not easily challenged by sudden 
changes in society. Fundamental rights, in other words, form part of the country’s 
‘basic political culture’, which is expressed in its (written or unwritten) Constitution, 
and generally tends to remain unaltered.199 It is thus appropriate to create a special 
protection for such rights by insulating them from everyday politics and demanding 
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that principled and persuasive reasons are articulated for their limitation. Judges, who 
decide cases following reasoned debate and who are politically unaccountable 
because they are unelected, are particularly well-suited to protect this more permanent 
‘basic political culture’; in contrast, politicians who might be affected by other, more 
passing considerations, are less so. Additional characteristics of fundamental rights 
include the fact that they are likely to result in disputes where the individual has 
special standing and that they tend to relate to a limited set of self-contained facts. 
These also make the Courts the most appropriate bodies to deal with them because the 
adjudicative process is designed to take into account the specific circumstances of the 
individual, rather than engage in a policy-making exercise that focuses on general 
considerations and the wishes of the majority.200 
 
Raz’s political approach has three main advantages over the traditional one. First, its 
less ambitious explanation for the existence of fundamental rights means that it is not 
suffering from the same theoretical deficiencies as Griffin’s theory. Decisions about 
which rights should be considered fundamental and what their scope should be are 
informed by practical considerations, such as the role of the Courts versus the 
legislature, rather than abstract and ultimately permanently unanswerable questions of 
what people deserve in virtue of their humanity. One critique of Raz’s approach is 
that it is not ambitious enough, since, in an attempt to come up with a coherent way of 
describing human rights, it misses their operative characteristic: that which connects 
them to humanity. However, the political approach does not deny that there is a 
connection between human rights and humanity; it simply suggests that while that 
might be the case, this connection is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain why 
we label fundamental rights as such. In fact, it is arguably the case that rights we 
readily consider as fundamental, such as the right to private life or freedom from 
torture, are considered as part of our ‘basic political culture’ precisely because of their 
connection to values that are important to our humanity such as dignity, autonomy 
and liberty. Yet, we gain nothing if we insist on that connection as the centrepiece of 
the theory that describes fundamental rights.  
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The second advantage of this political approach is that it reflects the practice of 
human rights more accurately than the traditional one. For instance, Griffin’s theory 
argues that there should not be a human right to democratic participation despite the 
fact that Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
recognises the rights ‘to take part in the conduct of public affairs’, ‘to vote and to be 
elected’ and ‘to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in [one’s] 
country’.201 Because of its failure to accurately reflect reality, the traditional approach 
cannot make any real contribution to questions such as how the right should be 
interpreted by the Courts. In contrast, the political approach argues that fundamental 
rights are those which are concerned with ‘matters admitting of greater stability, 
slower change, and of being settled by argument rather than through interest group 
coalitions’, thus properly reflecting human rights practice.202 These criteria can both 
meaningfully contribute to the debate of which rights should be considered 
fundamental and what is the role of the Courts in interpreting them. Importantly, this 
capacity of the political theory to reflect the practice of human rights makes it better 
suited when examining their effect in promoting peace on the ground.  
 
The third advantage of basing the existence of fundamental rights on the political 
process of negotiation, and the most relevant to the objectives of this thesis, is that it 
can explain the sometimes simplistic way in which the international community’s 
expectations of human rights are phrased. In practice, the inclusion of the phrase 
‘human rights’ in a UN document can be subject to rigorous background negotiations, 
with the end result often being achieved to the detriment of sophistication about what 
human rights can actually achieve. For example, when the Agenda for Peace urges us 
to make the ‘utmost effort to enhance respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms’ because these can ‘promote sustainable economic and social development 
for wider prosperity’, ‘alleviate distress and […] curtail the existence and use of 
massively destructive weapons’, there is clearly an expected hyperbolae there.203 It 
would thus be unfair and probably incorrect to criticize the Agenda’s drafters as being 
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unaware or unappreciative of human rights’ limitations; their expected positive effects 
were emphasized precisely because it was necessary to do so in the process of 
political negotiations. It is for this reason that the objective of this thesis is not to 
criticise UN documents per se. Rather, Part 2 argues that some of the – 
understandably – simplistic expectations of human rights listed in UN reports have 
found their way, without any added nuance, in the peacebuilding strategies adopted in 
ethnically divided, post-conflict societies; and therein lies the problem.  
 
Thus, human rights protect fundamental interests; they are distinguished from 
ordinary rights because of certain characteristics they possess, which make the 
judiciary the most appropriate body to protect them. These characteristics already 
point to certain conclusions about the relationship between human rights and peace. 
For instance, if peace consists of something more than that which can be objectively 
discussed in a court of law – such as a subjective sense of security or feelings of trust 
among previously warring individuals – it follows that merely protecting human 
rights might be an insufficient way of promoting it. Similarly, if the concern of 
fundamental rights is the protection of certain interests within a given set of self-
contained facts where the individual has special standing, what can they tell us about 
the broader relationships between ethnic groups and how can they guide debates, 
which unavoidably arise during peace negotiations, about the general structure of 
democratic institutions? 
 
4. Moral and legal human rights 
 
Even after agreeing that human rights are concerned with the protection of 
fundamental interests, a key distinction remains unexplored: that between moral and 
legal human rights. Undoubtedly the two types of rights are connected and moral 
rights can influence and affect legal ones. However, they should remain distinct 
because while they are both essential in a liberal society, they operate and are helpful 
in different ways, thus making it necessary to be clear about their differences. This 
section examines two opposing views about how moral and legal rights connect: on 
the one hand, it has been implied that there is no distinction between the two (or at 
least not one that is worth making) and on the other, that moral rights are neither 
necessary nor sufficient to justify the presence and protection of legal ones. I argue 
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that these views offer important insights about the relationship between the two types 
of rights, but both are ultimately unpersuasive, thus making it necessary to recognise 
equally their connections and distinctiveness. For the purposes of this thesis, the issue 
of distinctiveness becomes particularly important because it explains why moral and 
legal rights relate to peace in different ways and why ultimately, I will only be 
focusing on the peacebuilding effects of the latter. 
 
The central objective of Griffin’s personhood theory is to explain what we mean by 
human rights and how they can be justified. Despite his long answers to these 
questions however, he never distinguishes between moral and legal facets of rights. In 
fact, although his thesis (that the foundation of human rights is personhood) is a moral 
one, its explicit aim is to prevent the proliferation of legal human rights. Evidence of 
this is that Griffin tests the effects of his theory by applying it to legal instruments 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.204 Although he does not 
explicitly discuss the relationship between moral and legal rights, his approach 
implies one of two conclusions. Either Griffin does not make any distinction between 
the two facets and considers that they have identical content and justifications, or he 
believes that moral and legal rights are so directly and automatically connected that 
their distinction is only a technicality. According to the second, more likely 
possibility, justifying and determining the content of moral rights requires the same 
steps, or at least steps that are similar enough so as not to make a difference, as 
carrying out the same exercise for legal rights. The implication of this theory is that if 
a moral right exists, it should always and necessarily be followed by a parallel legal 
right. If the personhood theory cannot justify the existence of a moral right, then a 
legal right should not follow either. 
 
However, the failure to make the distinction between moral and legal rights is 
regrettable. A moral right is created when there are sufficient moral interests to 
something, which are not undermined by other conflicting moral considerations. Only 
if a legal body decided that this moral right should also be legally protected and be 
enforceable would this turn into a legal right as well.205 Thus, although moral and 
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legal rights are connected, the two are also different. The justifications for the 
existence of a moral right usually play a role in the decision of the legislature to create 
an equivalent legal right, but additional factors are also taken into account as well. 
The most important of these factors concerns the appropriateness of the judiciary to 
decide certain issues and points to the fact that not every moral right should also be 
converted into a legal one. A moral right might protect important interests, which 
should nevertheless not be the concern of the law, because the Courts are not always 
appropriate institutions to deal with morality’s demands. It is for this reason that 
although parents have a fundamental interest in the love of their children, and there 
may even exist a moral right to that effect, no institution should convert that into a 
legal right and attempt to enforce it. As Allen Buchanan very well put it, ‘[j]ustifying 
assertions about the existence of certain moral rights is one thing; justifying an 
institutionalized system […] to realize them is quite another.’206 The second 
difference between moral and legal rights is that the two facets result in different 
types of remedies. Not converting a moral right into a legal one does not mean that no 
right exists; it simply suggests that any recourse for a failure of the duty-bearer to 
comply with his obligations rests in morality rather than legal sanctions. Thus, the 
violation of moral rights will at most result in the social condemnation of the violator, 
while the violation of legal rights will also have legal consequences: it might lead to 
criminal sanctions or a change in the law or practices of the government. 
 
Nevertheless, the rejection of Griffin’s view that legal rights accurately mirror moral 
ones does not automatically support Buchanan’s position that the two facets of rights 
should be completely disconnected from each other.207 In fact, Buchanan’s argument 
that moral rights are neither necessary nor sufficient for the justification of legal rights 
is only partly persuasive. It has already been argued that moral rights are not in 
themselves sufficient to justify legal rights, but Buchanan offers an additional reason 
for why that is the case. He argues that even if philosophers could produce a 
comprehensive and sound theory of moral rights, this would fail to justify some of the 
most important legal human rights that exist. This is because, according to Buchanan, 
some rights, like the right to healthcare cannot be grounded in corresponding moral 
rights because the legal right is broader than the moral one. He bases this argument on 
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the premise that in the case of a moral right, the right-holder is entitled to the 
performance of the correlative duties only if there is something about him that makes 
him so entitled. To put it in interest terms, Buchanan rejects the idea that general 
interests can also support the existence of a moral right; only individual interests can 
justify moral rights. Since some moral rights make huge demands from the state, they 
cannot be morally justified by only referring to a single right-holder’s interests. Such 
a problem does not exist with legal rights since the legislature can rely on additional, 
more general justifications, to explain their existence. For example, the legal right to 
free healthcare under the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights requires that hospitals are built, doctors and nurses are trained and a 
considerable amount of money is spent in the process. Since a single individual 
cannot morally demand all these things from the state, if there is a moral right to 
health, it is narrower in scope than its legal equivalent. 
 
Buchanan’s claim is only persuasive if one abandons the idea that common goods can 
also justify moral rights, which I reject. Nevertheless, for reasons explained above, his 
conclusion that moral rights are not in themselves sufficient to ground legal rights is 
convincing. The real problem with Buchanan’s thesis that moral and legal rights 
should be completely disconnected rests in his claim that it is possible to justify some 
legal human rights without referring to their moral equivalents at all. Accordingly, he 
argues that the legal right to health should exist because its protection can contribute 
to social solidarity, help realise the ideal of a humane society and increase 
productivity among the population – but not because there is a moral right to 
health.208 However, while these utilitarian justifications explain why having free 
healthcare would be a good social practice, they do not offer sufficient explanations 
for why it should also be a right afforded to every individual. Rights are primarily 
about protecting individual interests; general interests can enhance the importance of 
the protection of certain rights, but they cannot in themselves justify them. Despite the 
key distinctions that exist between moral and legal rights, an important element that 
should always unite them is that at least part of their justifications – the part that is 
concerned with the interests of individuals – should be the same.  
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Buchanan’s thesis’ deficiencies aside however, there are good reasons why legal and 
moral fundamental rights should remain separate; key among them is the need to 
distinguish between those rights that can appropriately be protected by the judiciary 
and those that are better left in the moral realm. This distinction is not only 
philosophically sustainable, but it is also practically important for the conclusions of 
this thesis, which are only concerned with the relationship between peace and the 
protection of legal human rights. The choice to restrict my analysis in this way was 
not an arbitrary one; rather, like with the three other choices discussed in this chapter, 
it is intended to reflect the way peacebuilders themselves understand the term ‘human 
rights’. When UN reports refer to ‘human rights’, they do not explicitly restrict 
themselves to their legal protection; nevertheless, the examples they offer of how 
human rights can contribute to peace always seem to focus on their legal, rather than 
moral, facet.209 For instance, An Agenda for Peace refers to the need to ‘identify and 
support structures which will tend to consolidate peace’ and uses monitoring elections 
and the protection of human rights as examples.210 Elsewhere in the report there are 
other mentions of professionals who can help in peacebuilding operations; these 
include human rights monitors and electoral officials, in other words, those who are 
concerned with the implementation of legal human rights.211 Finally, the Brahimi 
Report recommends that the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
increase its peacebuilding efforts by creating ‘model databases for human rights field 
work’.212 Nowhere in these key UN documents are there signs of moral human rights 
being perceived as important peacebuilding tools.  
 
This emphasis of UN reports on legal human rights is also reflected in the 
peacebuilding operations in the ethnically divided, post-conflict societies themselves. 
While, for example, there has been a growing literature on the importance of moral 
rights in relation to peace education,213 and even some small scale grassroots attempts 
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to apply the theoretical findings in practice,214 the overwhelming attention and 
resources of peacebuilders are still focused on the contributions of legal rights. This is 
not surprising: moral rights are not as intellectually disciplined or clear in their 
content as their legal equivalents, thus making them susceptible to (ab)use by 
politically partisan groups seeking to undermine the peace process, a danger that 
peacebuilders are, understandably, keen to avoid. Of the three case studies, South 
Africa stands out as moral rights have played a more important role in its 
peacebuilding attempts: they were traditionally used by those opposing apartheid and 
the Final Constitution tasks the Human Rights Commission with building a ‘culture of 
human rights’ in the country.215 Nevertheless, even in South Africa, the rights to 
property and vote on which this thesis focuses, have almost exclusively been the 
concerns of legal institutions, such as the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights, 
the Electoral Commission and the Constitutional Court. Considering that the purpose 
of this chapter is to devise a definition of how human rights are perceived and 
understood by peaceubuilders themselves, their biases in terms of the types of rights 
they seek to protect should inform the definitional exercise.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis therefore, human rights are tools that protect 
fundamental interests in the legal sphere; in other words, they make it possible to 
safeguard such interests by adjudicating them in courts of law or debating them in 
legislative forums. They come into existence through a different process than moral 
rights and each results in different remedies. However, these distinguishing 
characteristics between them do not mean that the two are not linked in any way. 
Legal and moral rights are connected by the fact that they both seek to protect the 
interests of the individual, albeit in different arenas. Despite their connections, this 
thesis focuses only on legal rights, as it is they that have monopolised the attention 
and resources of peacebuilders on the ground. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
Transition, and Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2007); Felisa Tibbits, 'Understanding What We Do: 
Emerging Models for Human Rights Education', International Review of Education, 48/3/4 (2002), 
159. 
214 Sara Clarke-Habibi, 'Transforming Worldviews: The Case of Education for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina', Journal of Transformative Education, 3 (2005), 33. 
215 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa [No. 108 of 1996] (henceforth SA Constitution), 
Section 184(1)(a). 
  84 
5. Domestic and international legal human rights 
 
Peacebuilding reports frequently refer to the need to protect human rights in 
ethnically divided, post-conflict societies, but they never clarify whether by that they 
mean domestic or international protection. Practice on the ground is also ambivalent: 
peace agreements are usually accompanied by accession to an array of international 
human rights treaties, while at the same time, there is an increased focus on the 
strengthening and professionalisation of the domestic judiciary. This ambiguity could 
be explained by the fact that superficially the two categories of human rights look 
alike since they even tend to be worded in the same way. Nevertheless, a distinction 
between domestic and international human rights is necessary due to institutional and 
normative differences between them; in turn, these affect the way in which each 
relates to peace. However, while it is important to be aware of the differences 
between domestic and international rights, it is less easy to clearly distinguish 
between the two in practice. Constitutional Courts interpreting domestic human rights 
can be influenced by international practices and jurisprudence, while international 
courts tend to take into account the specific context of the country in which their 
judgement will be implemented, thus creating overlaps between the two spheres.  
 
In The Law of Peoples Rawls distinguishes between ‘constitutional rights’ and 
‘human rights’, by which he means international human rights, and argues that the 
purpose of the latter is to ‘restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and 
[…] specify limits to a regime’s internal autonomy.’216 Accordingly, if a regime 
violates international human rights, it loses its legitimacy and authority to prevent the 
international community from intervening in its internal affairs: the international 
community can publicly criticise the regime’s actions, impose diplomatic and 
economic sanctions, or in particularly grave cases use military force in the name of 
human rights protection. While the purpose and nature of constitutional rights is left 
unclear, Rawls argues that their content and extent of protection are broader than 
those of international human rights. This argument has one great advantage: by 
putting the emphasis on national sovereignty rather than the protection of the 
individual, it provides a clear reason for the distinction between domestic and 
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international rights. To put it in interest terms, human rights arise because they 
promote certain interests, which weigh more heavily than any other contradicting 
considerations that might exist. The reason domestic human rights generally attract 
greater protection than international ones is due to the contradicting consideration of 
protecting national sovereignty, which is a factor on the international, but not on the 
domestic plane. 
 
However, while the emphasis on national sovereignty makes an important 
contribution in explaining the distinction between domestic and international human 
rights, Rawls’ theory is ultimately unpersuasive for two reasons. First, Rawls does not 
offer any guidelines as to how to determine which rights are international human 
rights other than the fact that they should be universally accepted.217 As a result, he 
mentions that the right to freedom from slavery and serfdom and the right to liberty 
(but not equal liberty) of conscience should be protected, but offers contradictory 
guidance about what else should be included in the list of international human 
rights.218 For instance, he argues that ‘the right to life (to the means of subsistence and 
security)’ should be protected on the international plane, but he subsequently restricts 
human rights protection to the much more limited ‘security of ethnic groups from 
mass murder and genocide’.219 The second problem with Rawls’ theory is that in 
addition to not being clear about the human rights it applies to, it does not accurately 
describe the actual international human rights practice. For instance, it does not 
account for the practices of monitoring and reporting of international human rights, 
which regularly take place and infringe on national sovereignty even in cases of minor 
violations. Moreover, it does it explain the role in the protection of human rights of 
other international players, such as non-governmental organisations, which tend to be 
particularly active in peacebuilding contexts.220  
 
Nevertheless, while Rawls’ theory is underdeveloped and ultimately unpersuasive, 
there are good reasons why a distinction between domestic and international rights 
should be maintained, both on the institutional and the normative level. On the 
institutional level, international bodies cannot make the same demands for the 
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protection of human rights as domestic bodies because they do not have an equally 
developed framework to support them. While domestic courts have the backup of 
effective sanctions, international courts have to rely on the goodwill of the state 
parties for the enforcement of their decisions. Sanctions are in principle available to 
international bodies as a way of encouraging enforcement, but political and 
diplomatic considerations often make them unavailable in practice. Among 
international human rights bodies, by far the most institutionally developed and 
therefore most likely to produce the most ambitious jurisprudence is the ECtHR, yet 
even that has resulted in restrictive case law and an inability to enforce its decisions 
where the interests of the state are seriously threatened. In contrast, if the ruling of a 
domestic court is ignored, this can result in a constitutional crisis, which could have 
serious repercussions, potentially challenging the foundations of the country’s 
Constitution and democracy. Consequently, international courts, being aware of their 
limitations, take this factor into account and are more likely to confer a margin of 
appreciation to the respondent state than domestic ones.  
 
Moreover, international Courts are reluctant to interfere in a state’s national 
sovereignty when the circumstances of the case are in some way unique or when the 
right in question has varying interpretations in different member states. Thus, the 
ECtHR has stated that a wide margin of appreciation will be afforded to the 
respondent state when ‘there is no consensus within the member states of the Council 
of Europe, either as to the relative importance of the interest at stake or as to the best 
means of protecting it’.221 This is again, due to an acknowledgement by the European 
Court of its inherent institutional limitations: its judges, who come from different 
member states often lack the expertise and domestic knowledge to understand the 
context in which a decision will be applied or the way a certain issue will be 
perceived by the society more generally. Because of these limitations in their 
understanding of the case, international judges rightly often defer to the domestic 
authorities. As a result, the Court has held that ‘[b]y reason of their direct and 
continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, state authorities are in 
principle in a better position than the international judge to give an opinion’ on certain 
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controversial issues, such as moral or ethical issues.222 Thus, a further potential 
difference between domestic and international rights is that the former tend to be 
considered more legitimate by the public because there is less of a sense that outsiders 
are intervening in their domestic affairs. 
 
The institutional reasons for adopting a more restrictive interpretation of international 
rights, even if their wording is identical to that of constitutional rights, stem from one 
normative reason, namely the importance of national sovereignty. International 
human rights give effect to different interests that merit protection, but these interests 
have to be balanced against contradicting considerations of respecting national 
sovereignty. The extent to which such national sovereignty considerations can act as a 
‘conversation stopper’ to allegations of human rights is a matter of degree: it depends 
on the seriousness of the violation, the ability of the international community to react 
to that violation, its perceived legitimacy and impartiality and the type of intervention 
envisaged. Sometimes a state will not be able to use the principle of national 
sovereignty to defend itself from criticism or from the legal consequences that stem 
from rights violations, but that principle is something that should always be taken into 
account and shape the distinction between domestic and international rights. There is 
nothing morally wrong with this proposition: each country should have the power to 
determine its own ‘basic political culture’ and to make up its own policy decisions. 
Unless such policies seriously affect international human rights, it should not be the 
responsibility of the international community to intervene, even if the domestic courts 
could (according to the international community’s assessment) have acted differently. 
 
The distinction between domestic and international rights might seem counter-
intuitive to those who seek to maximise human rights protection on the global level, 
but it is reflective of how human rights operate in practice. In order to come up with a 
coherent description of international human rights practice, some basic facts about the 
world need to be taken into account. These include the fact that the world consists of a 
system of territorially defined political units, each claiming to exercise legitimate 
political authority within its borders. Thus, to quote Beitz: 
  
                                               
222 Handyside v. United Kingdom (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 737 at [48]. 
  88 
‘any plausible view of the justifying purposes of a practice of human rights must be 
compatible with the fact that the state constitutes the basic unit of the world’s 
political organization. A theory of human rights is not a theory of ideal global 
justice.’223  
 
Moreover, the emphasis on national sovereignty acknowledges that even justified 
international interventions in a country’s domestic affairs are always accompanied by 
the danger that human rights language and institutions can be abused by States in 
order to interfere in another’s national affairs. It is for this reason that international 
courts have rightly tended to be even more deferential when deciding cases 
influencing national security considerations, which go to the heart of national 
sovereignty. This danger is confirmed by Raz who argues that international human 
rights should not be determined ‘merely by the moral limits to the authority of states, 
but also by the possibility of morally sound interference by others.’224 
 
However, while the distinction between domestic and international rights is clear in 
theory, it starts fading when applied to practical situations on the ground. For 
example, a first glance to the Cypriot and South African jurisprudence would indicate 
that the former is based on international and the latter on domestic human rights 
protections. Yet a closer look points to a more nuanced picture: while the majority of 
Cypriot cases are being dealt with at the ECtHR level, a recent development, the 
Immovable Property Commission, is made up by both domestic and international 
judges. Moreover, South African human rights jurisprudence is exclusively developed 
by domestic courts, yet the Constitution states that when interpreting the Bill of 
Rights, they ‘must consider international law’.225 This provision has been applied by 
the Constitutional Court, which has, for example, stated in a case concerning the right 
to vote, that ‘[i]nternational and regional human rights instruments provide a useful 
guide in understanding the duty to facilitate public involvement in the context of our 
country.’226 However, it is the Bosnian case study that intertwines domestic and 
international human rights law the most. On the one hand, the country is a member to 
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a number of international human rights treaties and different bodies of the Council of 
Europe have taken an active interest in reforming its Constitution. On the other, while 
it enjoys a strong Constitutional Court, this consists of 3 international judges in 
addition to the 6 Bosnian nationals.227 Moreover, the efforts to protect property rights 
in the country were initiated by the High Representative, an internationally appointed 
official, but eventually the project was completed by the Bosnian local authorities.  
 
Ultimately, the distinction between domestic and international rights should be made 
clear, irrespective of whether in practice the two tend to overlap, since their 
differences can affect the way in which each contributes to peace. They are 
interpreted by different bodies, are affected by varying considerations and, as a result, 
they have distinct characteristics. Domestic rights are generally more broadly 
interpreted, more readily enforced and usually considered more legitimate by the 
people than international ones. At the same time, the distance between international 
judges and the country in question can give them perspective, minimise perceptions of 
ethnic bias and provide them with greater knowledge of international practices. The 
context of the conflict and the extent of the international community’s involvement in 
the broader peacebuilding operation are likely to determine whether human rights 
protection will mostly take place on the domestic or international level, and as a 




My aim in this chapter was to show that contrary to the international community’s 
assumptions, the term ‘human rights’ is in need of a definition and to offer one that 
would be helpful in determining the relationship between it and peace. The most 
appropriate method in this respect was not to argue for the best philosophical account 
of human rights, but to opt for that definition which is accepted and used by 
peacebuilders themselves. Therefore, drawing from peacebuilding reports and 
practices, I concluded that human rights are about protecting interests that are 
fundamental in nature, through legal means. Such protection can take place on the 
domestic or the international level with the two frequently coexisting and affecting 
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each other, but ultimately remaining distinct. This definition has been derived by 
making certain choices and as a result, leaving out characteristics of human rights that 
could also be helpful in peacebuilding processes. For example, had I defined human 
rights as morally, in addition to legally, protected fundamental interests, it would be 
possible to determine a relationship between them and peace, which would be 
different to the one proposed in the following chapters. Nevertheless, such a 
definition would be less useful because it would be compromising clear and robust 
conclusions for the sake of inclusiveness, thus making little progress over the existing 
assumptions about the relationship between the two terms. Moreover, it would be less 
relevant to policy makers on the ground, who have favoured the legal protection of 
human rights as their preferred peacebuilding tool.  
 
This definition of human rights already points to a number of conclusions about the 
relationship between them and peace. On the one hand, if each human right protects 
numerous and sometimes conflicting fundamental interests, various human rights can 
have different types of relationships with peace. Furthermore, what we mean by 
human rights slightly varies from country to country depending on whether 
peacebuilders have preferred to use domestic or international human rights. These 
characteristics make it necessary to examine the effect of particular rights in specific 
contexts, an exercise that is undertaken in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. It is however possible 
and desirable to reach some more general conclusions about the relationship between 
peace and human rights as well. For instance, since human rights are about the legal 
protection of fundamental interests, their peacebuilding effects are likely to be felt 
through the amendment of laws and by changing state practices and the workings of 
public bodies; ultimately, their contributions are concerned with institutional changes, 
rather than with how these are perceived by the people on the ground. Related, is the 
fact that human rights tend to focus on the peacebuilding contribution of lawyers and 
policy makers, as opposed to that of other professionals, such as teachers, religious 
leaders or psychologists. These more theoretical conclusions, which already start 
pointing to a more qualified understanding of the assumed positive relationship in 
question, are explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
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A better understanding of what we mean by the terms peace and human rights 
challenges the perception that the relationship between them is simple, without need 
of justification, and always positive. Rather, it points to different, and sometimes 
conflicting, connections between the latter and each of the three elements. Human 
rights can be promoted, but also restricted in the name of security and while they are 
often perceived as synonymous with justice, they might also inadvertently undermine 
it. For example, human rights can help criminalise and prosecute dangerous conduct, 
thus promote security, but they might also have to be limited in light of public safety 
considerations. Similarly, protecting them ensures that injustices will not be repeated 
in the future, but their inability to reflect the subtleties of the conflict – where for 
example a person is both the perpetrator and the victim – can also undermine feelings 
of justice. Finally, in addition to these positive and negative connections, it is also 
possible that there is no relation at all between the elements, especially reconciliation, 
and human rights: either peace can be promoted through mechanisms and tools that 
are unconnected to human rights altogether, or, in those cases that human rights have 
a contribution to make, this is relatively specific. They will only induce legal and 
institutional amendments and ignore political, socio-economic and psychological 
changes that are also necessary to build peace. 
 
This analysis provides the first evidence against the liberal peacebuilding approach, of 
which human rights are at the centrepiece. Liberal peacebuilding assumes that 
institutional and legal amendments more-or-less automatically result in changes to the 
perceptions of the public and lead to peace. Nevertheless, the different types of 
connections between security, justice, reconciliation and human rights, coupled with 
the fact that these elements sometimes contradict between themselves, suggest that 
the relationship in question is more nuanced and the journey towards peace more 
difficult to navigate than liberal peacebuilders believe. In particular, it transpires that 
even when human rights can help, they are unable to build peace on their own and 
they have to be supplemented by other tools and mechanisms as well. Finally, 
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disputing the liberal assumption that there is one peacebuilding recipe that fits all, the 
chapter argues that in order for human rights to build peace as effectively as possible, 
they have to operate under certain conditions and within a given context. Thus, 
bearing in mind that ethnically divided societies differ significantly between 
themselves, the extent to which human rights can contribute to peace in each of them 
is also likely to vary.  
 
2. The relationship between human rights and security 
 
Security exists when people are feeling safe from physical threats, such as war, 
internal conflict and serious crime, issues that are generally dealt with through 
targeted policies and coordinated governmental action. Consequently, at a first glance, 
human rights, with their primary focus on the interests of individuals and their 
capacity to be enforced through judicial decisions, do not seem to relate much to 
security. However, upon further inspection, it transpires that security and human 
rights are connected both in positive and negative ways. If security is understood as a 
negative concept, it requires the non-interference of the state with a person’s 
fundamental interests. Under this definition, the greatest threat to security is posed by 
the state itself and human rights can help curb its power. Alternatively, security can 
be understood as a positive concept, which can only be promoted if the state takes 
action, sometimes human rights limiting action, against external threats.228 These 
conclusions contradict the assumption of a merely positive relationship between 
human rights and peace. In any case, even in situations where human rights can 
contribute to security, this depends on some security already being present in the 
country; human rights cannot simply start building it from scratch. 
 
Despite expectations that the protection of human rights results in greater security in 
post-conflict societies, often the most effective security-promoting methods are not 
connected to human rights at all. Human rights are primarily concerned with 
protecting the interests of individual right-holders rather than the general well being. 
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Security threats on the other hand, are usually felt by the society as a whole and are 
more effectively resolved through coordinated governmental action. For example, the 
single most important step that increased feelings of security among Greek Cypriots 
was Cyprus joining the EU. One of the conditions that had to be met in order to join 
the EU was the protection of human rights; nevertheless, this was not a major 
consideration or hurdle for the Cypriot government or people, since Cyprus already 
had a long record of respect for human rights.229 The decision to join the EU was a 
political one and required the coordination of a number of governmental bodies; it 
was a policy decision, which neither could nor should be instituted by the Courts or 
by applicants advocating their individual interests.230  
 
Similarly, the best way to promote security in South Africa (SA) is to improve police 
and prison services so that they can deal with the high crime rates and challenge the 
culture of violence that exists in the country. Case law dealing with the shortcomings 
of existing practices in relation to human rights might help promote these objectives 
incrementally, but political decisions for sweeping changes are likely to be more 
effective. Making the police service more efficient, reducing the high number of 
firearms that exist in the country and better organising the criminal justice system are 
among the policies that, although unconnected to human rights, could make important 
contributions to security. The limited effect that human rights protections can have on 
security is also confirmed by the NATO-led SFOR (Stabilisation Force) military 
mission and its follow-up EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH).231 The main objective of both missions was ‘to maintain the safe and secure 
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environment in BiH’, yet neither of their mission statements makes any reference to 
human rights protections at all.232  
 
Moreover, victims of human rights violations during wartime are likely to be afraid of 
the recurrence of violence, even if such a scenario is in the eyes of outsiders 
objectively unlikely. However, human rights empower Courts to only act against 
obvious and objectively recognised threats. Vague and general fears among the 
population about their physical security might be genuine and be felt very strongly, 
but they cannot be dealt with through the protection of human rights. Thus, it is 
unlikely that their protection will make any meaningful contributions in situations 
where security (and peace more generally) requires that psychological change takes 
place. For example, it has been suggested that some Bosniacs are still concerned 
about a Croatian military attack to their country, especially now that Croatia has 
joined the EU and is more powerful than ever.233 Unrealistic as this scenario might be, 
it promotes feelings of insecurity among the population, yet human rights cannot 
really do much to alleviate them. What are needed instead are coordinated strategies 
that affect the whole of the country and have a real impact on the ground. Such 
security-promoting mechanisms, include demining, disarmament of ex-combatants 
and their reintegration into society, dealing with the organised crime that emerged 
during the conflict and developing good political relations with ex-enemies.  
 
While a number of security-promoting measures are not related to human rights at all, 
to the extent that the two are connected, their relationship can be both positive and 
negative. The main way in which human rights can positively contribute to security is 
through those rights traditionally understood as ‘negative rights’ and which were 
intended to promote freedom from fear by outlawing sources of insecurity. Such 
rights include the right to life and freedom from torture, which acquire a particularly 
important role in post-conflict contexts where their violations were frequent 
occurrences. The simplest way in which these human rights contribute to security is 
by empowering the Courts to convict and imprison their violators. In this way the 
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victims are likely to feel safer knowing that they cannot be harmed by their 
tormenters again and the general public is more secure in the knowledge that 
dangerous individuals are now powerless to take the country back into conflict.234 
Examples of such use of human rights include convictions of perpetrators of 
international crimes during the war by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Bosnian domestic courts. Moreover, human rights 
can contribute to feelings of security when they are included in the Constitutions of 
post-conflict States and act as reminders that human rights violations of the past will 
not be tolerated in the future. In this sense, the South African Constitution is telling: 
making explicit references to its violent apartheid past, it protects, in addition to 
traditional human rights, ‘the right to freedom and security of the person, which 
includes the right … to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private 
sources.’235 However, while in itself inspiring, the stark contrast between the 
constitutional provision and the high levels of insecurity in the country (mostly due to 
violent crime), acts as a reminder that it is not the legal text that is important, but the 
effect it actually has on the ground.  
 
These examples show the positive contributions that human rights can make to 
security, but they also point to their limitation: in order for human rights to be able to 
contribute to this objective, some security must already be present on the ground. 
Their protection cannot build security from scratch. While for example, the ICTY 
started operating in 1993 with the express objective of helping to stop the war in the 
Balkans and promote security in the region, the single most deadly attack in BiH, the 
Srebrenica massacre, took place in 1995.236 In the midst of the utter chaos that was the 
Bosnian war, legal protections of human rights could achieve nothing; it was 
necessary for some security to be established through other means – in this case the 
NATO bombings, which paradoxically also undermined security – before their effect 
could be felt. Moreover, despite the legal protection of a number of rights relating to 
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freedom from fear in the South African Constitution, feelings of insecurity remain 
high in the country. What is needed is to promote security by dealing with high crime 
rates through other means, and when that has yielded results, the protection of human 
rights will be able to make greater contributions to the security objectives.  
 
In any case, while security can be promoted through the protection of human rights, it 
is also possible, especially in post conflict contexts, that it will make rights-limiting 
demands as well. This happens when one adopts a positive conception of the term, 
which requires that the state takes steps in order to protect citizens from external 
threats. It is under this positive conception of security that general interests that can 
limit human rights acquire their legitimacy: for example, it is acknowledged that the 
state must take action, even human rights-limiting action, when that is necessary and 
proportionate for the protection of, inter alia, ‘national security’, the ‘maintenance of 
public safety’ and the ‘prevention of disorder or crime’. Especially in national 
security situations, courts have given the authorities a wide margin of appreciation or 
deference, to the detriment of human rights protections.237 This tension between 
security and human rights becomes most apparent when states formally derogate from 
their human rights obligations because they perceive the harm they are trying to avoid 
to be so immediate and serious that it is ‘threatening the life of the nation’.238 Thus, in 
addition to the non-existent and positive connections between human rights and 
security (and consequently peace), there is a very real negative one as well. 
 
Problematically, however, the idea that security can also undermine human rights 
does not seem to have been appreciated much. For instance, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights has published a report discussing the importance of 
‘citizen security’ in the region.239 It argues that citizen security is undermined 
whenever the State fails to protect its population from crime and social violence. 
Further, it lists a number of rights, such as the right to life, personal liberty and 
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security, fair trial and property, and persuasively argues that their protection is 
integrally linked to citizen security. However, it fails to point out that the most 
frequently used way in which citizens are protected from crime and social violence is 
through the criminal law, which can also result in the limitation of human rights, 
especially when it is used excessively and without the necessary safeguards. An 
overuse of the criminal law might increase citizen security, but could potentially also 
be detrimental to the human rights of the people, and in particular to the rights of 
those who tend to be disproportionately targeted by the authorities in relation to the 
rest of the population (young men of specific ethnic/racial origins).240  
 
Another example in which a positive conception of security requires the limitation of 
human rights becomes obvious through the ‘peace v. justice’ debate. In 1996 and 
shortly after the Dayton Agreement ending the war in BiH had been signed, an 
influential and anonymous article was written by one of the people involved in the 
negotiations.241 It argued that the international community’s insistence on the 
protection of human rights delayed the conclusion of the peace agreement and 
prolonged the insecurity of a number of victims on the ground. Conversely, there have 
been arguments that unless human rights are protected, the war is likely to resume, so 
a peace agreement that is negotiated to the detriment of real human rights protections 
promotes security only temporarily and in a superficial way.242 This debate has been 
labelled the ‘peace v. justice’ debate, with advocates of ‘peace’ arguing that security 
should have priority over human rights protection and proponents of ‘justice’ 
contending the opposite. Attempts have been made to downplay the differences 
between the two points of view by arguing that they are not necessarily incompatible 
with each other: the objective, irrespective of what is being prioritised by each school 
of thought, is always to achieve ‘peace with justice’ because ‘the absence of justice is 
often the primary reason for the absence of peace’.243 However, the observation that 
often security cannot be achieved without protecting human rights does not negate the 
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fact that, especially in post-conflict situations, security also makes rights-limiting 
demands, thus sometimes requiring the prioritisation of one over the other. 
 
This analysis suggests that the relationship between security and human rights 
consists of a lot more than merely a positive connection between the two. In addition 
to the expected positive contributions that human rights can make to security, it is also 
possible that the two are unconnected or that the promotion of security will require 
the limitation of human rights. Moreover, even in cases where there is a positive 
relationship between the two, the ways in which human rights can help are quite 
limited and specific. Security’s demand that people must be feeling safe from physical 
threats requires both that they are objectively secure and that people’s subjective 
feelings reflect that. While however, human rights can take some steps in terms of the 
former, their contribution to the latter is minimal. They might be well-suited in 
dealing with the legal and institutional demands of peace, but not the psychological 
ones. Finally, for human rights to promote security it is necessary that other 
mechanisms have already been used and some security has already been established. 
Building security from scratch is something that can only be achieved through 
genuine political willingness to abandon arms, which human rights cannot replace. 
 
3. The relationship between human rights and justice 
 
Post-conflict justice, it was argued in Chapter 2, is promoted by ensuring that the 
injustices of the past are remedied and are not repeated again in the future. Its positive 
connection to human rights is often assumed rather than justified, so this section aims 
to explain in what specific ways one can promote the other. It argues in particular that 
the legal nature of human rights empowers victims to demand, and not merely hope, 
to be remedied for past injustices and judicially guarantees their non-repetition in the 
future. Nevertheless, in order for such contributions to be made, it is necessary that 
certain conditions, such as that the parties have agreed on a peace settlement, are 
satisfied. Moreover, these positive connections between human rights and justice 
should not cloud the fact that the latter might also explicitly require, or at least 
inadvertently lead to, the limitation of the former. Finally, this section draws attention 
to instances of injustice that cannot always be labelled as human rights violations, 
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thus leaving a gap in the peacebuilding operation that will have to be addressed by 
alternative methods. 
 
The idea that human rights and justice are positively connected originates from the 
preambles of human rights conventions themselves, which are almost always based 
on the premise that human rights protection is ‘the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world’. These preambles were inspired by the experiences of the Second 
World War and the need to create mechanisms to ensure that the injustices perpetrated 
during that period were not repeated again. Over the years, the connection between 
justice and human rights has been repeated so often that it has sometimes even been 
assumed that the two concepts are identical or that utterances of their positive 
relationship are not in need of justification. For example, when writing on the growth 
of the human rights doctrine, Michael Akehurst made the seemingly uncontroversial 
observation that ‘[i]t was only after the United Nations Charter was signed in 1945 
that any attempt was made to provide comprehensive protection for all individuals 
against all forms of injustice.’244 Similarly, despite Paul Gready’s critical approach 
towards transitional justice and his urging to reconceptualise the concept in order to 
make it more useful in practice, he casually conflates it with human rights by arguing 
that ‘[h]uman rights and justice are seen as an alternative to war.’245 However, such 
broad statements are ultimately unhelpful because they hide more than they illuminate 
about the relationship in question. 
 
Rejecting this general positive relationship, I argue that human rights can contribute 
to the promotion of justice in three specific ways. When we are referring to injustices 
that take place during conflicts, we usually mean killings, forceful taking of properties 
and acting in a discriminatory way against certain groups of people, all of which can 
be expressed as human rights violations as well. Thus, the first important contribution 
that human rights can make to justice is to provide the legal tools for victims to 
demand that they are remedied for the injustices that took place during the war. 
Claims of injustices through the human rights vocabulary are particularly likely to be 
heard and remedied because of the legitimacy attached to them and the stigma that is 
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associated with their violations.246 Take for example the injustices that were 
committed during apartheid South Africa: the international community reacted to 
them in the strongest terms and started imposing economic sanctions against the 
apartheid government after they were described as human rights violations in the 
Apartheid Convention.247 
 
A related advantage to being able to label various injustices as human rights 
violations is that their legal nature can push unwilling politicians to start remedying 
them. This is particularly important in post-conflict societies where at least some of 
the players are likely to be uncooperative and resist change towards peace. 
Remedying injustices is not only important for applicants who are likely to be directly 
affected, but it also has a strong communicative effect on the rest of the population.248 
Ideally, it sends the message that things are changing and that this is a new, more 
legitimate state of affairs that deserves the support of the people.249 For instance, the 
complaint by a group of South Africans that they should have been consulted before a 
legislation directly affecting their interests was passed, led the Constitutional Court to 
invalidate the law and order that a consultation procedure take place before it was 
redebated.250 In its reasoning, the Court explicitly contrasted the democratic South 
Africa that the applicants are currently living in to the apartheid, human-rights 
violating regime that they had left behind.251 Reflective of the broader significance of 
the case to the rest of the population is the fact that the Court’s insistence that South 
Africa should be a deliberative, and not merely participatory democracy, gave rise to 
expectations, and set a legal precedent that this would indeed reflect the new state of 
affairs in the country.252 
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Finally, it has been argued that human rights promote justice by ensuring that past 
injustices will not be repeated again in the future. Courts can in theory achieve this by 
punishing past human rights violations, which in turn deters such future behaviour.253 
However, the effectiveness of trials to set an example has been questioned, with 
opponents persuasively arguing that there is no empirical evidence or sound theory in 
support of expectations of deterrence.254 Perhaps a more realistic way in which human 
rights can prevent future injustices is through the broad powers usually given to 
Constitutional Courts in post-conflict countries to invalidate legislation and hold 
governments to account when enacted laws are contrary to human rights standards.255 
Both the Bosnian and the South African Constitutional Courts have used these powers 
and referred to the past injustices and the need to prevent their repetition in the future. 
For example, Judge Van Der Westuizen justified his insistence on the importance of 
the right to vote by making extensive reference to South Africa’s ‘shameful apartheid 
past’.256 Similarly, in its decision to amend the Constitution of the Republika Srpska, 
the BiH Constitutional Court referred to past discriminatory practices on numerous 
occasions.257 A final example from the Cypriot context can be used to illustrate the 
contribution of human rights protection both in remedying past injustices and 
preventing future ones from occurring: it was the right to property that empowered 
Greek Cypriot (GC) displaced people to express their sense of injustice for being 
forcefully evicted from their homes and demand in an internationally understood and 
legitimate language both that they are remedied for these violations and that a future 
peace agreement should prevent them from continuing or being repeated again in the 
future. 
 
However, while the justice-promoting properties of human rights cannot be ignored, it 
is also important to acknowledge that their protection might also have the reverse 
effect. Whether an action is perceived as just or not depends on a range of contextual 
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factors, which can rarely be accurately reflected through the black and white 
dichotomies of the human rights language.258 Since human rights are morally loaded 
concepts, perpetrators of violations are always presented as villains and diametrically 
opposed to them are the disempowered victims.259 Yet, this picture rarely reflects the 
complex justice terrain of a post-conflict society. It ignores that someone can be both 
a victim and a perpetrator of human rights violations and that there are those who 
committed violations, yet in the eyes of the people, acted justly. A classic example of 
such an ambivalent figure is Winnie Mandela who suffered greatly as a victim in the 
hands of the apartheid regime, but was also responsible for human rights violations 
herself; violations, which some members of the black community consider justified. 
Moreover, Borer persuasively argues that it might be appropriate for the purposes of 
justice to create different categories of perpetrators depending on the culpability of 
their actions (direct, indirect, institutional and passive perpetrators), yet none of these 
subtleties can be expressed through human rights language.260 However, this inability 
of human rights to accurately label the protagonists of the conflict suggests that they 
will be unable to promote, and might even undermine, feelings of justice among the 
population. 
 
A similar limitation of human rights exists in relation to victims. Prosecutions of 
human rights violations tend to only deal with an arbitrarily narrow segment of 
injustices caused during the war, either because these are deemed more important than 
others or due to evidentiary reasons. However, decisions to only deal with specific 
types of violations often mean that those who suffered by unjust policies in other 
ways are not formally considered victims. This changes the way different types of 
harms caused by the war are portrayed, and as a result, people’s perception of how the 
previous regime acted unjustly. For example, the fact that the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission in South Africa (SA) did not deal with discriminatory 
practices in all areas of life, but only limited itself to specific violent crimes, made 
such injustices less condemnable and those who committed them less likely to 
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apologise for their actions. Thus, promoting justice exclusively through the protection 
of human rights can make victims feel doubly victimised since they are likely to feel 
that the injustices they have suffered have not been recognised or remedied. This 
inability of human rights to accurately describe a person’s experiences during the 
conflict, does not only undermine justice, but can also have similar effects on 
reconciliation, something that is examined in more detail in the next section. 
 
Perhaps more fundamentally, it should be acknowledged that in addition to human 
rights inadvertently undermining justice, their limitation might also be explicitly 
required by it. This is doubly complicated by the fact that often what justice requires 
in the first place is in itself ambiguous and uncertain. Take for example the 
controversy surrounding property rights in Cyprus. GC argue that since they were 
forcefully displaced from their homes and are still prevented from returning to them, 
the passage of time should not undermine the strength of their property titles. If they 
wish to, they should have a right to return, irrespective of who has been living in their 
property and for how long.261 They point to European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) cases following Loizidou v. Turkey, which confirm that their forced 
displacement and continuation of the practice are violations of the right to property.262 
Turkish Cypriots (TC) on the other hand, argue that forcing them to abandon the (GC) 
houses they have been occupying since 1974, when some of them have lived their 
whole lives there, would be an injustice in itself. While the forced displacements of 
the past were wrong, attempts to undo these injustices should not create new ones 
and, as a result, GC should be content with compensation of their lost properties. 
Supporting their claims are ECtHR statements that ‘with the passage of time the 
holding of a title may be emptied of any practical consequences’.263 Thus, if post-
conflict justice requires that injustices of the past are remedied and future ones are 
prevented, GC are concerned with the first part of the definition and TC with the 
second. Ultimately, what is just is often not clear in the first place. However, 
irrespective of which approach is preferred in the end, either Greek or Turkish 
Cypriots’ rights will have to be limited in the name of justice. 
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This example also points to the fact that even in situations where human rights can 
contribute to justice, they can be effective in this regard only under certain conditions, 
the most important of which is that a peace agreement concerning the future of the 
ethnically divided, post-conflict society has already been reached. One should not 
expect human rights to give ‘the right answer’ as to what justice in a given context 
demands because a number of proposals might be compatible with it. The expectation 
that human rights will somehow be able to replace political willingness to negotiate 
by pointing to the right answers and leaving nationalist leaders with a fait accompli 
they cannot escape, grossly overestimates their peacebuilding and justice-promoting 
potential. This is particularly so in relation to international human rights, which are 
limited by the margin of appreciation, especially in atypical contexts, such as those of 
ethnically divided societies. As McEvoy and Rebouche rightly put it in the context of 
legally-induced change more generally, ‘[t]he organised legal profession is likely to 
follow or at least move alongside rather than lead a process of change.’264 Thus, 
frequent demands from officials that the proposed solution to the Cypriot problem 
should be compatible with human rights and respect people’s status as European 
citizens, cannot meaningfully contribute to peace since a series of human rights-
compatible proposals that would be acceptable to one side’s sense of justice but 
unacceptable to the other’s, would satisfy this requirement.265 
 
Finally, and much like security, it should also be recognised that ‘matters of justice 
can be highly important in our lives without being matters of human rights’;266 as a 
result, the protection of human rights is in itself not enough to promote justice and 
other policies will also have to be adopted. This observation is particularly relevant in 
cases of economic rights and social justice. Especially where the conflict has been a 
long one, it is possible that social injustices will have arisen between different groups: 
the apartheid policies in SA have created huge differences in terms of wealth between 
blacks and whites, while the international embargo and isolation of the areas not 
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under the control of the Republic of Cyprus (henceforth, Republic or ROC), has left 
GC generally more well-off than TC. In both cases justice dictates that such injustices 
are remedied and measures are taken to prevent their continuation and repetition. 
However, it is unclear whether such a plea for justice can be expressed in human 
rights terms. Even if blacks in SA and TC in Cyprus are considerably poorer than 
whites and GC respectively, it does not follow that their human rights are being 
violated.267 In their majority they still have shelter, food and work, thus suggesting 
that the situation might be unjust and in need of state attention, but not in itself a 
violation of economic rights.268 Ultimately therefore, justice makes broader demands 
than human rights and a failure to acknowledge this increases the risk of ‘confusing 
rights with equality or legal recognition with emancipation.’269  
 
Even in cases where the socio-economic condition of a particular applicant is so grave 
that it can amount to a human rights violation, this is only likely to promote justice to 
a limited extent. On the one hand, labelling this situation as a violation of human 
rights can in theory promote justice because it sends the message that the victim 
deserves a better standard of living and that action from the government is a matter of 
entitlement rather than charity. On the other hand however, economic rights are rarely 
implemented and they tend to make very little headway in terms of promoting justice 
in practice. The obligation of the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights on each member state ‘to take steps […] to the maximum of its 
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization’ of the 
rights therein often makes its provisions practically meaningless.270 Moreover, even 
though the South African Constitution makes socio-economic rights justiciable, these 
have not made a huge difference to the lives of the people.271 Their adjudication has 
led to some notable successes, but in general the judiciary has granted the government 
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a wide deference in these issues.272 In turn, despite its rhetoric, the SA government 
has failed to take firm action to deal with the social injustices created by the apartheid 
regime.273  
 
The fact that justice makes broad demands that sometimes fall outside the ambit of 
human rights can have profound consequences for peacebuilding. Even if an injustice 
could be loosely expressed as a human rights violation, it does not necessarily follow 
that remedying that violation will also undo the injustice. Take for example the forced 
displacement of people, an injustice that also tends to be expressed as a violation of 
the right to property. While a big part of it has to do with the loss of one’s property, as 
the right correctly identifies, forced displacement is such a great injustice because it 
also has to do with the loss of a community and security for the future. 
Problematically, neither of these additional injustices can be described through human 
rights language. Peacebuilders tend to assume that forced displacement is merely a 
legal problem of property titles being in the wrong hands, an injustice that can simply 
be unlegislated.274 As a result, they often protect the right to property, thus address the 
legal part of the injustice, and expect that no further action is needed to deal with the 
socio-economic or psychological consequences of forced displacement. This failure to 
understand that often human rights protection is only part of the process of undoing 
injustices offers an explanation for many of the failures of peacebuilding operations 
around the world. It is because of an overestimation of the justice-promoting potential 
of human rights that while restitution and compensation programmes are almost 
always present in peacebuilders’ agendas, the equally important steps of apologising 
for the forced displacement or offering post-restitution support are often absent.  
 
Peacebuilders have worked on the assumption that ‘the sustained protection of rights 
is essential for dealing with conflict constructively’ because it avoids ‘structural 
                                               
272 Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign (CCT 9/02) [2002] ZACC 16. 
273 The 2011 census showed that incomes for black households increased on average 169% over 10 
years, but their annual earnings are still approximately a sixth of those of whites. (Mike Cohen, 'South 
Africa’s Racial Income Inequality Persists, Census Shows', Bloomberg, 30 October 2012 on 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-30/south-africa-s-racial-income-inequality-persists-census-
shows.html [accessed 7 June 2013]. 
274 Theunis Roux, 'Land Restitution and Reconciliation in South Africa', in Francois Du Bois and Antje 
Du Bois-Pedain (eds.), Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Apartheid South Africa (Cambridge: CUP, 
2008). 
  107 
injustices and inequalities’.275 Nevertheless, the analysis in this section suggests that 
this is only a one-dimensional account of the relationship between justice and human 
rights. In addition to the positive connection that Parlevliet alludes to, justice could 
require that human rights are restricted, or it might inadvertently have this effect. In 
any case, if human rights are to promote justice, certain conditions must be satisfied: 
there must, for example, exist an agreement between the groups as to the structure of 
the post-conflict society they want to create. Finally, it is often the case that justice 
makes broader demands than human rights. There might be injustices, such as socio-
economic inequalities, that do not amount to human rights violations in the first place, 
or situations where an injustice can only be partially expressed in human rights terms. 
Even justice therefore, the one element of peace that is most closely associated to 
human rights, cannot be completely achieved through their protection. 
 
 
4. The relationship between human rights and reconciliation 
 
Reconciliation requires the forging of positive relationships between members of 
different ethnic groups, both on the personal and the political level. In order for such 
relationships to develop in post-conflict societies where members of the ‘other’ ethnic 
group have usually been dehumanised, it is necessary that perceptions about people’s 
identity are challenged and eventually some sort of trust is established between them. 
It is this process leading to the promotion of the final element of peace, that the 
Brahimi Report argues, can be aided through human rights protection. The report does 
not explain how exactly the protection of human rights will result in better-reconciled 
individuals and communities. It merely declares that ‘the human rights component of 
a peace operation is indeed critical to effective peace-building. United Nations human 
rights personnel can play a leading role, for example, in helping to implement a 
comprehensive programme for national reconciliation.’276 However, this expectation 
is only rarely confirmed through practical examples. In fact, most reconciliation-
promoting measures are not connected to human rights at all, and in some cases, there 
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might even be a negative relationship between the protection of the one and the 
promotion of the other.  
 
To the extent that human rights can promote security and justice, they can also 
indirectly contribute to reconciliation. It is after all, impossible to start (re)building 
positive relationships between groups if their members feel that they are under 
physical threat, that injustices are still taking place or that they are likely to be 
repeated. However, this relationship is only an incidental one since it is possible that 
human rights protection can promote security or justice at the same time as 
undermining reconciliation. An example of this is the prosecution of war criminals, 
which can contribute to a sense of security among the population and feelings of 
justice among the victims, but can undermine reconciliation, especially if all the 
defendants are members of the same ethnic group. Alternatively, it has been argued 
that ideas that are popularly associated with human rights, such as dignity and respect 
of the person, could promote reconciliation.277 Nevertheless, having rejected any 
necessary connection between human rights and foundational principles in favour of 
Raz’s political approach, this argument also becomes unpersuasive. A final way in 
which human rights can promote reconciliation is by challenging dominant narratives 
that present one group’s identity as diametrically opposed to the other’s. By 
highlighting the concerns that members of various ethnic groups have in common, 
human rights reject ideas of unavoidably conflicting interests between them. An 
example of this is the foundation of the Northern Ireland’s Women Coalition, the 
members of which, Protestant and Catholic alike, worked towards the protection of 
women’s rights. However, any contributions this made to reconciliation have not been 
the results of legally protected human rights and thus, fall outside the ambit of this 
analysis. 
 
The more one thinks about the positive contributions of human rights to 
reconciliation, the harder it becomes to find examples of them. In fact, it is more 
likely that legally protected human rights relate in negative, rather than positive ways 
to reconciliation. The law, with its black and white language and, in the context of 
post-conflict societies, sometimes artificially clear distinctions between perpetrators 
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and victims, is unlikely to accurately reflect people’s perceptions of reality. 
Furthermore, the determination of certain individuals as guilty perpetrators and others 
as the diametrically opposed innocent victims creates clear winners and losers. 
Importantly, these determinations are not just about the guilt or innocence of a 
specific individual, but are often perceived as determinations about their group as a 
whole. These characteristics and effects of human rights however, are likely to 
polarise members of the two sides and undermine reconciliation. Take for example, 
the GC cases to the ECtHR against Turkey:278 the GC understood the ECtHR 
decisions that Turkey was violating their human rights as a ‘win’ for their side and 
confirmation of their long-held belief that the only perpetrators in the conflict were 
the ‘others’. Moreover, since the applicants – and by extension, all GC – were the 
confirmed victims, this must mean that there were no TC victims in the conflict. On 
the other hand, the TC understood Turkey’s ‘loss’ at the ECtHR as another indication 
of the GC’ intention to isolate and punish them. With these polarised points of view 
and ample help from politicians ready to misinterpret the Court’s decisions in a way 
that confirmed each side’s dominant narrative, the cases seriously undermined rather 
than promoted any reconciliation attempts between the two communities.  
 
While this example suggests that internationally protected human rights entail clear 
dangers, their domestic protection could also have detrimental consequences for 
reconciliation. There is a mistaken assumption among peacebuilders that the judiciary 
is always progressive and independent, which has resulted in a tendency to view 
domestic courts separately from the larger institutional context in which they 
operate.279 Yet, this assumption is particularly problematic in relation to issues that 
have to do with ethnic identities, which deeply affect people’s perceptions of what is 
right, whether they have had legal training or not. The starkest example of this is the 
Constituent People’s case, described by the BiH Constitutional Court as ‘the case of 
all cases’,280 in which all domestic judges voted (and used human rights language in 
order to support their decision) in line with their ethnic groups’ interests. 
Characteristic of this is the allegation of one of the dissenting judges that the 
                                               
278 See in particular Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections); Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits). 
279 Erik G. Jensen, 'The Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy of Diverse 
Institutional Patterns and Reformers’ Responses', in Erik G. Jensen and Thomas C. Heller (eds.), 
Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003). 
280 U-98/5 (3rd Partial Opinion), Dissenting judgement by Judge Mirko Zovko. 
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(Bosniac) applicant had stated in a daily newspaper: ‘We need five votes for the 
Decision, three foreign Judges will probably vote for us, which means that in the 
worst case we will have five votes.’281 ‘Us’ in this case being the Bosniacs, with a 
clear indication that he took his ethnic group’s judges’ decision for granted. However, 
if the judiciary is perceived as ethnically biased, this can be a major setback for 
reconciliation attempts in the country. 
 
This example illustrates a further way in which human rights can undermine 
reconciliation attempts: judges can use them in order to justify intolerant or nationalist 
practices with which they personally agree. This was avoided in the Bosnian case due 
to the presence of the international judges in the Constitutional Court, but the danger 
materialised when Ibrahim Aziz v. Ministry of the Interior was heard in Cyprus.282 In 
that case the Supreme Court – exclusively composed of GC members – unanimously 
held that preventing TC from voting in all Republic elections since 1963 because of 
their ethnic group was neither a violation of the right to vote nor of freedom from 
discrimination. Case law that seems to favour one ethnic group over the other is 
generally a problem for reconciliation, a fact confirmed by Gibson and Gouws’ 
statistical evidence from SA, which suggests that an intolerant judgment by the 
Constitutional Court increases intolerant public attitudes in relation to the same issue 
from 58.3% to 75%.283 It is however particularly problematic when human rights 
language is used to support such judgments because it provides them with additional 
legitimacy and further undermines reconciliation attempts. Merely assuming that 
human rights are beneficial for peace because they empower judges, who always get 
it right, grossly overestimates the reconciliation-promoting potential of both judges 
and human rights. 
 
In addition to human rights protections undermining reconciliation attempts, the 
opposite is also true: the language of reconciliation can be used in such a way so as to 
prevent robust human rights protections. This danger, identified by McEvoy in his 
analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict, arises when the powerful group in the 
society argues that the ethnic conflict exists because of a lack of reconciliation rather 
                                               
281 Ibid., cited by Judge Mirko Zovko. 
282 Ibrahim Aziz v. Ministry of the Interior (Case No. 369/2001) (23/05/2001, ROC Supreme Court). 
283 James L. Gibson and Amanda Gouws, Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa: Experiments in 
Democratic Persuasion (Cambridge: CUP, 2003) at 173. 
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than due to human rights abuses.284 Attempts by the weaker party to label the problem 
as one of human rights violations are often dismissed as being too divisive. This 
tendency does not only exist in Northern Ireland, but is arguably a characteristic of 
ethnically divided, post-conflict societies more generally. An example where this 
danger has materialised is Bosnia and Herzegovina where shortly after the end of the 
war, the leaderships of all three ethnic groups committed to allow refugees to return to 
their homes and made vague political promises to this effect. This general talk of 
sustainable return (which was equated with reconciliation285) appeased and stopped 
the international community from demanding more robust strategies for the 
remedying of displaced people for half a decade, thus seriously undermining feelings 
of security and justice in the country.286 McEvoy’s warning should act as a reminder 
therefore, that reconciliatory language, especially where it crowds out more robust 
rights talk (and action), can often be abused and undermine, rather than promote, 
peacebuilding attempts in the country. 
 
Nonetheless, perhaps the most important observation about the relationship between 
reconciliation and human rights is that the two are often unconnected. As Philpott put 
it, ‘[t]hough reconciliation encompasses core commitments of the liberal tradition, 
such as human rights, it is a far more holistic concept’.287 Since reconciliation requires 
changing perceptions about our and the other’s identity, among the most effective 
ways of promoting it is through projects that have a direct impact on our lives. Yet, 
such projects are often not connected to human rights at all. For instance, ‘Reimagine 
Coexistence’, a reconciliation-promoting project in BiH, brought together members of 
different ethnic groups that participated in a number of activities, such as joining a 
basketball team and running a café. Similarly, the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) in Cyprus is tasked with supporting the ongoing peace and 
reconciliation process. As part of its mandate, it has encouraged Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots from a previously mixed village to build a library/museum together and has 
                                               
284 Lesley McEvoy, Kieran McEvoy and Kirsten McConnachie, 'Reconciliation as a Dirty Word: 
Conflict, Community Relations and Education in Northern Ireland', Journal of International Affairs 
60(1) (2006), 81.  
285 Leopold Von Carlowitz, 'Resolution of Property Disputes in Bosnia and Kosovo: The Contribution 
to Peacebuilding' International Peacekeeping 12(4) (2005), 547 at 558. 
286 The change in strategies came in 1999 with the adoption of the Property Law Implementation Plan. 
For more information, see the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7. 
287 Daniel Philpott, 'An Ethic of Political Reconciliation', Ethics and Intentional Affairs, 23/4 (2009), 
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fostered partnerships between the two Chambers of Commerce on the island.288 
Additional measures that could be taken in ethnically divided societies to promote 
reconciliation include preventing inflammatory propaganda in public media, adopting 
a common educational syllabus and a common version of history and encouraging 
people to learn the other’s language. None of these projects directly relates to human 
rights, thus suggesting that important as they may be for other elements of peace, they 
remain largely unconnected to the most effective reconciliation-promoting methods. 
 
Moreover, human rights often fail to influence reconciliation attempts because of the 
type of change they tend to induce. Reconciliation does not require the abandonment 
of ethnic identities, but it does involve the re-evaluation of some deeply held beliefs 
about the ‘other’; it is, in other words, all about changing people’s attitudes and 
beliefs. In this sense, the reconciliation-promoting contribution of human rights is 
potentially limited since they are generally concerned with changing policies, 
processes and institutions rather than the perceptions of the people.289 Illustrative of 
this is the implementation of Aziz v. Cyprus, the ECtHR case which resulted in an 
amendment of the Cypriot electoral law and empowered TC permanently living in the 
areas controlled by the Republic to vote.290 However, while the new law protected the 
right to vote, it was not accompanied by any public discussion about the desirability 
of such an amendment or its broader implications. Moreover, there were no debates 
about why TC had been disenfranchised in the first place and how this affected the 
relationship between the two communities. Thus, if the legal change had any positive 
impact on inter-ethnic relations, this was surely just an incidental one. Similarly, the 
South African Doctors for Life International line of cases, which is discussed in more 
detail in the following chapters, shows how the protection of the right to democratic 
participation may compel politicians to follow different practices (in this case 
consulting the people before reaching a decision), but it cannot force them to change 
                                               
288 Projects of UNDP Cyprus, available at 
http://www.cy.undp.org/content/cyprus/en/home/operations/projects/overview.html [accessed 30 May 
2014]. 
289 For the contrary view, emphasising the power of international law to change perceptions, see Robert 
Sloane, 'The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment', Stanford Journal of International Law, 
43 (2007), 39. 
290 Aziz v. Cyprus (2005) 41 E.H.R.R. 11. 
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their beliefs and actually take into account what was expressed during the 
consultation process.291 
 
This is not to argue that changing a State’s formal practices cannot eventually 
influence the politicians’ and public’s opinions and promote reconciliation. In fact, 
Gibson and Gouws provide evidence that a decision by the South African 
Constitutional Court to allow an unpopular party to protest is likely to increase levels 
of ‘grudging tolerance’ in the population.292 However, it is unclear what the long-term 
impact of such a decision is on the people and whether tolerant attitudes usually take 
root or are ephemeral, especially when these judicial decisions are not accompanied 
by reconciliation-promoting measures on the ground. Moreover, if a change in 
institutions is followed by a change in attitudes, this is only a pleasant side effect, 
rather than an unavoidable consequence of human rights: human rights protection has 
achieved its objectives when institutions and official practices have been changed, 
irrespective of whether reconciliation requires a lot more than that in order to be 
achieved. Furthermore, relatively few issues that have to do with inter-ethnic 
reconciliation can be put in legal language and be heard by the courts, and it is rare 
that judicial decisions are published broadly enough to become known to the public. 
Thus, the contribution of judicially protecting human rights is often indirect and 
sporadic and cannot be the only reconciliation-promoting measure relied on by the 
state.  
 
Finally, in order for the reconciliation-promoting potential of human rights to fully 
materialise, the specific context in which they are being implemented must be taken 
into account. Illustrative of this is the creation of the Committee for Missing Persons 
in Cyprus. Missing persons strike a special chord in the psyche of both Cypriot 
communities and uncertainty about their whereabouts and the human rights violations 
that this has created undermine reconciliation attempts on the island. The Committee 
for Missing Persons, made up from Greek and Turkish Cypriot experts, has uncovered 
the remains of a number of these people and has been described as ‘a model of 
                                               
291 Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others; Matatiele 
Municipality and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (2). 
292 Gibson and Gouws, Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa: Experiments in Democratic 
Persuasion at 171. They argue that the Court could boost tolerance from 27.7% to 56.8%, an increase 
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successful cooperation between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities’.293 Nevertheless, its effects on reconciliation remain limited since its 
achievements are rarely acknowledged and discussed in public. The protection of the 
right to life and freedom from torture that the Committee seeks to achieve is therefore 
only the first step; it is also necessary that the people on the ground – the subjects of 
reconciliation attempts – are made aware of its practices and internalise its 
conclusions. 
 
Equally important for reconciliation is the requirement that human rights are protected 
by a body that the public considers legitimate. If this condition is not satisfied, its 
judgments will not be able to contribute to feelings of reconciliation among the 
people. The clearest example of a failed judicial attempt to promote reconciliation is 
the ICTY which suffers from a lack of legitimacy in almost all countries in the 
Former Yugoslavia, but particularly in Serbia and the Republika Srpska in BiH.294 
Surveys in the region suggest that only a tiny percentage of people trust the ICTY 
(7.6% in Serbia and 3.6% in the Republika) and that the majority of Serbs consider it 
biased against them.295 This profound hostility towards the Tribunal is coupled with a 
lack of knowledge among the people about the institution: there is the misconception 
that it unfairly and overwhelmingly indicts Serbs and the majority of the Serb 
population consider it ‘the greatest danger to national security’.296 A sizable number 
of people polled (19%) believe that Serbia should not cooperate with the ICTY no 
matter the cost, while only 15% believe that it is important to do so for reasons of 
justice and reconciliation.297 The majority believes that Serbia should cooperate only 
if this will result in the avoidance of sanctions or the granting of international 
financial aid.  
 
With these statistics in mind, even if the ICTY rulings were well-known (which they 
are not) and even if prosecuting war criminals generally promotes reconciliation 
                                               
293 Committee of Missing Persons in Cyprus brochure,  
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(which has been contested), the impact of the Tribunal on reconciliation is at best 
non-existent and at worst, a negative one. Thus, what reconciliation needs in addition 
to the legal protection of human rights is a coordinated campaign that speaks to the 
people: it challenges the national media’s and politicians’ accusations about the Court 
being biased, explains why its work and human rights protection are important and 
dismisses some of the most important myths about the events of the war (such as that 
only one side committed atrocities). Moreover, a criminal court might have fared 
better in terms of reconciliation if it was a domestic rather than an international one, 
since the allegation that it was imposed on the people by biased outsiders would be 
more difficult to support. For instance, while the two are not easily comparable and 
despite the problems that have been identified with the domestically created Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, its findings have been accepted by South Africans to a 
much greater extent than the findings of the ICTY in the Balkans.298  
 
It therefore transpires that despite the confident declaration in the Brahimi Report 
about the reconciliation-promoting potential of human rights, reconciliation is in fact 
the one element of peace that is connected to them in mostly negative, rather than 
positive ways. In particular, human rights, with their tendency to create clear winners 
and losers and the possibility that they can be used by judges to justify their personal 
beliefs, are more likely to further polarise different ethnic groups. Like with the other 
two elements however, most of the time, human rights and reconciliation are simply 
not connected at all. The most effective method of promoting reconciliation is to 
challenge perceptions, not change laws and institutions, a task that human rights can 
contribute very little to. In any case, even in those cases where human rights can 
indirectly contribute to reconciliation, their effectiveness will depend on whether the 
institution giving effect to them is considered legitimate and is well known to the 
population at large. 
 
5. Assessing the use of human rights as part of the liberal peacebuilding strategy 
 
                                               
298 Jay A. Vora and Erica Vora, 'The Effectiveness of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner and English South Africans', Journal of Black Studies, 
34/3 (2004), 301. 
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The strategy that is currently used in different ethnically divided, post-conflict 
societies around the world – liberal peacebuilding – is based on certain assumptions 
and displays a number of characteristics. It essentially presupposes that if the post-
conflict state engages in liberal practices, this will more-or-less automatically also 
result in the development of liberal values among the population. Consequently, 
peacebuilders perceive the establishment of liberal laws and institutions as the success 
they were working towards, and halt their efforts before they actually see and assess 
the effects of these institutions in practice. Moreover, the liberal peacebuilding recipe 
always consists, irrespective of the society’s history and context, of the two same 
ingredients: democratic and free market institutions. Both ingredients depend on the 
protection of human rights, since democracy cannot function without the right to vote 
and free markets without the right to property. In fact, so closely associated has been 
the protection of human rights with the promotion of peace through the liberal recipe 
that the two have sometimes been perceived as ultimately being one and the same 
thing.299 Nevertheless, the current assessment suggests that none of these assumptions 
are well-grounded, thus pointing to the need to re-examine the liberal peacebuilding 
model as a whole and the central role that human rights have played in it. 
 
Among the most important conclusions reached from the analysis so far is that there 
is nothing to indicate that the protection of human rights will certainly and 
unavoidably lead to a peaceful society; to the contrary, while there are positive 
connections between the two, it is also possible that human rights might compromise 
efforts to promote security, justice and reconciliation or might leave them completely 
unaffected. This is primarily because all three elements, but especially reconciliation, 
are broader than human rights. The term ‘broader’ relates to two different but related 
characteristics: first, each of the elements can be promoted through different methods, 
                                               
299 The suggestion that the two concepts are identical has been made by scholars who talk of the 
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some of which might be connected to human rights, and others which adopt a 
different approach altogether. Second, those methods that are connected to human 
rights contribute to peace in valuable, but specific and limited ways. In particular, 
they can result in institutional changes and amendments to the law, but they cannot 
directly induce the necessary socio-economic and psychological changes for peace. 
Positive, negative or simply no connections between human rights and the three 
elements, coupled with the fact that the demands of security, justice and reconciliation 
often contradict between themselves, suggest that the relationship between the two 
concepts is in fact more complicated than peacebuilders have so far assumed. 
 
Arguably therefore, the centrality of human rights as part of the liberal peacebuilding 
strategy has been misplaced. Far from their protection always leading to democratic 
and free market institutions and then straight on to peace, they must in fact be 
supplemented by other peacebuilding mechanisms as well. Such mechanisms can 
either be instituted from the top down or from the grassroots up, but their focus 
should be the people of the ethnically divided society itself rather than its institutions. 
Examples of such top-down peacebuilding measures could include subsidies or loans 
to previously disempowered groups within the population or the establishment of a 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission that could help dispel myths about the conflict. 
Alternatively, victim support groups or grassroots development projects, which have a 
practical impact on the life of the community, could contribute to peacebuilding from 
the bottom-up. Such people-centred peacebuilding practices should co-exist alongside 
human rights protections since they can in fact make them more effective in their 
peacebuilding task. Where resources are restrained however, as they often are in post-
conflict societies, it would be wise to consider in each case whether peacebuilding 
objectives would be more effectively promoted through human rights protections or 
any of these other alternative methods. If peacebuilders conclude in favour of the 
former, it should be because of a careful consideration rather than a vague expectation 
that human rights will do good.  
 
Finally, the analysis suggests that instead of uniformly applying the same 
peacebuilding strategy in different countries around the world, peacebuilders should 
appreciate that the way and extent to which human rights can promote peace is in fact 
context-specific. Their effectiveness as peacebuilding tools ultimately relies on the 
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presence of certain conditions on the ground that peacebuilders should seek to 
promote rather than take for granted. For instance, irrespective of how diligently 
human rights are protected, they are only likely to make meaningful contributions to 
security when some security has already been established on the ground through other 
ways. What these ways are and the extent to which they can in fact lead to greater 
security depends on the context of the society in question. Similarly, protecting 
human rights is unlikely to promote feelings of justice and reconciliation if the 
institutions tasked with their protection are considered illegitimate or detached from 
the population they are addressing. Again, whether such conditions are present in 
different divided societies depends on the history of the institutions and the way they 
have been perceived by opinion-shapers. If they are not present however, 
peacebuilders should either work towards them or adjust their expectations about 




This chapter, read together with Chapters 2 and 3, concludes the theoretical part of the 
thesis and lays out a framework of the relationship between peace and human rights 
that is both sobering and at the same time promising for future peacebuilding 
operations. It is sobering because it challenges the peacebuilding presumption that if a 
post-conflict society resembles a liberal state closely enough because of its 
institutions and human rights protections, it will somehow also start acting as one. It 
outright acknowledges that there are important steps that must be taken in the 
peacebuilding process, which are nevertheless, unrelated to institutional changes and 
human rights protections. Both the ambit of human rights and the changes they can 
result in are limited and specific, which suggests that they have to be supplemented by 
other peacebuilding tools and methods as well. Moreover, this framework clarifies 
that even in those situations in which human rights can help build peace, if this is to 
be done effectively, a number of conditions must be present. The most important 
among these conditions is that there is a political willingness to promote each of the 
elements of peace; human rights are at their most effective when they operate 
alongside such political willingness, rather than when they are trying to compensate 
for its absence.  
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At the same time however, the framework is promising for the future of peacebuilding 
operations to come. It argues that peace in ethnically divided, post-conflict societies is 
something achievable and confirms that human rights can contribute in specific and 
practical ways so that it can in fact be achieved. The conflict between the elements 
and the fact that human rights can promote some but not others, suggests that difficult 
decisions will have to be made as to whether they should be protected or not. 
However, deciding between difficult dilemmas has always been in the job description 
of peacebuilders: among such dilemmas, are decisions about opting for prosecutions 
or amnesties and whether the international community should allow the war to 
continue in the hope of a more just peace agreement later on. Nevertheless, being 
aware of the different relationships between the elements and human rights allows 
such difficult dilemmas to be carefully thought out and for arguments to be made for 
each side, rather than be determined through intuition and unjustified assumptions. 
Finally, this analysis makes the peacebuilders’ task more difficult by asking that they 
turn their attention, in addition to the drafting and implementation of human rights, to 
the conditions that will make them effective. While this demands more from 
peacebuilders than the current practice, it is also likely to be more fruitful in ensuring 
that the peacebuilding potential of human rights will be utilised to the greatest 
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PART 2: The practical relationship between human rights and peace 
Interlude: The road travelled so far and the remaining path to follow 
 
Part 1, the theoretical part of the thesis, argued that there is a need to adopt a more 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between peace and human rights. Both 
concepts were deemed to be unclear – the first because so little has been said about it 
and the second because of how much. Thus, peace was defined as existing when a 
balance is struck between the sometimes reinforcing and other times contradictory 
elements of security, justice and reconciliation. Security is concerned with an absence 
of fear among the population, justice with the remedying and non-repetition of past 
atrocities and reconciliation with the (re)building of positive relations between the 
ethnic groups. Human rights on the other hand, have been defined as fundamental 
interests that are entrenched and legally protected on the domestic and international 
levels. They can promote security, justice and reconciliation in different ways and to 
various extents depending on the context of the ethnically divided, post-conflict 
society itself and the conditions that exist there. Thus, a better understanding of the 
two key concepts suggests that in addition to the expected positive relationship 
between human rights and peace, the two might not be connected at all or the former 
might even have negative consequences for the latter. This directly challenges the 
international community’s assumption that the existence of liberal institutions, key 
among them being those safeguarding human rights, necessarily results in the creation 
of a peaceful society.  
 
This conclusion is confirmed and its importance highlighted in Part 2, the practical 
part of the thesis, which examines the relationship between two human rights – the 
right to vote and the right to property – and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, South 
Africa and Cyprus. The premise of the practical section is that a society can balance 
security, justice and reconciliation concerns by successfully managing the conflicts 
that are keeping it divided. The more successfully these conflicts are dealt with, the 
more effective peacebuilding operations become. Thus, the question posed in Part 2 
concerns the extent to which human rights have aided this conflict management 
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process and consequently helped build peace in practice. The next two chapters 
(Chapters 5 and 6) provide insights to this question by focusing on the adjudication 
and implementation of human rights respectively; they argue that in addition to the 
well-established strengths of human rights, one must also recognise the limitations 
that undermine their peacebuilding potential. The last of the three practical chapters 
(Chapter 7) looks at what lies beneath the conflict and points to the fact that, even 
when perfectly protected, human rights can only induce legal and institutional 
amendments. Since the management of conflicts and the building of peace require that 
political, socio-economic and psychological changes also take place, human rights are 
at best only one of the peacebuilding tools that should be used in ethnically divided, 
post-conflict societies.  
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The expectation that human rights can help build peace has been reiterated time and 
time again in the last 20 years. Illustrative of this is the Brahimi Report’s 
unambiguous statement that ‘the human rights component of a peace operation is 
indeed critical to effective peace-building’.300 This belief has been especially 
manifested in relation to the protection of the right to vote and the right to property: 
much ink has been spilled, by academics and practitioners alike, about the 
peacebuilding qualities of democratic systems, at the centre of which lies the right to 
vote.301 Similarly, the need to remedy victims of forced displacement by protecting 
their right to property has also attracted considerable attention.302 This faith in the 
peacebuilding potential of human rights also seems to be shared by individual 
applicants who have turned to Courts and asked that they contribute to the 
management of the political conflicts that divide their countries. For these reasons it 
becomes important to examine in more detail what has been the relationship between 
human rights adjudication and conflict management in practice:303 have the Courts 
always been able to deliver the expected positive results and, if not, should human 
rights be supplemented or even replaced by other peacebuilding tools? 
 
The conflict transformation and peacebuilding potential of human rights in practice 
will be examined by focusing on three case studies: Cyprus, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH) and South Africa (SA). The three case studies vary between themselves 
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because they tend to be divided by different types of conflicts. On the one hand, the 
lack of a peace agreement in Cyprus means that there is no (or at least not yet, a) 
common framework on which the parties can rely and build, in order to gradually 
manage their differences. The conflicts in the country remain zero-sum, with the 
ethnic groups refusing to compromise their respective positions, which in turn, makes 
them seemingly impossible to manage. Conversely, while conflicts still exist in SA, 
they are less divisive and easier to manage than the Cypriot ones. The most difficult 
questions about what the post-apartheid state would look like were answered during 
the negotiations leading up to the Interim and Final Constitutions and any lingering 
disagreements have been concerned with the more practical issue of what is the best 
interpretation of these legal documents.304 Finally, the Bosnian case study rests 
somewhere between the Cypriot and the South African ones: the Dayton Agreement 
that ended the war has answered some of the dilemmas that were dividing the three 
ethnic groups, but other zero-sum disagreements, not dissimilar to those found in 
Cyprus, still remain.305 
 
This chapter makes the argument that the contribution of human rights to conflict 
management and the building of peace varies depending on how zero-sum and 
divisive is the conflict in the first place. Courts – rightly – tend to avoid getting 
involved in the most fundamental disagreements between the parties and are more 
comfortable making pronouncements in relation to less divisive conflicts, such as the 
ones that are present in SA and to a lesser extent in BiH. Section 2 explains why 
conflict management is necessary in order to successfully balance the competing 
elements of peace. Sections 3, 4 and 5 elaborate on and illustrate with practical 
examples the contributions – positive or negative – that the rights to property and vote 
have made to specific disagreements in each of the three case studies. Finally, Section 
6 draws on the practical implications of this analysis and suggests tools and strategies 
that could supplement or replace human rights when their adjudication fails to have 
the expected peacebuilding effects.  
 
                                               
304 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act [No. 200 of 1993]; Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa [No. 108 of 1996] (henceforth, SA Constitution). 
305 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed on 14 December 
1995. 
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2. Political conflicts and peace in ethnically divided, post-conflict societies 
 
A war is the result of divisive political conflicts that remain ignored or not managed 
in the appropriate way; frustrated and worried about the protection of their interests 
and their ethnic group’s survival (concerns that tend to be exacerbated by nationalist 
propaganda), individuals often resort to violence.306 Looking at the process in reverse, 
peace requires, as a first step, the successful management of these political 
conflicts.307 Importantly, by ‘successful management’ I do not mean their permanent 
resolution or elimination since such objectives are neither possible nor desirable in 
ethnically divided, post-conflict societies.308 Political conflicts result from different 
views about the best course of action on a given question and are therefore, a 
necessary part of life in healthy democratic states, which accept and encourage 
divergence of opinion. What is problematic is not the existence of political conflicts 
per se, but the fact that they sometimes remain unaddressed and can, as a result, 
become violent. While their elimination – a phrase that necessarily portrays conflicts 
as negative phenomena – demands that political disagreements are no longer 
expressed, their successful management requires that they are debated, negotiated and 
different points of view are incorporated in the final solution. As with all 
compromises, the solution is unlikely to be the ideal outcome for all parties, but it 
might nevertheless be acceptable to them for the sake of the common good.  
 
Such compromise solutions are particularly difficult to achieve in the early stages of 
the peacebuilding operation because during that period the disagreements dividing the 
society tend to be characterised by the fixed and irreconcilable views of the parties. 
These views can result in zero-sum conflicts, the existence of which makes balancing 
the three elements of peace look like a seemingly impossible endeavour. In the worst 
case scenarios, difficulties in managing irreconcilable conflicts can lead to the status 
                                               
306 William Zartman, 'Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts', in William 
Zartman (ed.), Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars (Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1995); John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Prevention (London: Macmillan, 1990). 
307 This echoes some of Galtung’s work, discussed in Chapter 2, Section 3. While his definition of 
positive and negative peace was ultimately rejected as unworkable, some of his original assumptions 
(like the need to successfully manage, or in his words ‘transform’ conflicts) are of great value. See in 
particular, Johan Galtung, 'Introduction: Peace by Peaceful Conflict Transformation – the 
TRANSCEND Approach', in Charles Webel and Johan Galtung (eds.), The Handbook of Peace and 
Conflict Studies (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). 
308 Peter Harris and Ben Reilly, 'Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for Negotiators', 
(Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 1998) at 17-18. 
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quo – unsatisfactory as it may be – being the preferred solution by everyone. 
Problematically however, the longer a conflict remains without a solution, the more 
fixed the views of the parties become and the hurdles of the conflict management 
process increase. The way out of this vicious cycle is for the parties to transform zero-
sum conflicts into simpler disagreements and work towards managing those instead. 
Since peace is a continuing balance between security, justice and reconciliation, 
solutions to such political conflicts are not set in stone: rather, their successful 
management requires that they are revisited if the context or the interests of the 
parties change. 
 
An example of an unmanaged, zero-sum conflict concerns the types of remedies that 
should be provided to those Cypriots who were displaced in the 1960s and 1970s. 
This dilemma between the remedy of restitution and the remedy of compensation has 
been manifested as a clash between the Greek Cypriots’ (GC) wish to promote justice 
and the Turkish Cypriots’ (TC) concern to ensure security. On the one hand, the 
majority of GC believe that a peace agreement should allow them to buy property and 
reside anywhere they want in Cyprus; any restrictions to their freedom of movement 
would be unjust and simply perpetuate the divisions that exist on the island. On the 
other, TC contend that the only way to protect their identity is for them to remain a 
majority within their own constituent state, something which due to their small 
numbers, would require that GC are permanently prevented from residing there. 
 
If peace is to be achieved, conflicts such as this must be transformed into a series of 
less divisive and more manageable disagreements. This transformation requires both 
sides to take a leap of faith and abandon demands for the absolute protection of their – 
irreconcilable – interests, thus pointing to the importance of charismatic, popular and 
peace-friendly political leaders. Taking the Cypriot property example again, the 
parties should compromise their all-or-nothing positions and agree that, at least in the 
early stages after the peace agreement, only certain categories of GC will be allowed 
to reside and buy property in the TC constituent state. (With the passage of time and 
increased levels of security among the TC, the restrictions on GC’s freedom to reside 
in the place of their choice should ideally be gradually lifted.) The question would 
then be a matter of assessing the evidence and determining whether specific 
individuals from the GC community fall in these categories or not; this might result in 
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additional smaller disagreements, but they are likely to be a lot more manageable than 
the original irreconcilable conflict. To put it in peace terms, such disagreements might 
still be disruptive to the affairs of the state, but the balance between security and 
justice considerations would become easier to strike. Thus, the more successfully a 
conflict is managed, the easier it becomes to balance the three elements of peace; in 
turn, the effectiveness of human rights as peacebuilding tools is ultimately determined 
by the extent to which they can contribute to this conflict management process.  
 
Peacebuilding practices have, at least partly, relied on the expectation that 
adjudication of human rights, and in particular of the rights to vote and property, can 
lead to successful conflict management and ultimately to peace. For example, 
statements have been made that the right to vote is ‘the backbone of the democratic 
system itself’309 and that ‘democracy contributes to preserving peace and security’.310 
Similarly, the protection of the right to property has received attention from the 
UN,311 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),312 the World 
Bank,313 the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs314 and academics.315 This is 
because in addition to being able to contribute to the alleviation of economic 
difficulties that tend to arise after a war, the right has been considered as instrumental 
to the remedying of displaced people, one of the most emotive and difficult to resolve 
issues of the conflict. Nevertheless, while an examination of the conflicts in the three 
case studies sometimes confirms these expectations, it disproves them on other 
occasions. In particular, it appears that the more zero-sum the nature of the conflict, 
the less likely it is that human rights adjudication can contribute to its management.  
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3. Adjudicating political conflicts in Cyprus 
 
Of the three case studies, conflicts in Cyprus remain the most divisive, something 
reflected in the fact that peace negotiations remain stagnant more than 40 years after 
the last serious occurrence of violence. The parties’ positions have over the years 
been so irreconcilable that questions have been raised as to whether the conflict is an 
unsolvable one with partition being the only alternative.316 Thus, the question that 
arises is: to what extent can the protection of the rights to vote and property contribute 
to the difficult task of forging some common ground between the fixed positions of 
the parties? An analysis of the disagreements between the two Cypriot communities 
suggests that human rights adjudication has made very limited contributions to 
conflict management in the country and has arguably even resulted in negative 
consequences for the outcome of the negotiations. 
 
The conflict between the two ethnic groups on the island is really a disagreement as to 
the purpose of a united Cyprus: who should the state be seeking to protect? The 
individual Cypriot citizen or the ethnic group to which she is a member? GC contend 
that they want a Cyprus where ethnicity plays as little role as possible, while TC 
argue the opposite. One specific manifestation of this conflict concerns disagreements 
about the allocation of political power between the two ethnic groups. GC favour a 
strong federal government with limited powers to the Constituent states, universal 
protection of individual rights and as little protections of minority rights as possible. 
Moreover, they argue that it is unfair for TC, a community of 18% to elect 30 or 40% 
of the legislature and to have the veto power in important decisions. Conversely, TC 
maintain that the 1960 Constitution recognised their community, despite its smaller 
size, as politically equal to the GC one. The only way to safeguard its distinctness and 
equality is for most political power in a future Constitution to rest with the constituent 
states and any federal decisions to be subject to the veto power.  
 
Another manifestation of this zero-sum conflict concerns the way in which the people 
that were displaced during the 1963-1964 inter-community strife and the 1974 
                                               
316 International Crisis Group, 'Divided Cyprus: Coming to Terms on an Imperfect Reality', 
(Nicosia/Instabul/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014). 
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Turkish invasion will be remedied. There are currently approximately 165,000 
displaced Greek and 45,000 displaced Turkish Cypriots on the island, but each 
community has in mind very different solutions to this problem.317 On the one hand, 
GC consider the Turkish invasion of the island to be the root of the displacement 
problem. Their preferred remedy is restitution since that will take them back to the 
pre-1974 situation as much as possible. On the other, TC see the events of 1974 not as 
an illegal invasion, but as a necessary intervention for the protection of their 
endangered ethnic identity from the GC majority. They consider the current state of 
affairs, with the two populations largely segregated, as the best alternative; they argue 
that GC should recognise the facts on the ground and accept that the only realistic 
remedies to the displacement problem are compensation and exchange of 
properties.318 These different remedies envisioned by the two communities are not the 
result of different interpretations of the law; rather they stem from different visions of 
what a united and peaceful Cyprus should look like, thus explaining the unwillingness 
of the two sides to compromise their positions. 
 
The failure of the negotiators to agree on and successfully manage these conflicts 
directly undermines peace on the island: while there has been no serious violence in 
Cyprus since the 1974 Turkish invasion, there are still thousands of Turkish troops 
stationed there and Turkey has since then, been (successfully) threatening the 
Republic of Cyprus (ROC) with the use of military force in order to influence its 
decisions on a range of issues of national importance.319 In addition to undermining 
security, the ongoing, unsuccessful negotiations keep reminding Cypriots on both 
sides of the Green Line that the injustices of the 1960s and 1970s continue until today 
and that a solution will be a compromise where their preferred form of justice will not 
                                               
317 Global IDP Database, 'Profile of Internal Displacement: Cyprus', (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee 
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be fully protected. Finally, the current status quo also undermines reconciliation since 
each side portrays the other as making maximalist demands and as being solely to 
blame for the lack of a peace agreement. The unsuccessful management of these 
conflicts also has indirect negative consequences for peace: it has created conditions 
for nationalist rhetoric to flourish, demonised the idea of inter-ethnic cooperation and 
contributed to electoral disillusionment, none of which helps promote feelings of 
security, justice or reconciliation.  
 
Nevertheless, while the successful management of these conflicts is necessary for 
building peace in Cyprus, human rights adjudication has not really contributed to it. 
On the one hand, the judiciary has generally been unwilling to hear and decide cases 
that are concerned with such zero-sum conflicts and on the other, even in cases where 
it has become involved, its contribution has been far from positive. Ultimately, the 
conflicts in Cyprus are best dealt with, not through human rights adjudication, but 
through political negotiations and it is on these that peacebuilders should be turning 
their attention and resources. In a different context and while explaining its reluctance 
to get involved in the management of a divisive political conflict, the South African 
Constitutional Court made exactly this distinction between legal and political 
processes. In particular, it pointed out that ‘[t]his Court is not and cannot be a site for 
political struggle. It can do nothing to resolve differences within that process. We are 
a site for the vindication of rights’.320  
 
The first limitation of human rights in relation to conflict management in Cyprus, 
namely the judiciary’s unwillingness to use them, is illustrated through case law on 
the right to vote. The right is protected by Article 31 of the ROC Constitution, and 
Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (Article 3-1) of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). Two Cypriot right to vote cases have reached the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) to date: Aziz v. Cyprus321 and its follow-up case, Erel and 
Damdelen v. Cyprus.322 In order to understand the claims of the parties in the two 
cases, some background into the complex development of the Cypriot electoral 
provisions is necessary. The 1960 ROC Constitution provided for executive and 
                                               
320 Merafong Demarcation Forum v. President of the Republic of South Africa (CCT 41/07) [2008] 
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321 Aziz v. Cyprus (2005) 41 E.H.R.R. 11. 
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legislative elections through two electoral registers – one for GC and one for TC. The 
GC would vote for 70% of the legislature and the President, while the TC would 
decide on the composition of 30% of the legislature and the Vice-President.323 When 
the TC withdrew from government in 1963, all their positions remained vacant, thus 
making the Republic’s operation according to the Constitution, impossible. In 
response to this situation, the Supreme Court decided that the doctrine of necessity 
could be used to interpret the Constitution in such a way so as to allow for the State’s 
continued existence.324 As a result, the Republic has, since then, been operating with 
decision-making bodies consisting only of GC (who are, according to the 
Constitution, only elected through the GC electoral register). This, coupled with the 
continuing requirement that all TC voters should be registered in their own electoral 
catalogues, wholly prevented TC from exercising their right to vote. 
 
Over the years, the GC electoral register came to include those foreigners who had 
become naturalised, but not TC. Mr. Aziz challenged this situation arguing that since 
the Republic has for all intents and purposes a single electoral register, TC 
permanently residing in ROC-controlled areas should be included in it as well. The 
Cypriot Supreme Court rejected the suggestion finding that what limited the TC from 
voting was not the law, but the TC community’s unilateral decision to abandon their 
positions in the Republic.325 The case reached the ECtHR where this argument was, 
unsurprisingly, dismissed: the 40-year disenfranchisement of TC permanently living 
in the ROC-controlled areas was a violation of Articles 3-1 and 14 of the 
Convention.326 The Court’s judgment was swiftly implemented: the applicants and 
other TC in a similar position are now included in the Republic’s single electoral 
register, they are allowed to vote in all elections and be voted in all elections except 
the Presidential one.327 Encouraged by the applicants’ success in Aziz, a group of 
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Turkish Cypriots challenged the electoral law again, arguing that Article 3-1 required 
not only that they are allowed to vote in the ROC, but also that they are entitled to a 
separate electoral register through which they could vote for 30% of the legislature 
and the Vice-President.328 The Court, referring to Cyprus’ wide margin of 
appreciation, declared this follow-up case as inadmissible.  
 
The ECtHR adopted a radically different approach in the two cases: the challenge in 
Aziz was not only found to be admissible but also successful, while that in Erel was 
swiftly dismissed as manifestly ill-founded. An explanation of this is that while the 
two cases seemingly dealt with a same issue, the demands of the applicants were 
much more at odds with the position of the ROC in Erel than in Aziz. The challenge 
of the state’s structures in Erel was based on the belief that Cypriots should not vote 
as individual citizens, but rather as members of ethnic groups (hence the need for 
separate electoral registers). This fundamentally contrasted with the GC 
understanding of the purpose of the state, thus giving rise to a zero-sum, difficult-to-
manage conflict. Conversely, the applicants in Aziz were in agreement with the ROC 
that individuals should enjoy voting rights because of their status as citizens rather 
than because of their ethnic group membership. They were merely asking that their 
ethnic background did not cloud this agreement and affect the rights they should 
enjoy. The Court’s willingness to intervene in Aziz but not in Erel, even though the 
issue could be expressed in human rights terms in both cases, suggests that human 
rights can contribute to the management of some conflicts but not others. In 
particular, it seems that the conflicts that are least likely to be successfully managed 
through human rights adjudication are those that divide the post-conflict society the 
most. 
 
Several reasons can explain the right’s failure to manage the conflict in question. The 
applicants in Erel essentially asked an international Court to compel the ROC to 
fundamentally change its democratic structures: increase the number of MPs, re-
introduce the position of the Vice-President and create another electoral register. 
However, a country’s democratic structures are deeply affected by a ‘wealth of 
differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political 
                                               
328 Erel and Damdelen v. Cyprus. 
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thought’.329 It is not the place of an international court to set uniform standards on this 
issue, something acknowledged by the ECtHR in Erel when it referred to each State’s 
‘considerable latitude in establishing constitutional rules’.330 Ultimately, the 
management of such divisive political conflicts requires considerably more 
intervention than an international court can legitimately engage in. Nevertheless, even 
a domestic court is likely to have exercised similar judicial restraint. The issue in Erel 
goes to the heart of a state’s relationship with its citizens and it is a question that 
should be publicly debated and decided by democratically elected and accountable 
politicians, not judges. In any case, the judiciary – domestic or international – can 
only interpret human rights within a given matrix; it can protect an individual’s 
interests in a specific context, not build a society from scratch, which is what the 
successful management of these zero-sum conflicts aims to achieve. These reasons 
suggest that the Court’s decision in Erel is not a one-off; attempts to manage the most 
divisive political disagreements in the country by judicially protecting the right to 
vote will generally fail. 
 
The unwillingness of the ECtHR to get involved in conflicts relating to the right to 
property in Cyprus is less apparent than in the right to vote cases, but still there. The 
right is protected under Article 23 and Section 36 of the ROC and ‘Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’) Constitutions respectively and also safeguarded by 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (Article 1-1) of the European Convention. The first right 
to property case concerning the Cypriot conflict to reach the ECtHR was Loizidou v. 
Turkey, where the Court found a violation of the applicant’s Article 1-1.331 The 
applicant owned property in the occupied part of Cyprus and argued that the presence 
of Turkish troops and the fact that they prevented her from crossing the Green Line 
violated her right to freely use and enjoy it. The majority of the Court agreed, finding 
that Turkey was in effective control of the northern part of Cyprus, and therefore 
responsible for any violations that were taking place there.332 Conversely, the 
minority in Loizidou had expressed serious reservations about whether the ECtHR 
should get involved in the adjudication of such a zero-sum conflict. Judge Jambreg 
for example, pointed out that ‘Courts are adjudicating in individual and in concrete 
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cases according to prescribed legal standards. They are ill-equipped to deal with 
large-scale and complex issues which as a rule call for normative action and legal 
reform.’333 Echoing these concerns, Judge Pettiti referred to ‘the whole problem of the 
two communities [which…] has more to do with politics and diplomacy than with 
European judicial scrutiny’.334 
 
Confirming the minority’s concerns, over the years approximately 1400 cases with 
similar facts flooded the European Court, which kept reaffirming the majority’s 
decision in Loizidou.335 This state of affairs, with the Court almost mechanically 
finding a violation of Article 1-1, changed in Demopoulos v. Turkey, a case with 
identical facts to Loizidou.336 In Demopoulos, Turkey accepted responsibility for the 
violation of property rights of GC for the first time and sought to offer a remedy by 
establishing the Immovable Property Commission (IPC). The Court examined the 
IPC’s power to offer restitution, compensation or exchange of properties to the 
applicants and declared that it provided effective legal remedies, which barred further 
legal action from GC applicants to the ECtHR. The current situation is that applicants 
seeking a remedy for the violation of their property rights, must apply to the IPC and 
only after exhausting all legal remedies in the ‘TRNC’ can they apply to the ECtHR. 
Thus, Demopoulos brings the Cyprus cases in line with other decisions of the ECtHR 
on the right to property, in which the Court has generally avoided to adjudicate such 
zero-sum conflicts.337  
 
The right to property cases also point to the second limitation of human rights in 
terms of conflict management, namely that even in situations in which the judiciary 
has become involved, its contribution has not always been positive. In fact, despite 
the ECtHR’s assessment that Cyprus’ problem ‘should have been resolved by all 
parties assuming full responsibility for finding a solution on a political level’, its case 
law on the right to property has actually hindered the successful outcome of the 
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negotiations.338 One of the major hurdles to a solution is the disagreement of the two 
sides as to what the right to property requires: GC favour restitution and generally 
believe that compensation is not an adequate remedy at all, while TC contend that that 
should suffice. The ECtHR’s case law has destabilised the negotiations by hardening 
the respective positions of the parties since they have selectively read it as only 
confirming their point of view. For instance, after Loizidou had been decided in the 
applicant’s favour, GC assumed that the ECtHR had confirmed their long-standing 
position that all displaced persons should return to their homes and that nothing short 
of restitution of all properties could satisfy the European Court’s standards. The Court 
had insisted that it ‘does not consider it necessary, let alone desirable […] to elaborate 
a general theory concerning the lawfulness of legislative and administrative acts of 
the “TRNC”’;339 yet, GC have understood Loizidou to mean that the property issue is 
a matter of rectifying an illegal situation, a task that could only be achieved through 
full compliance with international law. This has in turn resulted in an unwillingness 
among the majority of GC to approve of a solution that does not allow restitution in 
all cases.340 
 
On the other hand, the Demopoulos line of cases has also created very few incentives 
for TC to resolve the conflict. In Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey, a case that preceded 
Demopoulos and held for the first time that the IPC could in principle be an effective 
domestic remedy, the Court pointed out that the possibility of restitution should exist 
for the applicants.341 Nevertheless, it was subsequently stated in Demopoulos that it is 
within the discretion of each state what remedy it will provide since ‘property is a 
material commodity which can be valued and compensated for in monetary terms.’342 
As a result of Demopoulos, almost all the cases that have been decided by the IPC so 
far have been settled through compensation.343 However, if the IPC provides the 
opportunity to the ‘TRNC’ to resolve the overwhelming majority of claims through its 
preferred remedy, this removes any incentive from the TC side to negotiate an 
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agreement, which is likely to require the return of considerable areas of land back to 
the GC.  
 
At best, the ECtHR’s decisions in relation to the property conflict in Cyprus point to 
the obvious conclusion: that a compromise is necessary and that the solution lies 
neither with all victims receiving restitution of their properties, nor with all of them 
simply being compensated for their loss. At worst, the Court’s confirmation of the 
obvious has been achieved to the detriment of reconciliation on the island. A selective 
reading of the case law allows each side to perceive the other as making maximalist 
demands that are contrary to what it perceives human rights and justice to require. 
This, in turn, makes Cypriots less confident that they can coexist in a united Cyprus. 
‘If we cannot settle on this self-evident issue, whose answer is clearly provided in 
international law’ each side reasons, ‘how can we hope to live together and reach joint 
decisions in the future?’ Courts are therefore rightly reluctant to get involved in the 
management of the most divisive, zero-sum conflicts in a society not only because 
they have little authority to decide what is the ‘right answer’ in each case, but also 
because when they do, they risk undermining the willingness to compromise both 
among the negotiators and the public at large. As a result, such conflicts should 
arguably be managed through peacebuilding strategies other than human rights 
adjudication; examples of these are discussed in more detail in the final section of this 
chapter. 
 
4. Adjudicating political conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
The Bosnian peace process has also been mared by the existence of unmanaged 
conflicts in the country. Contrary to Cyprus however, where the parties are still 
debating the purpose of the new state and the structure of how its institutions, these 
questions have been answered in BiH, at least to some extent. In theory, the common 
ground that was reached by the three ethnic groups in Dayton should have allowed 
them, in the twenty years that followed, to successfully manage the remaining of their 
conflicts and through that process reach a balance between the competing elements of 
peace. This has somewhat taken place over the years, with a range of political 
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conflicts, such as those concerning the appropriate use of the veto power by ethnic 
group representatives, having been successfully managed.344  
 
Nevertheless, the Dayton Agreement has to a large extent proven to be unworkable 
and ethnically divisive;345 consequently, and especially in the early years after the 
war, conflicts were managed through decrees from the Office of the High 
Representative rather than political negotiations and compromises from the country’s 
elected representatives.346 As a result, several political conflicts have lingered and 
festered, thus paralysing the country and undermining the peace process: the 
extensive use of the veto power and a complete unwillingness for political 
cooperation among the ethnic group representatives has turned law-making into an 
almost impossible endeavour. Among the most recent, but by no means unique, 
illustrations of this was the inability of the elected representatives to agree on changes 
to the Law on Personal Identification Number, which concerns the ID number given 
to every citizen after birth.347 This stopped the issuing of new passports to newborns 
and resulted in the tragic death of a baby that needed, but could not obtain, medical 
assistance abroad.348 Peaceful protests to stir Parliament into action fell on deaf ears 
and soon afterwards a number of BiH’s main cities witnessed violent uprisings, 
arguably leaving the country in its most volatile state since the 1990s.349 The 
detrimental effect of unmanaged conflicts in the country, has led the Deputy High-
Representative to publicly describe BiH, almost 20 years after the end of the war, not 
as a post-conflict country, but as a pre-conflict one.350 Questions of whether 
protecting human rights, and in particular the right to vote, can contribute to the better 
management of conflicts and the building of peace in BiH are therefore pressing. 
 
                                               
344 BiH has also been divided by political conflicts concerning forced displacement and the allocation 
of economic power between the ethnic groups. While the right to property has majorly affected the 
management of these conflicts, it has become relevant through the international community’s ‘Property 
Law Implementation Plan’ rather than adjudication and will be dealt with in Chapters 6 and 7. 
345 International Crisis Group, 'Bosnia’s Future' (Sarajevo/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014). 
346 Richard Caplan, 'Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia', in David 
Chandler (ed.), Peace without Politics? Ten Years of International State Building in Bosnia (London 
and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006). 
347 Law on Personal Identification Number (Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina nos. 32/01 and 
63/08). 
348 For additional contextual information, see Elvira M. Jukic, 'Bosnia Ends Crisis over Personal 
Number Law', Balkan Insight, 6 November 2013. 
349 Jasmin Mujanovic, 'It’s Spring at Last in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Aljazeera, 11 February 2014. 
350 Speech by Mr. Christopher Bennett, the Deputy High Representative, at the launch of Lord David 
Owen’s book Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ways Forward (London School of Economics, 11 June 2013).  
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The BiH Constitution does not specifically include a right to vote provision, but 
declares in Article II.2 that the ECHR and its Protocols ‘shall apply directly in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.’ As a result of that, several conflicts in the country have already 
been managed through the adjudication of the right to vote. Among the most 
noteworthy contributions of the right was made in relation to a disagreement about the 
proper use of the veto power in the law making procedure. According to the Bosnian 
Constitution, a ‘proposed decision of the Parliamentary Assembly may be declared to 
be destructive of a vital interest of the Bosniac, Croat and Serb people’, a declaration 
which empowers the majority of the relevant ethnic caucus to veto the law in 
question.351 The far-reaching consequences of this provision have raised questions as 
to when it is appropriate for an ethnic caucus to make such a declaration and what is 
meant by the term ‘vital interest’ in the first place. The BiH Constitutional Court has 
contributed to the management of this conflict by finding that the meaning of the term 
is not completely subjective.352 While the Court did not explicitly refer to the right to 
vote when reaching its decision, it placed significant emphasis on the final objective 
of the right, namely the promotion of democracy. It thus reasoned that:  
 
‘the meaning of “vital interests” is partly shaped by Article I.2 of the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which provides that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina shall be a democratic state, i.e. “that democratic governmental 
institutions and fair procedures best produce peaceful relations within a 
pluralist society” (line 3 of the Preamble). To this end, the interest of the 
constituent peoples in fully participating in the system of government and the 
operation of public authorities can be seen as a vital interest.’353  
 
The Court went on however, to argue that a democratic state is also a functional one; 
consequently, the efficient participation of the constituent peoples in the decision 
making procedures through the use of the veto power should never take place at the 
expense of the effective operation of the state. The vital interest cases provide 
evidence that the right to vote has, on occasions, played an important, albeit indirect, 
                                               
351 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4 of the General Framework Agreement signed on 
14 December 1995 (henceforth, BiH Constitution), Article IV.3.e. The veto power can also be 
exercised by each of the three members of the Presidency under Article V.2.d of the BiH Constitution.  
352 U-8/04 (25 June 2004, BiH CC); U-10/05 (22 July 2005, BiH CC). 
353 U-10/05, para.24. 
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role in conflict management in the country. Had these disagreements remained 
unaddressed, they would have further paralysed the Bosnian state and undermined 
peacebuilding attempts in the process. 
 
Another, perhaps the most, divisive conflict in the country concerns the question of 
whether Bosnian citizens who are not members of the three constituent people – in 
other words, those who do not identify as Bosniacs, Serbs or Croats – should be 
allowed to run for office. This question has been adjudicated in the seminal ECtHR 
case of Sejdić and Finci v. BiH, in which the applicants challenged the Bosnian 
Constitution itself as violating the right to vote.354 A detailed analysis of this case 
suggests that while the ECtHR used the right to vote in an attempt to adjudicate and 
manage the conflict in question, this was by no means an easy or uncontroversial 
decision. In order to understand the claims of the parties and significance of the case, 
some knowledge of the complex BiH Constitution is necessary. The Constitution 
establishes a federal government and two entities – the Federation of BiH and the 
Republika Srpska – and divides all political power equally between the three 
Constituent Peoples. The House of Peoples (the upper chamber of the Legislative 
Assembly) consists of 5 Serbs from the Republika and 5 Croats and 5 Bosniacs from 
the Federation, while two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives (the 
lower chamber) are from the Federation and a third from the Republika.355 Similarly, 
the Presidency is made up of 3 members, one from each constituent people, with the 
proviso that the Serb representative comes from the Republika and the Croat and 
Bosniac ones from the Federation.356  
 
Necessary as this protection of the ethnic groups was deemed to be for the ending of 
the war, it has resulted in two major problems in relation to the right to vote. First, it 
purposively excludes the citizens of BiH who are not members of one of the three 
constituent groups, referred to in the Constitution as ‘Others’, from exercising their 
right to be elected in one of these positions. Second, it prevents members of 
constituent peoples living in the ‘wrong’ entity – that is, Bosniacs and Croats living in 
                                               
354 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009) 28 B.H.R.C. 201. 
355 BiH Constitution, Article IV. 
356 Ibid., Article V. 
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the Republika and Serbs living in the Federation – from running for elections.357 
Sejdić arose from the first of the two identified problems; it concerns a complaint 
from two Bosnian citizens, a Roma and a Jew, who despite their experience in 
politics, were not allowed to run for office because they did not want to declare 
themselves as members of one of the constituent groups. This state of affairs, the 
ECtHR held in Sejdić, results in violations of the right to vote and freedom from 
discrimination.358  
 
On the one hand, the Court’s willingness to decide Sejdić suggests that where a 
divisive conflict arises after a peace agreement has been reached (rather than before, 
as was the case in Cyprus), the judiciary will be more willing to become involved in 
its management. In such cases, the contribution of human rights adjudication to the 
peacebuilding efforts can be a positive one. On the other, the exceptional nature of the 
case and the specific factors that pushed the Court to intervene should not be ignored. 
The ECtHR must have recognised that if it did not intervene in favour of the 
applicants, it was unlikely that the constitutional provisions in question would be 
amended in the short to medium-term. Ideally, the amendment should have been the 
result of political negotiations between the parties, but two such major attempts had 
already been unsuccessful even before the case reached the European Court.359 
Alternatively, the Constitution could have been amended following the finding of a 
violation by the Bosnian Constitutional Court. However, the Court had already 
refused to find a violation on three separate occasions and even invited the ECtHR, if 
it thought it was necessary, to take upon it the responsibility for such a step.360 As a 
result, the ECtHR’s intervention in Sejdić should be viewed, not as a paradigm 
example of its willingness to adjudicate divisive conflicts, but rather as an exceptional 
circumstance.  
 
                                               
357 This second consequence of the ethnocentric provisions also negatively affects the relocation of 
refugees to their pre-war properties, thus indirectly compromising the right to property as well. (Ayaki 
Ito, 'Politicisation of Minority Return in Bosnia-Herzegovina: The First Five Years Examined', 
International Journal of Refugee Law, 13/1/2 (2001), 98 at 118.) 
358 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina at [50] and [56]. 
359 International Crisis Group, 'Bosnia’s Gordian Knot: Constitutional Reform', 
(Sarajevo/Instabul/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012a) at 2-3. 
360 AP-2678/06 (26 May 2006, BiH CC), Separate Concurring Opinion of Judge Feldman at [5]. (The 
other two Constitutional Court cases on this issue were U-5/04 (27 January 2006, BiH CC) and U-
13/05 (29 September 2006, BiH CC). 
  140 
In any case, the Court’s decision to intervene was arguably not taken lightly. An 
important consideration in the judgment was the idea that the Dayton Agreement had 
been signed almost 20 years prior and the danger of violence in the country had been 
largely overcome.361 This suggests that had the case reached the Court sooner, when 
the situation in the country was more unstable and this conflict was even harder to 
manage, it might have been decided differently. Moreover, Judge Bonello’s dissenting 
judgment expressly articulates the fear that judicial intervention in order to manage 
this conflict could overall be detrimental for peace in the country. He therefore 
argues:  
 
‘one cannot possibly disagree with the almost platitudinous Preamble to the 
Convention that human rights “are the foundation of peace in the world”. Sure 
they are. But what of exceptionally perverse situations in which the 
enforcement of human rights could be the trigger for war rather than the 
conveyor of peace?’362  
 
The conclusions of the Bosnian case study are both important and varied. The cases 
that have been examined provide evidence that there is both a greater capacity and 
more willingness to use human rights adjudication in order to manage conflicts where 
these arise after the conclusion of a peace agreement. Even then however, the extent 
of their contribution depends on the divisiveness of the conflict and the forum which 
it is being adjudicated in. The disagreement in Sejdić is much more zero-sum than the 
one in the vital interest cases because its successful management requires a 
constitutional amendment that can potentially challenge the hegemony of the ethnic 
groups in the country. Conversely, this was less of a danger in the vital interest cases 
since the Court was not asked to decide on the constitutionality of the veto power 
itself; rather, it only had to provide some guidance on the most appropriate way to use 
it. It is for this reason that the BiH Constitutional Court refused to adjudicate the first 
conflict on three different occasions, but was a lot more comfortable contributing to 
the management of the second. Moreover, it is worth noting that while the conflict in 
Sejdić was indeed more controversial than the disagreement on vital interests, neither 
                                               
361 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina at [47]. See, also, Michael Hamilton, 'Transition, 
Political Loyalties and the Order of the State', in Antoine Buyse and Michael Hamilton (eds.), 
Transitional Jurisprudence and the ECHR: Justice, Politics and Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 2011). 
362 Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bonello. 
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case was as broad in its consequences, or as divisive in its subject matter, as Erel and 
Damdelen v. Cyprus, which had been declared inadmissible by the ECtHR.  
 
One more observation worth making that the two Bosnian conflicts were managed by 
two different courts. The reasoning of the Constitutional Court in the vital interest 
cases drew inspiration from the objectives of the right to vote, but was ultimately 
explicitly based on the democratic principles of the BiH Constitution’s Preamble. 
Such a reasoning could not have legitimately been adopted by the ECtHR, which had 
it been asked to decide these cases, it would have probably found them inadmissible. 
This contrasts with Sejdić in which it was the ECtHR with its greater expertise in 
deciding difficult human rights cases, rather than the Constitutional Court, which 
finally adjudicated the conflict. Thus, the Bosnian case study offers evidence that 
human rights can contribute to peacebuilding efforts, with the provisos that their 
adjudication takes place in the appropriate (domestic or international) institution and 
that the conflict in question concerns relatively minor amendments, rather than 
overhauling changes to the democratic structures of the country. Bearing in mind 
these limitations and the fact that even then, judicial intervention might remain 
controversial, peacebuilders should not exclude the possibility that engaging in 
political negotiations rather than courtroom battles could be a more effective 
peacebuilding strategy.  
 
5. Adjudicating political conflicts in South Africa 
 
Unlike conflicts in the other two case studies, which prevent the three elements of 
peace from being balanced against each other, those in SA have been largely managed 
successfully. This is mainly because most zero-sum conflicts in the country were dealt 
with during the political negotiations leading up to the Interim and Final 
Constitutions, and any disagreements that remained were less divisive and more 
manageable. Thus, while conflicts have arisen in the country, these concern more 
practical issues such as the kind of identification documents that should be used in 
elections363 and the meaning of specific provisions in the Restitution of Land Rights 
                                               
363 New National Party v. Government of South Africa (CCT 9/99) [1999] ZACC 5. 
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Act [No. 22 of 1994].364 These conflicts have been adjudicated and the rights to vote 
and property have greatly contributed to their better management; therefore, the South 
African experience confirms the international community’s expectations about the 
positive contributions that human rights can make to peace.  
 
The protection of the right to vote in SA differs from that under Article 3-1 of the 
European Convention in three important respects. First, the right is protected under 
Section 19 of the SA Constitution rather than an international human rights treaty. As 
a result, considerations such as national sovereignty, which restrict the ECtHR’s 
interpretation of Article 3-1, are of no significance in SA. Second, Section 19 is more 
broadly worded than its European equivalent. In addition to protecting the right to 
vote and to stand for public office (Sections 19(2) and 19(3)), it also refers to every 
citizen’s freedom ‘to make political choices’, which extend beyond the electoral 
period. Thus, Section 19(1) includes three non-exhaustive examples of protected 
political choices, namely the right to form a political party, the right to participate in 
the activities of a political party, and the right to campaign for a political party or 
cause. Third, the SA Constitutional Court has often used the country’s apartheid 
history as its starting point, referring to the need to avoid undemocratic practices in 
the future and interpreting Section 19 broadly.365 These differences make the ambit of 
Section 19 broader than that of Article 3-1 and suggest that it can successfully deal 
with a greater range of political conflicts.  
 
Section 19’s contribution to the management of conflicts in the country is illustrated 
by New National Party v. Government of South Africa, a case concerning a 
disagreement as to what documents could be used for identification purposes during 
the country’s second democratic elections.366 Acceptable IDs only included 
documents published under the Identification Acts [No. 72 of 1986] and [No. 68 of 
1997] or the Electoral Act [No. 73 of 1998]. This left about 10% of the population 
unable to vote and resulted in a challenge of the legislation as being incompatible 
with Section 19. Essentially, the case was about determining the rationale of the law 
                                               
364 Department of Land Affairs and Others v. Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (PTY) Ltd (CCT 69/06) 
[2007] ZACC 12. 
365 See for example, Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 
(CCT 12/05) [2006] ZACC 11 at [112]; Democratic Alliance and Other v. Amos Masondo and Other 
(CCT 29/02) [2002] ZACC 28 at [17], [38] and [56]-[58]. 
366 New National Party v. Government of South Africa. 
  143 
in question and assessing whether its provisions reasonably limited Section 19; no 
other body was better suited to carry out this task than the judiciary, which explains 
its willingness and success in managing this particular conflict. Delivering a well-
reasoned judgment, the majority of the Court held that practically speaking, the new 
identification documents were necessary because the 10% who had older IDs could 
have been in possession of one of seven different documents, thus considerably 
confusing the situation at the poll. Moreover, the 1997 Electoral Act had been passed 
long enough before the elections so that those who wanted to vote had six months 
within which to apply for the necessary document. Finally, the Court considered the 
symbolic value of the older documents, which had been issued during the apartheid 
regime and reflected the race of the person in possession of them. They were a 
reminder of SA’s shameful past, personally offensive to many people and 
inappropriate for the beginning of democracy in South Africa.  
 
Arguably, the right to property’s contribution to conflict management in SA has been 
even greater than that of the right to vote. The right is protected under Section 25 of 
the Constitution, which unlike Article 1-1 of the ECHR, prima facie protects, not the 
original owner, but the secondary occupier of the property (that is, the person who 
acquired the property under apartheid law). In particular, Section 25 starts from the 
premise that the right-holder is the current occupant and prohibits the arbitrary 
deprivation of his property,367 but also allows its expropriation for the purposes of the 
public interest.368 ‘[T]he nation's commitment to land reform’, which was considered 
necessary due to the property injustices carried out during apartheid, is explicitly 
mentioned as such an interest.369 Section 25(7) makes specific reference to the 
remedying of apartheid injustices when it states that  
 
‘A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent 
provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to 
equitable redress.’ (My emphasis)  
 
                                               
367 SA Constitution, Section 25(1). 
368 SA Constitution, Section 25(2). 
369 SA Constitution, Section 25(4).  
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It is the interpretation of this subsection that has resulted in a number of conflicts, 
which the Constitutional Court has been called to adjudicate. In particular, there have 
been disagreements about what is the exact meaning of the phrases ‘community’, ‘as 
a result of’ and ‘racially discriminatory laws or practices’, all of which affect the 
number of people who are labelled as victims and are entitled to a remedy.  
 
In relation to the first disagreement, the Court adopted a broad interpretation of the 
term ‘community’ as ‘a sufficiently cohesive group of persons’, with ‘some element 
of commonality between the claiming community and the community as it was at the 
point of dispossession.’370 It acknowledged that this definition is relatively easy to 
satisfy, but justified its decision by pointing to the fact that the displacement, and the 
consequent scattering of the people, did not only have adverse economic 
consequences for them, but also weakened the bonds holding the community together 
in the first place.371 A similarly broad interpretation was given to the phrase ‘as a 
result of’: the Court pointed out that apartheid laws pushing towards land 
dispossession were a labyrinth of different statutes preventing non-whites from 
owning land, and that ‘often the cause of historical dispossession of land rights will 
not lie in an isolated moment in time or a single act’.372 Consequently, the phrase ‘as a 
result of’ was held to mean ‘as a consequence of’, rather than ‘solely as a 
consequence of’.373 White landowners might have terminated the tenancy rights of the 
displaced community for commercial reasons, but this only became possible due to, 
and was therefore a consequence of, the matrix of racially discriminatory laws that 
existed in the country at the time. The successful management of both these conflicts 
was aided by the right to property, which the Court relied on in its analysis. In 
particular, the judiciary adopted a broad interpretation of the two phrases because it 
took into account the declared purpose of the law, namely to offer redress to as many 
victims of the right’s violation as possible.374  
 
Similarly, the use of the right to property helped the Court manage the disagreement 
about the meaning of the phrase ‘racially discriminatory laws and practices’. This 
                                               
370 Department of Land Affairs and Others v. Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (PTY) Ltd at [39]. 
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became an issue in the case of Alexkor v Richtersveld Community in which the 
appellant, Alexkor, argued that the Richtersveld Community should not be entitled to 
a remedy because it was displaced, not by one of the statutes directly forcing black 
displacement, but by the Precious Stones Act [No. 44 of 1927].375 The Court, 
rejecting the argument, started its analysis by referring to the need ‘to provide redress 
to those individuals and communities who were dispossessed of their land rights’.376 It 
pointed out that, while the motive of the Precious Stones Act might not have been 
racially discriminatory, its consequences were, because it made a distinction between 
registered owners of the land and those who had indigenous law ownership 
(customary rights to the land). Registered owners were allowed to continue having 
access to the land and to share its mineral wealth with the government; indigenous 
law owners on the other hand, were simply excluded from the land and the 
government exploited their resources without compensating them in any way. Bearing 
in mind that indigenous law ownership was the main way in which black communities 
held land in SA and that these rights were not recognised, legitimised or protected by 
the law, the legislation was inherently racially discriminatory through its 
consequences, even though it did not seek to achieve ‘the (then) ideal of spatial 
apartheid’.377  
 
Thus, the right to property in SA – although at a first glance seemingly favouring the 
status quo rather than the remedying of displaced people – has contributed in 
important ways to the judicial management of the conflicts that are dividing the 
country. An explanation for this lies in the fact that these conflicts are less divisive 
than the ones that exist in Cyprus. They are mainly concerned with differences in 
interpretation of an already agreed upon legal document, rather than with fundamental 
disagreements about how the society should be structured in the first place; they are in 
other words, precisely the types of conflicts that Courts were designed to adjudicate. 
This suggests that the rights’ contribution to conflict management increases as the 
conflict becomes less zero-sum. In Cyprus, where the conflicts are still majorly 
divisive, human rights often fail to contribute to their management and can even have 
negative consequences in this respect. Conversely, in SA, where the disagreements 
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essentially have to do with the fine-tuning of existing legislation, human rights can be 
hugely beneficial. The middle ground is occupied by BiH where adjudication has had 
positive consequences, but only where certain conditions have been satisfied. This 
mixed assessment of the contribution of human rights makes it necessary to consider 
other supplementary (or in some cases even alternative) peacebuilding tools that can 
also contribute to conflict management.  
 
6. Supplementary and alternative peacebuilding tools to human rights 
 
One reading of the analysis that has been made so far is that there are very few 
negative consequences to the use of human rights as peacebuilding tools. In most 
situations, the worst thing that can happen is that their protection will not contribute to 
the peacebuilding efforts, but will not undermine them either. A more critical reading 
however, suggests that human rights adjudication has hidden costs, both financial and 
in terms of distracting the peacebuilders’ attention from other, potentially more 
appropriate tools they could use.378 The most effective peacebuilding strategy 
therefore, is to strengthen the protection of human rights when this can have a positive 
outcome, but use alternative tools where adjudication might contribute in no, or even 
in negative, ways to conflict management. Which of these approaches should be used 
depends on how divisive the conflict that peacebuilders seek to manage is in the first 
place. This section outlines some of the methods and tools that could be used in 
addition, or as alternatives, to adjudicating human rights in order to more effectively 
manage political conflicts.  
 
Since the rights to vote and property can significantly contribute to the management 
of some conflicts, peacebuilders should seek ways to further strengthen and protect 
them. One way in which this can happen is by broadening the ambit of the rights, thus 
ensuring that they become applicable to a greater range of political disagreements. 
Illustrative of this is the fact that due to its narrow ambit, Article 3-1 of the ECHR 
would have never been able to deal with the range of political conflicts addressed by 
the much broader Section 19 of the SA Constitution. Even a small change in the 
wording of the right can make a difference in its contribution to conflict management. 
                                               
378 David Kennedy, 'The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?', Harvard 
Human Rights Journal, 15 (2002), 101. 
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For example, Aziz was concerned with the right of TC living in the ROC-controlled 
areas to vote and be voted in legislative, but not in Presidential elections. This 
arbitrary distinction between the two could have been avoided if Article 3-1 did not 
only protect ‘the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the 
legislature’, but safeguarded their choice in relation to all democratically elected posts 
instead.  
 
Another reason why Sections 19 and 25 have broader ambits than Articles 3-1 and 1-1 
respectively is the fact that the former are interpreted and applied by the domestic 
judiciary, while the latter by an international court. A Constitutional Court is likely to 
interpret the Bill of Rights more broadly than the ECtHR is to interpret an 
international human rights treaty for two reasons. First, because it does not have to 
take into account national sovereignty considerations and is therefore not limited by 
the margin of appreciation and second, because it is more likely to take the country’s 
history and background into account, thus interpreting the right in ways that are not 
always apparent from its wording. For instance, the SA Constitutional Court has 
interpreted Sections 19 and 25 widely by seeing them as responses to the country’s 
apartheid past.379 Similarly, the BiH Constitutional Court interpreted the right to vote 
as giving effect to the Constitution’s Preamble which sought to create ‘democratic 
governmental institutions and fair procedures’ that can ‘produce peaceful relations 
within a pluralist society.’ This is not to suggest however that domestic courts are 
always the best forums for conflict management, since international bodies also 
benefit from a range of advantages. Among them is the fact that they act as fail-safe 
mechanisms in case the domestic judiciary refuses to intervene. An example in point 
is the BiH Constitutional Court’s consistent refusal to deal with the 
disenfranchisement of Others and those residing in the ‘wrong entity’, thus leaving 
the ECtHR as the only forum that the applicants could take action in. Moreover, an 
additional advantage of international courts is the fact that they might be more easily 
perceived as neutral since they do not have a particular stake in the outcome of the 
case. Thus, another way of strengthening human rights is to ensure that they are 
                                               
379 Moreover, the Court has been encouraged to expand this purposive interpretation of Section 19 
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protected domestically and internationally, so that they can benefit from the strengths 
of both levels of adjudication.  
 
An additional element affecting the effectiveness of human rights in managing 
conflicts is the extent to which the judiciary is perceived as neutral. It is therefore 
important that judges see themselves as legal experts interpreting the contested legal 
document as objectively as possible, rather than as representatives of their ethnic 
groups.380 After a shaky start,381 the BiH Constitutional Court reached exactly this 
conclusion and has over the last years started issuing unanimous decisions on a range 
of divisive and controversial political conflicts.382 As a result of the Court’s 
achievement to be perceived as neutral, it is today considered as one of the most 
trustworthy institutions established by Dayton, which makes its decisions more 
widely accepted and likely to successfully contribute to conflict management.383 
Equally important to delivering objective and well-supported decisions is the 
appearance that the Court is indeed acting in such a way. It is for this reason that 
accusations that the ECtHR’s decisions are politically motivated, even if they are 
unfounded, have undermined their peacebuilding contributions in Cyprus. These 
accusations were repeated for years by TC during the Loizidou line of cases, and were 
swiftly echoed by GC as soon as the Court delivered its Demopoulos decision.384 In 
such situations an effective response strategy is not only to focus on the law, but to 
also strengthen the peace-friendly civil society in order to counter the nationalist 
voices in the country.  
 
The final way to strengthen the peacebuilding potential of human rights through 
conflict adjudication is for the judiciary to strike the appropriate balance: on the one 
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hand, unelected judges should not overstep their mandate and on the other, they 
should aim to promote security, justice and reconciliation wherever possible. Judicial 
restraint is valuable because too much intervention for the sake of managing less 
divisive disagreements can spark much more fundamental and zero sum conflicts 
about the role of the Courts in a democratic state. Illustrative of this is the experience 
of the Israeli Supreme Court, which in an attempt to promote human rights and curtail 
what it perceived to be illiberal practices, it created a constitutional turmoil and 
reignited a conflict about whether the state should promote secular or Jewish 
values.385 Conversely, the Courts should, when given the opportunity, also take brave 
steps to contribute to conflict management as much as possible. A successful example 
of this is the BiH Constituent Peoples case in which the majority of the Constitutional 
Court gave broad guidelines about the type of society the Constitution aimed to create 
and in the process pre-empted and decisively dealt with a number of political conflicts 
that were likely to arise in the future.386 
 
While however the strengthening of and emphasis on human rights can make 
important contributions to the management of certain conflicts, the most divisive 
disagreements among them are best addressed using exactly the opposite strategy, 
namely shifting the peacebuilders’ attention to altogether different tools and methods. 
Thus, the most significant step towards the successful management of zero-sum 
conflicts is the existence of good negotiators that see eye-to-eye on the importance of 
a political compromise and are willing to take the appropriate steps to achieve it. 
Illustrative of this is a contrast between the South African and the Cypriot negotiation 
processes. The SA negotiation process was successful at least partly because the 
negotiators of the two sides understood that the status quo was unsustainable; as a 
result, they compromised and agreed on the Interim Constitution and the five-year 
sunset clause, both of which avoided deadlocked discussions which could have 
derailed the negotiating process.387 Moreover, the negotiators are reported to have had 
good working relationships with each other, which made them more willing to accept 
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a compromise suggested by the other side.388 Conversely, in Cyprus the negotiations 
have moved painstakingly slowly and have focused on the technical definitions of 
terms such as ‘bizonality’, ‘federation’ and ‘confederation’, rather than make any real 
progress towards a solution.389 Part of the reason for this disappointing state of affairs 
is that, unlike SA, the two ethnic groups have generally not been ruled by leaders who 
are positively predisposed towards a solution, while Turkey’s interventions have for 
the most part undermined the success prospects of the negotiation process.390  
 
A second requirement for the successful management of zero-sum conflicts is the 
existence of a good opportunity to push the negotiations forward and give some 
momentum to the negotiating process, especially if this is as long and fruitless as the 
Cypriot one. For instance, one of the most important factors that led to the Annan 
Plan, a peace settlement agreed to by the political elites but rejected by the Cypriot 
public, was the international community’s initiative to join the peace negotiations 
with Cyprus’ EU accession process.391 Thus, the promise that upon the public’s 
acceptance of the Plan, Cyprus would be able to join the EU as a whole, pushed the 
leaders of both sides to make compromises that they would not otherwise be willing 
to accept. A similar window of opportunity – perhaps the last one – is afforded to 
Cypriots today, who in the midst of the economic crisis have discovered a significant 
amount of hydrocarbons in the island’s exclusive economic zone.392 This has 
encouraged the international community to become actively involved in the 
negotiations and push the two parties to sign a common declaration, listing the areas 
in which they agree and committing to negotiate the rest.393 However, whether this 
process will lead to the reunification of the island remains unclear, thus pointing once 
more to the significance of peace-friendly political elites. 
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A study of the Annan Plan’s rise and fall points to two additional factors that can 
contribute to the successful management of zero-sum conflicts. The first is the 
involvement of the international community, which can push the parties to overcome 
their irreconcilable differences by making the necessary compromises. Thus, the UN 
Secretary-General played an important role during the Cypriot negotiations, both by 
making it clear to the TC leader that some of his demands were unrealistic and asking 
him to withdraw them and in giving his own view of what would be the fairer 
compromise when the parties failed to agree between themselves.394 It is important to 
note however, that the international community should always be acting in a neutral 
capacity, something which has often been disputed in ethnically divided, post-conflict 
societies. If international actors become involved in order to promote their own 
countries’ or organisations’ interests, this is likely to have detrimental consequences 
for the peacebuilding process because the parties will become even less trusting of 
each other and even more unwilling to abandon their fixed positions on given issues.  
 
The second factor that can contribute to peacebuilding efforts is the existence of pro-
solution media and civil society organisations that will present the negotiations and 
their outcomes to the public in a positive light rather than seek to criticise 
shortcomings, which will unavoidably exist.395 Had these organisations been more 
vocal in Cyprus in 2004, the Greek Cypriot vote to the referendum, which was 
overwhelmingly against the Annan Plan, might have been different. The situation 
today has slightly changed since there is a stronger and better-funded civil society that 
sends a reconciliatory message to both communities; it is suffering however from 
serious outreach deficiencies since the majority of the population still remains 
unaware of its initiatives and most of the efforts of pro-peace organisations are limited 
to ‘preaching to the converted’. A pro-solution civil society is also likely to play an 
important role in peacebuilding efforts after an agreement has been signed between 
the two parties.396 If a conflict arises during the peace negotiation process itself, the 
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at [131], [43], [48] and [54]. 
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international community can more legitimately intervene and push the parties towards 
its successful management. Conversely, it is considerably less acceptable for it to 
interfere after the peace negotiations have been completed, thus leaving a peace-
friendly civil society as the only actor that can push towards compromise.397 Thus, 
while the American heavy-handed involvement during the Dayton negotiations was 
generally seen in a positive light, the continuing interference in everyday politics by 
the Office of the High Representative after the signing of the agreement has been 




The expectation that human rights can contribute to the management of political 
conflicts in ethnically divided, post-conflict societies, and therefore ease the balancing 
between the three elements of peace, is not wrong. It is however, subject to major 
qualifications. The first, and one that was discussed in this chapter, is that their 
contribution operates along a continuum: the more zero-sum the conflict (and 
therefore, the more detrimental its consequences to peacebuilding attempts in the 
country), the less likely is human rights adjudication to contribute to its management. 
The least divisive conflicts will usually be concerned with disagreements of how a 
law should be interpreted (as was the case with Alexkor v Richtersveld Community in 
SA), or how much weight different considerations should carry (like with the vital 
interest cases in BiH); both are issues that the judiciary is well-suited to deal with. 
Conversely, Courts are generally unwilling – and for good reason – to interfere in the 
management of conflicts that are more appropriately dealt with through political 
debate and negotiations.  
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This observation has important practical consequences relating to the methods that 
peacebuilders should adopt. Specifically, it suggests that human rights protection 
should be used as a conflict management tool only in those cases where it can actually 
have this effect; in the remaining cases, alternative and more efficient methods should 
be used instead. As Dudai and McEvoy put it, ‘human rights work has to do more 
than simply make us feel better about ourselves and what we do. If it doesn’t alter 
behaviour, […] by definition, its impact is diminished.’399 While it is often advisable 
to take steps to strengthen human rights protection, on other occasions, peacebuilders’ 
attention and resources should be directed towards other ways of managing conflicts, 
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Praxis', Journal of Human Rights Practice, 4(1) (2012), 1 at 11. 
  154 





Every applicant who argues that her human rights have been violated in some way or 
another, who willingly endures the long and expensive judicial process and the 
endless legal jargon, does so because she has a set of ultimate goals in mind: to 
eventually be remedied for her sufferings and/or set a precedent so that other people 
in her position do not suffer in the same way. Important as the adjudication of the 
legal issues might be therefore, the litmus test of whether it was all worth it is only 
satisfied when the judicial decision has been enforced. More specifically in relation to 
the peacebuilding context, a conflict has only been successfully managed when the 
grievances in question have been addressed: among others, when the properties of 
displaced people are returned to them and when the disenfranchised population starts 
participating, actively or passively, in regular free and fair elections. Thus, what the 
first part of this chapter (Section 2) is concerned with, is examining the extent to 
which human rights decisions are actually implemented in practice. The outcome is a 
mixed one: one country can swiftly implement the decision and might even go beyond 
its human rights obligations and another might delay the judgment’s enforcement for 
years. 
 
A second consideration concerns the extent to which the legal and institutional 
amendments that result from the implementation of human rights judgments actually 
contribute to conflict management and successful peacebuilding. The international 
community assumes that they do and in many situations, it is proven right. Among the 
most positive outcomes of human rights implementation in terms of their 
peacebuilding effect has been the protection of the right to vote in Cyprus and the 
right to property in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). However, the legal amendments 
stemming from the implementation of a human rights decision do not always 
guarantee the successful management of a conflict; a change in the law might make 
no contribution to peace on the ground, or could even have negative peacebuilding 
effects. Section 3 provides examples of the positive relationship between human 
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rights implementation and conflict management, while Section 4 elaborates on the 
other side of the coin. The final section of this chapter concludes that the main reason 
for the lack of implementation or for its disappointing contributions to peace is the 
political unwillingness to act. Acknowledging that nothing can truly replace the 
absence of a peace-friendly political elite, I offer three suggestions that could 
nevertheless somewhat mitigate its negative consequences.  
 
2. Getting from the adjudication of political conflicts to implementing their 
solutions 
 
When the international community contends that human rights can act as effective 
peacebuilding tools, what it has in mind is not simply their adjudication in a court of 
law, but also their practical implementation as well. It is for this reason that, since the 
1990s peacebuilders have experienced a steep learning curve, which has resulted in a 
shift of attention from vague human rights pronouncements in the peace agreements 
to robust mechanisms that ensure their enforcement in practice.400 This emphasis on 
human rights implementation is undoubtedly important since peace requires changes 
which actually take place on the ground rather than in legal texts. Feelings of justice 
are promoted, not when applicants have a theoretical right to a remedy, but when they 
are empowered to use it in the real world. Moreover, the non-implementation of a 
judgment is likely to disappoint the affected parties and undermine reconciliation 
between them. Finally, respecting and swiftly implementing judicial decisions 
promotes a sense of security among the population by showing that the executive’s 
power is not exercised arbitrarily and is unlikely to be abused in the future. Yet, 
despite its importance for peace, implementation of human rights cases does not 
always follow from their adjudication.  
 
In best case scenarios the implementation of the judicial decision is uneventful and 
takes place quickly. Case in point is Aziz v. Cyprus, where the Turkish Cypriot (TC) 
applicant’s complaint concerned the fact that he was prevented from participating in 
                                               
400 Christine Bell, 'Human Rights, Peace Agreements and Conflict Resolution: Negotiating Justice in 
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the 2001 Republic of Cyprus (ROC) parliamentary election.401 Finding a violation, the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ordered the ROC authorities ‘to 
implement such measures as they consider appropriate to fulfil their obligations to 
secure the right to vote in compliance with this judgment’.402 Since Article 3-1 only 
safeguards ‘the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the 
legislature’, the ROC could have complied with its Convention obligations by merely 
amending the law concerning parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, despite the 
existence of internal nationalist voices, the amended legislation went further and 
allowed TC residing in the ROC-controlled areas to vote in the presidential, 
parliamentary and municipal elections. The electoral law also allows TC to run as 
candidates in the parliamentary and municipal elections, but not the presidential 
one.403 As a result of the swift implementation of the case, some TC have run for 
office, although none of them has managed to win a seat so far. 
 
Another case in which the Court’s decision was promptly implemented is Matatiele 
Municipality v. President of the Republic of South Africa.404 The facts of the case 
stem from South Africa (SA)’s division into provinces in 1994, which resulted in 
some municipalities having territories in two provinces. While this was tolerated for 
some time, cross-boundary municipalities proved difficult to administer. As a result, 
the government sought to eliminate them by shifting provincial boundaries and 
bringing the whole of these municipalities within a single province. Bearing in mind 
differences in the quality of services between the provinces, conflicts arose as to 
which province each municipality should be incorporated into. In one of the first 
cases to reach the Constitutional Court on this issue, it was argued that the legislative 
decision to place Matatiele Municipality from the province of KwaZulu-Natal to 
Eastern Cape, did not follow a process that facilitated public involvement as required 
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by Section 72(1)(a) of the Constitution.405 The Court, using Section 19 to interpret the 
phrase ‘to facilitate public involvement’, held that there was an obligation on the 
legislature to consult and take into account the affected community’s views on the 
issue.406 In light of the State’s failure to provide applicants with the opportunity to 
express their opinion about the legislation in question, the law was found to be in 
violation of the right to vote. Complying with the Court’s decision, the National 
Council of Provinces started a consultation process and after its completion, it 
redebated the issue. 
 
On the other hand, the implementation of a decision does not always follow smoothly 
from the adjudication of the case; sometimes it might even take years, if at all, for it to 
successfully take place. Illustrative of this is Loizidou v. Turkey, where the ECtHR 
ordered the respondent state to pay the applicant, within three months, approximately 
450,000 Cypriot pounds for the violation of her right to property.407 Turkey ignored 
the reports of the Committee of Ministers calling for the judgment’s enforcement for 
years until compensation was finally paid at the end of 2003.408 This delayed 
implementation of the judgment was problematic for a range of additional reasons as 
well. Loizidou is the first of a number of identical cases where the Court found a 
violation of the right to property, yet when implementing the decision Turkey 
explicitly stated that this did not set a precedent for all the other cases.409 As a result, 
all victims whose case was heard and a violation was found after Loizidou remain to 
this day unremedied.410 Moreover, Turkey was compensating Loizidou at the same 
time as maintaining that the Court’s decision was mistaken.411 Considering that most 
human rights victims’ primary concern is an apology, rather than payment of 
monetary compensation, the implementation of the judgment is unlikely to have 
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contributed to feelings of justice for Loizidou herself or for the thousands of Greek 
Cypriots (GC) who identified with her plight.412 Perhaps the most serious deficiency 
of Turkey’s response however, is failing to recognise that ‘payment of just 
satisfaction, although it is a great step forward in the implementation of the judgment 
of 1998, still does not, in fact, implement the basic context of the decision’.413 
Loizidou’s complaint was that the presence of Turkish troops in the non-ROC 
controlled areas of Cyprus prevented her from using and enjoying her property, a 
situation that still remains in place and constitutes a continuing violation of her right, 
despite the payment of compensation back in 2003.414  
 
An even more unsatisfactory situation exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), with 
Sejdić and Finci v. BiH, the right to vote case, remaining unimplemented almost 5 
years after the ECtHR’s decision.415 The international community’s response to Sejdić 
has been momentous: reports and suggestions for its implementation have been 
published by the Venice Commission,416 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe,417 non-governmental organisations418 and academics.419 Additionally, its 
implementation has been made a condition for BiH’s EU accession process, 
something repeated frequently by European officials.420 They sometimes cajole the 
Bosnian elite by promising that implementing the decision and joining the EU will 
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have concrete positive economic consequences for the country.421 On other occasions, 
they issue warnings that continued non-implementation can ‘potentially undermine 
the legitimacy and the credibility of the country’s future elected bodies’.422 Yet 
neither the carrot nor the stick have motivated Bosnian politicians into action: BiH’s 
response to the implementation of the case has ranged from apathetic to hostile with 
all attempts for a constitutional amendment ending so far in failure.423 
 
The examples from the three case studies suggest that the implementation prospects 
of a case depend on a number of factors. First, it is arguably more likely that a 
decision will be implemented if it is issued by a domestic rather than an international 
court since ignoring the former can induce a more serious constitutional crisis than the 
latter. Second, international judgments are more likely to be enforced by countries 
that respect international and human rights law more generally. For instance, Aziz’s 
swift implementation could be foreseen since Cyprus, generally speaking, has a good 
human rights record and GC politicians frequently refer to the need to respect and 
comply with international law. Similarly, Loizidou’s problematic implementation is in 
line with Turkey’s enforcement record of ECtHR decisions more generally. A final 
factor affecting the implementation prospects of a case is the extent to which the 
country in question has something to gain by taking such a step. Most typically in the 
European context this will involve an improvement in the country’s relationship with 
the EU, which is likely to result in a better economic future. It is therefore not a 
coincidence that Loizidou was implemented in 2003, at a time when Turkey’s interest 
in the EU had reached its peak. Despite these indications however, Sejdić is the 
ultimate reminder that what really matters is the extent to which there is political 
willingness for change; if this is absent, the implementation of a decision becomes 
considerably less likely. 
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3. Positive peacebuilding effects of human rights implementation 
 
In best-case scenarios the implementation of a human rights decision or programme 
will make positive contributions to peace. Since human rights are legal tools, they are 
likely to result in amendments to the laws, practices and institutions of the country in 
question, which can be the first step towards changes in the living conditions and 
perceptions of the people. Examples of such amendments include the revision of the 
electoral law in Cyprus in order to make it compatible with the ECtHR decision in 
Aziz and the complete transformation of the restitution process in BiH due to the 
implementation of the right to property. In both of these situations the legal and 
institutional amendments promoted security and justice and might have even 
indirectly contributed to feelings of reconciliation. 
 
Illustrative of the peacebuilding effects of implementing human rights decisions is the 
aftermath of the Aziz case in Cyprus. Aziz led to the amendment of the electoral law, 
which allowed TC residing in the ROC-controlled areas to become involved in the 
democratic process for the first time since 1963 and send the message that they are 
equal citizens of the Republic. In practical terms, this is significant because it 
empowers TC, who by voting in ROC elections, are impliedly rejecting Turkey’s 
rhetoric that only a separate and independent ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ 
(‘TRNC’) can protect their interests. Equally importantly, this legal amendment has 
the potential to start changing the relationship between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
TC who are politically active in the ROC have an incentive and are given the 
opportunity to communicate with the GC public directly and explain their 
community’s concerns. It is only through discussions such as these that each side can 
understand the other’s point of view and reconciliation can start being promoted on 
the island. TC who decide to run for elections in the ROC, do so because they 
imagine and work towards a united Cyprus. They are among the most vocal 
supporters of peace between the two communities and their empowerment shows to 
Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike that there is an alternative to the more dominant 
nationalist views expressed on both sides of the Green Line.  
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Recently, the ROC’s Council of Ministers has further expanded the protection of the 
right to vote by allowing all TC with a ROC identity card – whether living in the 
ROC-controlled areas or not – to participate in the elections of the European 
Parliament.424 Although the TC parties that are active in the ‘TRNC’ boycotted the 
election, 5 TC ran for office – 2 of them in a joint ballot with 4 GC – and 3.19% of all 
TC with a ROC ID card voted in the elections.425 No TC was elected in the end, but a 
future electoral success could give TC the opportunity to express their community’s 
views on the international level. This is important because the non-recognition of the 
‘TRNC’ has meant that TC are represented in the international community by Turkey, 
whose interests are not always aligned with their own.426 It transpires therefore that 
Aziz’s implementation has over the last 10 years gradually contributed to legal 
changes on the island that can have positive practical implications for peace.  
 
Equally positive have been the effects of New National Party v. Government of South 
Africa, in which the Constitutional Court held that the requirement that all voters 
present their bar-coded IDs at polling stations was not a violation of the right to 
vote.427 The aftermath of the decision provides evidence of the positive peacebuilding 
effects that enforcing a Court judgment can have. In particular, New National Party 
positively affected democratic practices – that can contribute to feelings of security, 
justice and reconciliation – in three ways: the first and most important, is that it 
legitimised the electoral process as being compatible with the right to vote and 
allowed the elections to continue as planned, thus providing much-needed stability in 
the country. The second effect of the decision and the extensive media coverage that 
followed it, was that these raised public awareness about the need to have a bar-coded 
ID in order to participate in the election; in turn, this pushed potential voters to apply 
for the ID in time and avoided potential disappointment and feelings of frustration at 
the polling stations. Finally, when the Court was delivering its decision, it relied on 
the government’s assurances that the Department of Home Affairs had the capacity to 
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controlled areas risks making them a minority even within the ‘TRNC’ itself (Mete Hatay, 'Is the 
Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking?', (Nicosia: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2007).) 
427 New National Party v. Government of South Africa (CCT 9/99) [1999] ZACC 5. 
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deal with last minute applications from citizens seeking to obtain the bar-coded 
IDs.428 These assurances turned out to be accurate: while in July 1998 10% of 
potential voters was not in possession of any IDs, by March 1999, this number had 
dropped to 2%.429 The fact that the Department was indeed successful in processing 
the last minute applications increased the voter turnout, enhanced confidence in 
government departments to deliver on their promises and further legitimised the 
electoral results.      
 
Even more successful in terms of building peace however, has been the 
implementation of the right to property in BiH. The ethnic cleansing strategies used 
by the warring parties displaced, either within the country or outside its borders, more 
than half of its population.430 In an attempt to prevent the cementation of these 
strategies, the return of displaced people became one of the main peacebuilding 
objectives in the country.431 This is reflected both in the strong protections of the right 
to property in the Constitution and the specific provisions made in Annex 7 of the 
Dayton Agreement, entitled, ‘Refugees and Displaced Persons’.432 The right to 
property, like all rights included in the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and its Protocols, is protected under Article II.2 of the Constitution, which 
makes them directly applicable and gives them priority over all other law. Also, 
Article II.3.k specifically protects the right to property and Article II.5 states that 
‘[a]ll refugees and displaced persons have the right freely to return to their homes of 
origin’. In the words of one of the peacebuilders in BiH, protecting property rights 
‘had the potential to undo the results of ethnic cleansing through the collective effect 
of hundreds of thousands of decisions to return.’433 More impressive than the list of 
rights however, has been the coordinated programme undertaken by the Office of the 
High Representative to implement these constitutional provisions in practice. 
                                               
428 Ibid., at [42]. 
429 Johan Oivier, 'The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC): The Quest for Free and Fair Elections' 
in Yvonne Muthien (ed.), Democracy in South Africa: Evaluating the 1999 Election (Pretoria: Human 
Sciences Research Council, 1999), 21 at 29. 
430 Charles Philpott, 'Though the Dog Is Dead, the Pig Must Be Killed: Finishing with Property 
Restitution to Bosnia Herzegovina’s IDPs and Refugees', Journal of Refugee Studies, 18 (2005), 1 at 1. 
431 Annex 7 at [1]; Lisa D’Onofrio, 'Welcome Home? Minority Return in South-East Rebublika 
Srpska', Sussex Migration Working Paper No. 19, (2004). 
432 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed on 14 December 
1995, Annex 7. 
433 Rhodri C. Williams, 'The Significance of Property Restitution to Sustainable Return in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina', International Migration, 44/3 (2006), 39 at 43. 
  163 
 
The success of the property implementation programme becomes even more obvious 
because of a change in strategy that took place in 1999, which resulted in a clear 
‘before and after’ picture. The ‘before’ picture is a rather bleak one: in the early 
stages after Dayton, the international community’s strategy was to encourage group 
returns in areas where this was considered safe, but to actively discourage them in 
others where it was believed that the conditions were not ripe yet. The strategy’s 
reliance on the political right to return rested on the idea that peacebuilders could 
encourage the ethnic groups to accept minority returnees in their areas of effective 
control through political pressure and economic incentives.434 However, the 
implementation of the political right to return, which essentially prioritised feelings of 
security over those of justice, was largely a failure because all three ethnic groups 
proved uncooperative. Despite encouraging promises, they adopted discriminatory 
laws against minorities, prioritised restitution applications by their own community 
members and were slow to stop any nationalist violence that took place upon minority 
returns.435 This political unwillingness to encourage minority returns was easily 
camouflaged under the complexity of and contradictions between the laws that existed 
at the time.436 Consequently, between 1996 and 2000, the first time the international 
community started systematically collecting statistics, only 12% of applications by 
displaced people had been dealt with.437  
 
The huge contrast between the ‘before’ and ‘after’ pictures is largely attributed to the 
abandonment of the political right to return and the implementation of the legal right 
to property instead. The change took place in 1999 when the international community 
introduced the Property Legislation Implementation Plan (PLIP); this relied on a 
series of legislative amendments pushed through by the High Representative and on 
                                               
434 The term ‘minority returnees’ refers to displaced people returning to areas where they are not in the 
majority ethnic group.  
435 Ayaki Ito, 'Politicisation of Minority Return in Bosnia-Herzegovina: The First Five Years 
Examined', International Journal of Refugee Law, 13/1/2 (2001), 98. 
436 Shortly after the war, different and often contradictory sets of laws existed and were selectively 
applied: laws passed by the ex-Yugoslav state, pre-war laws that only applied to BiH, wartime 
legislation (which was different according to the ethnic group that controlled each area), the 
Constitution, post-war legislation and international instruments that were directly applicable at the 
national level. For an excellent background to the property laws in BiH, see Philpott, 'Though the Dog 
Is Dead, the Pig Must Be Killed'. 
437 Office of the High Representative, 'Statistics: Implementation of the Property Laws in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina', (Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative, 31 May 2000), on 
http://www.ohr.int/plip/pdf/PLIP5.00.PDF [accessed 10 June 2014]. 
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the active involvement of international peacebuilders for their enforcement in 
practice. The amendments included retrospectively putting out of force the 
discriminatory property laws that had been passed during and before the war, 
harmonising the claim procedures in both constituent states and creating a process 
that was heavily weighted in favour of the claimants. In particular, displaced people 
only had to show that they had pre-war rights to the property and the responsible 
authority had 30 days to investigate the claim. If the current occupant had no right to 
occupy the property or had access to other housing, he had to vacate it within 15 days. 
If he was in need of alternative accommodation, the authorities had 90 days to secure 
it for him and he had to be evicted even if no such accommodation had been 
provided.438 Although these deadlines were often exceeded by several months, the 
new legislation jump-started the process and prevented uncooperative public officials 
from using excuses.  
 
It was estimated that if restitution continued with the same rate as it did before 1999, 
the process would have taken another 40 years to complete.439 Rather, the 
international community’s implementation of the legal right to property meant that by 
December 2003, when PLIP came to an end, 93% of the property claims had been 
handled and the few remaining cases were handed over to the local authorities to 
complete.440 Ultimately, ‘[t]he restoration of property rights and the return of refugees 
and displaced persons to their homes must rank as the most dramatic success of the 
peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina’.441 At the most basic level, the legislative 
amendments, resulting in an increasing number of displaced people empowered to 
return to their houses, promoted security by sending the message that the war was 
truly over and the conflict was being left behind. As the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHRC) put it, ‘[w]hen they choose voluntarily to go 
back to their homeland, refugees are, quite literally, voting with their feet and 
                                               
438 Philpott, 'Though the Dog Is Dead, the Pig Must Be Killed'. 
439 Office of the High Representative, 'PLIP – Non Negotiable Principles in the Context of the Property 
Law Implementation', (Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative, 7 March 2000), on 
http://www.ohr.int/plip [accessed 10 May 2014]. 
440 Office of the High Representative, 'Statistics: Implementation of the Property Laws in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina', (Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative, 31 December 2003), on 
http://www.ohr.int/plip/pdf/plip_12.03.PDF [accessed 10 June 2014]. 
441 Marcus Cox and Madeline Garlick, 'Musical Chairs: Property Repossession and Return Strategies in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina', in Scott Leckie (ed.), Returning Home: Housing and Property Restituiton 
Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2003), 65 at 65. 
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expressing confidence in the future of their country.’442 It is arguably for this reason 
that the nationalist leaders in BiH were keen to prevent minority returns in the country 
and why it is considered such a big success of the international community that this 
was prevented.  
 
More importantly, the implementation programme promoted peace by contributing to 
feelings of justice in three ways. First, PLIP moved beyond empty political promises 
and put in place clear laws and procedures, which displaced people could rely on in 
practice. This empowered the applicants since it clarified the process through which 
they could demand – rather than merely wait at the discretion of the uncooperative 
state – for the return of their properties. Second, the clear legal provisions made it 
easy to spot state officials who refused to protect the right to property and to impose 
strict penalties on them. As a result, in November 1999 the High Representative 
removed 22 officials from office for failing to comply with PLIP and sent the 
message that the return of displaced people was a peacebuilding priority.443 Third, 
implementing the right to property helped coordinate different international 
organisations that were operating in BiH; for instance, Organisation for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and UNHCR officials were sent in every municipality 
in the country to collect statistics and deliver PLIP guidelines to the local 
authorities.444 This resulted in a speedier and more professional response by the 
authorities since it, for example, stopped the popular practice of prioritising ‘easy 
applications’ (usually returns where the applicant was in the majority or where there 
was no secondary occupier in the property). Instead, all applications were treated in 
the chronological order that they had been submitted, thus preventing the privileging 
of applicants because of their personal connections or ethnic group.445 This also gave 
a rough indication to people as to when their claim would be dealt with, thus allowing 
them to better prepare, financially and psychologically for their return. Clearly 
therefore, the implementation of the right to property in BiH, like the enforcement of 
                                               
442 UNHCR, The State of the World’s Refugees: A Humanitarian Agenda (Oxford: OUP, 1997) at 162. 
443 D’Onofrio, 'Welcome Home? Minority Return in South-East Rebublika Srpska' at 9. 
444 Philpott, 'Though the Dog Is Dead, the Pig Must Be Killed'. 
445 Ibid. One of the few exceptions to this strict chronological order was the prioritisation of policemen, 
with the rationale being that they could make minority returnees feel more secure. This is an example 
of a conscious policy decision to prioritise the element of security over the element of justice in the 
post-conflict society. 
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the right to vote in Cyprus, resulted in practical changes that promoted peace in the 
respective countries. 
 
4. The other side of the coin: dangers and deficiencies of human rights 
implementation 
 
As encouraging as the ‘success stories’ of human rights implementation might be, 
they do not reflect the complete picture of what happens in ethnically divided, post-
conflict societies. While their enforcement has in some cases had positive 
implications for peace, examples from all three case studies suggest that the legal and 
institutional amendments deriving from human rights judgments do not always lead to 
better conflict management. The main factor contributing to bad implementation 
policies is the political elite’s unwillingness to implement the decision in the first 
place. This can result in legal remedies that are technically compatible with human 
rights, but make no real contributions to peace, as was the case with the 
implementation of the right to property in Cyprus. More worryingly, the outcome of 
Matatiele (SA) and suggestions for Sejdić’s enforcement (BiH), suggest that a badly 
implemented human rights decision can potentially even have negative consequences 
for the divided society. Importantly, the argument here is not that other peacebuilding 
tools should have supplemented the legal or institutional amendments that resulted 
from the right’s implementation; rather, it is that the right’s enforcement should have 
resulted in altogether different laws and institutions in the first place. Ultimately, not 
every remedy that is compatible with human rights necessarily also contributes to 
peace. 
 
Cyprus is a unique case with regards to its implementation of the right to property 
because the current status quo on the island has resulted in different remedies being 
available to Greek and Turkish Cypriot displaced people. According to the ECtHR’s 
case law, which has been the driving force behind the implementation of these 
remedies, until a peace settlement has been agreed, any violations of (Greek 
Cypriots’) property rights in the occupied part of the island are attributable to Turkey, 
while Cyprus is responsible for (Turkish Cypriots’) rights in the ROC-controlled 
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areas.446 Turkey’s response to GC displacement came, after years of delay, in the 
form of the Immovable Property Commission (IPC), which the ECtHR found to be an 
effective remedy in Demopoulos v. Turkey.447 The IPC is a 6-member body consisting 
of 4 TC and 2 international members. It has jurisdiction to hear cases concerning 
property violations arising from the 1974 war and remedy the applicants in one of 
three ways: provide restitution and/or compensation for the loss of income and for the 
property itself or exchange the GC property in question with a TC property of 
equivalent value in the ROC-controlled area of the island.448  
 
Conversely, TC rights in the ROC-controlled areas are managed through the 
Custodianship regime. The ROC starts from the premise that the rightful owners of 
the properties in question are the Turkish Cypriots, but that it is necessary for the 
Custodian, who is the ROC Minister of the Interior, to manage and protect them on 
their behalf until the conflict has been resolved.449 Despite the seemingly altruistic 
motives of the legislation, the legal impossibility of opting out of this system of 
protection meant that in practice TC were prevented from accessing and controlling 
their properties, which resulted in possibly rights-violating situations. Thus, in 2010 
the ROC introduced a series of amendments to the law that made it possible for TC to 
apply for the return of their property and opt out of the Custodianship regime. This 
amendment was the result of a case, Sofi v. Cyprus, that had been submitted to the 
ECtHR by a TC complaining of a violation of her right to property.450 Presumably 
afraid that Sofi would be as detrimental to the ROC as Loizidou had been to Turkey, 
Cyprus settled and committed to amend its Custodianship legislation. Kazali v. 
Cyprus, a TC attempt to challenge this amended state of affairs as still being in 
violation of the right to property was found inadmissible by the ECtHR;451 it held that 
being allowed to apply to the Custodian for the return of their property and then to 
                                               
446 Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits) (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 513 at [64]. 
447 Demopoulos v. Turkey. 
448 ‘TRNC’, Law for the Compensation, Exchange and Restitution of Immovable Properties which are 
Within the Scope of Sub- paragraph (B) of Paragraph 1 of Article 159 of the Constitution, Law 
67/2005. The remedy of exchange becomes technically possible because according to ‘TRNC’ law, the 
properties that were owned by TC in the ROC-controlled areas now belong to the ‘TRNC’ itself, which 
can do as it pleases with them. (‘TRNC’, Law for Housing, Allocation of Land, and Property of Equal 
Value, Law 41/1977.) For an excellent legal background of the issue, see International Crisis Group, 
'Cyprus: Bridging the Property Divide', (Europe Report No210; Nicosia/Instanbul/Brussels, 2009). 
449 The Law Concerning Turkish-Cypriot Properties (Administration and Other Matters) (Temporary 
Provisions) Law of 1991 (Law 139/1991). 
450 Sofi v. Cyprus (App. No. 18163/04) (14 January 2010, ECtHR). 
451 Kazali v. Cyprus (App. No. 49247/08) (6 March 2012, ECtHR). 
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appeal the decision in the ROC Courts constituted effective domestic remedies that 
had not been exhausted.452  
 
According to ECHR case law therefore, the right to property of GC is sufficiently 
protected through recourse to the IPC and that of TC by allowing them to opt out of 
the Custodianship regime; possible dissatisfaction with the decisions of these two 
bodies can be expressed through appeals in the ‘TRNC’ and ROC Courts respectively. 
Yet, neither of the two implementation mechanisms has resulted in an improvement 
of inter-ethnic relations on the island. Both remedies technically provide victims with 
the legal tools to demand redress for past injustices in the clearest and most direct 
way. Importantly, applicants that make use of these mechanisms are remedied 
immediately, rather than after the conclusion of the peace negotiations. Nevertheless, 
both are problematic in that although they technically protect the right to property, 
they have not actually resulted in efficient remedies in practice. The most serious 
deficiency of both remedies and in particular the IPC is one of legitimacy. According 
to the majority of GC, applying to the IPC and being bound by its decisions is 
tantamount to recognising the legitimacy and legality of the ‘TRNC’; since the 
‘TRNC’ is a product of the illegal Turkish invasion, this is unacceptable.453 Thus, 
instead of the Commission being perceived by GC as a justice and reconciliation-
promoting tool, it has been viewed as a way to trick them into giving up their property 
claims and accepting the current status quo as legal. The ECtHR’s response to these 
concerns is theoretically persuasive: the IPC is, legally speaking, not a product of the 
‘TRNC’, but of Turkey.454 However, this technical assessment is unconvincing to 
those aware of the context in which the IPC operates: the Commission was the 
product of a ‘TRNC’ law, it is based in the non-ROC controlled part of Cyprus rather 
than Turkey and its non-international members are TC, not Turks.455 Due to its 
perceived illegitimacy and unpopularity, GC who apply to the IPC do so in secret and 
                                               
452 Nasia Hadjigeorgiou, ‘Case note on Kazali and Others v. Cyprus’ Cyprus Human Rights Law 
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453 Demopoulos v. Turkey at [92]-[98]. 
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in fear that that their actions will be criticised by the rest of their community, factors 
that are unlikely to promote feelings of justice and reconciliation among victims.  
 
Moreover, while the preferred remedy for most GC has historically been restitution, 
the IPC is only willing to consider it as a possibility when the property is not in the 
possession of a TC and is not used in any way by the ‘TRNC’.456 Since this excludes 
most properties, the Commission has so far only granted restitution in 7 out of the 
approximately 500 cases it has decided.457 Displaced people that could potentially be 
entitled to restitution under the IPC law are those who own property in the empty 
town of Varosha.458 However, any applications that have reached the IPC about these 
properties have been pushed back to the end of the queue and have not been decided 
at all, thus further undermining the Commission’s legitimacy in the eyes of the GC 
public.459 As a result, the ECtHR’s insistence that the IPC should allow for the 
possibility of restitution, which Turkey technically complied with, has only affected 
the wording of the law rather than the remedy’s effectiveness in promoting justice.460 
Equally problematic has been the remedy of compensation, which, GC argue, is not 
paid at market price.461 This has resulted in accusations, at least some of which are 
true, that most applicants settle for compensation due to financial need rather than 
because they perceive it as just. However, if this is the motivation for their 
applications, it is unlikely that the remedy will majorly contribute to feelings of 
justice and reconciliation. Reflective of the deficiencies of the IPC is the fact that 1 in 
every 5 applications submitted to the Commission is revoked before a decision is 
made.462 Ultimately therefore, the ECtHR’s case law was implemented, but the 
existence of legal remedies has not actually promoted peace on the ground.  
 
                                               
456 Meleagrou v. Turkey (App. No. 14434/09) (2 April 2013, ECtHR) at [5]. 
457 Presidency of Immovable Property Commission, 'Monthly Bulletin, May 2014', (Nicosia: 
Immovable Property Commission, 30 May 2014), on 
http://www.tamk.gov.ct.tr/dokuman/istatistik_subat14ing.pdf [accessed 7 June 2014] at 7. 
458 Varosha was a vibrant, fast-developing tourist town in Cyprus, which was left abandoned in 1974 
when its inhabitants fled to avoid the atrocities of the war. Tragically, it has remained empty ever 
since: it is on the north side of the Green Line, but no GC or TC are allowed to visit since it is reserved 
for Turkish military personnel only. Since the abandoned properties in Varosha are not inhabited by TC 
and are not used in any other way by the ‘TRNC’, they would be ideal cases for restitution. 
459 The fact that cases concerning Varosha are being delayed by the IPC was flagged up by lawyers 
representing GC to the Commission and confirmed by the President of the IPC himself (files with the 
author). 
460 Demopoulos v. Turkey at [119]. 
461 For a discussion of this issue, see Demopoulos v. Turkey at [121]-[123]. 
462 Presidency of Immovable Property Commission, 'Monthly Bulletin, May 2014'. 
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Similar difficulties exist in relation to justice and reconciliation for TC, 
notwithstanding the law’s amendment and the possibility to opt out of the 
Custodianship regime. All TC can technically apply to acquire control of their 
properties, but in fact, very few actually achieve this. When the Custodian considers 
lifting his powers from a specific property, he takes a number of factors into account 
that in practice restrict access to justice for TC. For instance, it is extremely unlikely 
that a TC who permanently lives in the non-ROC controlled area of the island or who 
occupies GC land there will be successful in lifting the Custodianship from his 
property.463 Moreover, in most situations where the Custodianship has been lifted, this 
was done on the condition that the property would be immediately sold either to a GC 
buyer or the ROC, thus preventing TC from using their properties as they see fit and 
feeling truly remedied.464 Feelings of injustice are further heightened by the fact that 
even in situations where the property has been returned, no applicant has so far 
received any compensation for loss of use of his property from 1974 until today.465 
Unavoidably, a remedy that only applies to a small minority of potential applicants 
and which is provided under such strict conditions, even if it has in principle been 
approved by the ECtHR, is unlikely to contribute to successful conflict management 
in the country. Thus, even though the IPC and the amended Custodianship legislation 
technically implement the ECtHR’s decisions, they have not promoted peace in any 
meaningful way. Both must be replaced by other laws and practices that not only 
protect human rights, but also give effect to the demands of peace more broadly.  
 
The main reason for the disappointing peacebuilding effects of the right’s 
implementation in Cyprus is that the two communities are still divided by a 
fundamental conflict and each side tries to deviate as little as possible from its ideal 
solution. However, similar problems with the content of the implemented remedies 
exist in relation to less divisive conflicts in BiH and SA as well. For instance, the 
South African Constitutional Court’s decision in Matatiele, the boundary-changing 
                                               
463 Turkish-Cypriot Properties (Administration and Other Matters) (Temporary Provisions) Law of 
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case discussed in Section 2, was swiftly implemented, but this did not result in the 
better management of the conflict in question; in fact, its enforcement might have 
even had the opposite effect. This is because while Matatiele was technically 
complied with, the outcome of the consultation procedure was actually ignored: 
Parliament overlooked people’s preference to keep Matatiele as part of KwaZulu-
Natal and incorporated it into the province of Eastern Cape instead. Matatiele’s 
disappointing implementation gave rise to a second case where it was argued that the 
consultation was merely a ‘formalistic sham’ and that the boundary change should be 
found unconstitutional once again.466 The Court rejected the argument and held that 
the fact that there was no change in the legislative decision did not mean that an 
effective consultation had not taken place. Arguing that it would be inappropriate to 
replace the legislative assessment with its own, it restrained itself to checking whether 
the applicants’ submissions were among those received by the legislature rather than 
whether a fruitful debate, taking into account these submissions, had taken place in 
Parliament.467  
 
The legislative decision to ignore the results of the consultation process and the 
Court’s refusal to intervene further despite the disappointing outcome of Matatiele’s 
implementation are unlikely to have contributed to peace in SA. Since Parliament 
maintained its original stance even after it became unequivocally aware of the 
public’s views, most people saw the law as unjust and disrespectful of their wishes. 
Especially in SA where the memories of political disempowerment are still fresh, so 
blatantly ignoring the popular mandate can undermine reconciliation and challenge 
the government’s legitimacy. Perhaps most worryingly, the Court’s unwillingness to 
invalidate the unpopular decision, occasionally even resulted in the eruption of 
violence, also leading to feelings of insecurity.468 Troubling and sad as these 
consequences are however, the Court was right to reach this decision. ‘Courts deal 
with bad law; voters must deal with bad politics’ and the specific way in which a case 
will be implemented is a political, not a legal issue.469 Ignoring the distinction 
between the two risks converting a relatively easily manageable practical 
                                               
466 Poverty Alleviation Network and Others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 
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disagreement into a much more fundamental conflict concerning the role of unelected 
judges in a constitutional democracy. While the Court was able to adjudicate the 
conflict therefore, it was unable to influence the government’s decisions beyond that, 
which resulted in the right to vote being implemented in such a way that it had 
detrimental, instead of positive, peacebuilding effects for SA. This case provides 
confirmation of the fact that adjudicating and technically complying with a decision 
are only the first steps towards peace. It is equally important that the resulting legal 
amendments actually contribute to peace, rather than simply being compatible with 
the wording of the Court’s decision.  
 
However, it is Sejdić and Finci v. BiH that demonstrates the most damaging 
consequences that a bad implementation decision can have on peace. The ECtHR, 
finding that preventing those in the category of ‘Others’ from running for office was a 
violation of Article 3-1, ordered that BiH’s Constitution was amended accordingly. 
The case has remained unenforced for almost 5 years, but arguably, even if the case 
was implemented, it is not clear that this would have necessarily been a positive step 
towards peace. In fact, some of the suggestions for Sejdić’s implementation risk 
having the opposite effect by further fragmenting the political scene in the country. 
For instance, one suggestion has been to create a fourth caucus consisting of Others, 
thus allowing them to be elected and protecting their vital interests through the veto 
power.470 Nevertheless, this suggestion fails to take into account the heterogeneity of 
the category of Others and the difficulties that would arise in determining their vital 
interests in order to exercise the veto power on their behalf. Additionally, since 
ethnicity is a self-defining characteristic in BiH politics, there is a risk that members 
of the Constituent Peoples would hijack the Others group in order to obtain additional 
power in the legislature. Even if these dangers did not materialise, giving the veto 
power to a tiny population group in the country is likely to be perceived by the rest of 
the people as unjust.471 Most problematically however, this ‘pluralisation of 
ethnocracy’472 and the overuse of group rights, which assume that people can only be 
                                               
470 This was suggested by Bosnian elites in 2012. 
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identified itself as ‘Other’, with ‘Yugoslav’, a category that is today obsolete, making up about 70% of 
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represented by members of their ethnic group, ignore the detrimental effects that 
separating a population into pre-determined categories can have on reconciliation.  
 
The ‘fourth caucus’ implementation suggestion is perfectly compatible with, and in 
fact goes beyond what Sejdić would require. It allows Others to be voted in both 
Chambers of the Legislative Assembly and in the Presidency and also gives them the 
veto power as a way of further protecting their status. Yet, it fails to successfully 
manage the political conflict in question since it arguably creates more problems than 
it resolves. This is because conflicts such as the one the ECtHR was called to manage 
in Sejdić emerge from ethnic differences between groups, yet the right to vote is blind 
to such differences. The main concern of the right to vote is to safeguard individual 
interests; the interests of people as members of ethnic groups are taken into account 
only indirectly, if at all. Numerous suggestions are technically compatible with the 
right to vote: among them is the creation of a fourth caucus, the overall elimination of 
ethnic protection in favour of a one person-one vote system or the adoption of a more 
complicated formula that balances individual and ethnic interests. Of the three, only 
the last suggestion is likely to be accepted by the parties and contribute to conflict 
management in BiH, thus suggesting that a state of affairs might be human rights 
compatible, yet fail to contribute to peace. 
 
This section, therefore, provides evidence that the human rights compatibility of the 
law does not also guarantee that it will make positive contributions to peace. 
Enforcement of a human rights decision might not make any positive contributions to 
conflict-management in the country, as was the case with the right to property in 
Cyprus, or could even have detrimental consequences for peacebuilding attempts on 
the ground, as was the case with Matatiele’s implementation in SA and suggestions 
for Sejdić’s enforcement in BiH. Building on the conclusions of the previous chapter, 
it transpires that human rights can act as efficient peacebuilding tools under 
increasingly specific circumstances: only when they are addressing practical 
disagreements rather than fundamental conflicts, when the Court’s decision in such a 
case has been enforced and when the legal and institutional amendments stemming 
from its enforcement, in addition to being human rights compatible, meet the 
independent objectives of also promoting security, justice and reconciliation.  
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5. Dealing with the shortcomings of human rights implementation 
 
Whether the adjudication of a case will have positive peacebuilding consequences 
depends on whether the decision is implemented in the first place and, if it is, on the 
actual content of the implementation decision. Both steps of the process rely on the 
existence of political willingness to manage the conflict and work towards peace. 
Where this is absent, the Court’s decision is likely to remain unenforced, or if 
implemented, to not really contribute to peace in practice. Problematically however, a 
peace-friendly political elite is often precisely what is missing in ethnically divided, 
post-conflict societies and what human rights are expected to replace in the first place. 
There are a number of alternative strategies that can deal with the absence of political 
willingness for change, three of which are discussed here in detail: the international 
community can become more involved in the peacebuilding process, the judiciary can 
adopt a more activist stance and steps can be taken to strengthen the peace-friendly 
civil society. Which of these strategies will be used and where, depends on the 
context of the different ethnically divided societies, thus dismissing the liberal 
assumption that there is one peacebuilding recipe that fits all. Moreover, effective as 
these alternative suggestions might be in alleviating the unwillingness to implement a 
decision, they can never really replace a genuine political commitment to peace.  
 
The importance of political willingness in implementing human rights decisions and 
remedying a problematic state of affairs is illustrated through the property situation in 
Cyprus. A persuasive explanation for the deficiencies of the IPC is that Turkey 
created it while claiming at the same time that it did not recognise the violation of the 
very rights it was seeking to remedy.473 Similarly, the ROC remedy is disappointing 
because Cyprus amended its law to allow the lifting of the Custodianship, after 
settling with Ms. Sofi and in fear of prospective endless legal battles, rather than due 
to a genuine recognition that its practices were problematic.474 As a result of this 
political unwillingness to remedy the applicants, both Cyprus and Turkey are doing as 
little as possible to protect the victims’ property rights so long as they are not caught 
by the ECtHR’s supervision. This approach however, makes feelings of justice and 
                                               
473 BBC News, 'Turkey Compensates Cyprus Refugee'. 
474 In fact, in unofficial discussions of the author with civil servants working for the Custodian, Sofi, far 
from being described as a turning point in ROC policies concerning the right to property, was 
characterised as a ‘mistaken handling’ of the situation. 
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reconciliation among the population even harder to flourish, despite the law’s 
technical compliance with human rights. Had political willingness to promote peace 
been present, the two sides would have adopted different legal measures and managed 
the conflicts in question more effectively. Similar conclusions can also be drawn from 
the SA case study: Matatiele’s aftermath has been so disappointing and detrimental to 
peace precisely because the politicians’ unwillingness to implement the decision 
meant that they complied with the letter, but not the spirit of the law, thus making the 
population feel cheated.  
 
In the absence of such political willingness, one alternative strategy is to involve the 
international community in the political decision-making of the divided country. 
Especially where international peacebuilders are given extensive decision-making 
powers, as is the case with the High Representative in BiH, this can make the conflict-
management process less difficult since nationalist, uncooperative leaders can be 
circumvented.475 Illustrative of the effects of this strategy is not just the Dayton Peace 
Agreement itself, but also the launching of PLIP, which was almost exclusively run 
and funded by the international community. Nevertheless, adopting such a strategy is 
not always possible, especially in countries such as SA, which have traditionally 
relied on domestic peacebuilding programmes. Moreover, if the international 
community does become involved in the conflict-management process, it must do so 
while bearing in mind the future consequences of such a decision. Years of 
experience and mistakes in BiH suggest that while it is easier for international 
peacebuilders to override the elected representatives and take the difficult decisions 
itself, this can have negative long-term effects. Bosnian politicians know that if the 
situation gets bad or urgent enough, the High Representative will intervene, while 
they can watch by, criticising any necessary action that he takes, without engaging in 
political inter-ethnic cooperation or suffering any political cost themselves. Finally, if 
the international community’s objective is to set an example that domestic politicians 
are to follow after its withdrawal, it should act in accordance with the democratic 
values it proclaims, even if that slows down the peacebuilding process. The High 
                                               
475 For some background information on the High Representative, see Chapter 1, Section 5(a). 
Moreover, a rich literature exists on the legitimacy and effectiveness of this institution in BiH: Richard 
Caplan, 'Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia', in David Chandler (ed.), 
Peace without Politics? Ten Years of International State Building in Bosnia (London and New York: 
Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), 157; Gergana Dimitrova, 'Democracy and International 
Intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina', Central European Political Studies Review, VII/1 (2005). 
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Representative failed to do that when he issued a statement ‘overruling’ the 
Constitutional Court’s judgment that one of his decisions was incompatible with 
human rights.476  
 
Potentially therefore, the best way for the international community to contribute to 
conflict management is through more indirect intervention, whereby pressure is put 
on politicians to cooperate with each other and implement beneficial policies for 
peace, rather than by actually hijacking the democratic process itself. Nevertheless, 
attempts to do that in relation to Sejdić’s implementation have been completely 
unsuccessful, while political pressure on Turkey to implement the ECtHR right to 
property decisions in Cyprus has largely resulted in only a success on paper. This 
confirms a basic limitation of human rights – that they depend on the existence of 
political willingness for change – and goes against the international community’s 
assumption that in ethnically divided, post-conflict societies they can in fact make up 
for its absence. 
 
An alternative way in which the international community could help in the 
implementation of human rights and the management of political conflicts is by 
offering technical expertise, either in the form of legal advice or through insights 
concerning the experiences of other divided societies. This expertise might do little to 
help with implementation if there is no willingness on behalf of the political elite to 
take steps in that direction, but it might be helpful when the reasons for non-
implementation have to do with lack of knowledge. An example of this is the 
assistance offered by Germany to the ANC delegation just before the start of the SA 
peace negotiations, which showed the delegates that what was important was not 
whether the state would be a federal or a unitary one, but how much power would rest 
at each level of government.477 This resulted in the ANC conceding to a federal state 
and contributed to the successful outcome of the peace negotiations. Conversely, 
                                               
476 AP-953/05 (08 July 2006, BiH CC). For the High Representative’s response, see Office of the High 
Representative, 'Order on the Implementation of the Decision of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in the Appeal of Milorad Bilbija et al, No. AP-953/05', (Sarajevo: Office of the High 
Representative, 23 March 2007), on 
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/statemattersdec/default.asp?content_id=39397 [accessed 10 June 2014]. 
The word ‘overruling’ in the main text is in inverted commas because technically, the High 
Representative has no such authority over the Constitutional Court. 
477 Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (London: Abacus, 1994) at 492. 
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however, the international community’s offering of technical assistance to BiH in 
relation to Sejdić’s implementation has not had any significant effect on 
peacebuilding attempts, thus emphasising once again the importance of having a 
peace-friendly political elite in the country.  
 
A second strategy in dealing with the problem of political unwillingness to implement 
human rights decisions is for the judiciary to interpret its powers broadly and take a 
more active role in the enforcement of the judgment itself. This was the approach 
adopted by the BiH Constitutional Court in U-44/01 where it held that the change of a 
number of towns’ names in the Republika Srpska in a way that presented them as 
having an exclusively Serb identity was unconstitutional.478 The Court gave the 
Republika Srpska National Assembly 3 months to bring the legislation into line with 
the Constitution, but the use of the veto in the legislature delayed the proceedings. 
Seven months later and with no amendment of the relevant law in sight, the Court 
made two further rulings.479 First, noting that its previous decision remained 
unenforced, it invalidated the unconstitutional law and referred the matter to the state 
prosecutor for consideration. Second, it took the initiative to temporarily rename the 
towns itself (usually by reinstating the old names) until the new legislation came into 
effect. Soon after, the National Assembly agreed with all but one of the names 
assigned by the Court, and adopted an acceptable alternative in the last case. As a 
result, ‘[t]his novel remedy broke the legislative logjam [and showed that the 
judiciary] can usefully complement, as well as check, the work of legislatures.’480  
 
Despite the success of this approach however, it should be acknowledged that it can 
only be used in exceptional circumstances where the implementation of the decision 
does not require a political judgement call. On the facts of this case, the most 
appropriate thing to do would be for the legislature to adopt the old names of the 
towns, which made the Court’s decision to adopt this approach relatively 
uncontroversial. However, the scenario was considerably different in the case of 
Matatiele, where the decision of what province the municipality would become part 
of required balancing the wishes of its population with other factors, such as the 
                                               
478 U-44/01 (27 February 2004, BiH CC). 
479 U-44/01 (No.2) (22 September 2004, BiH CC). 
480 David Feldman, 'Renaming Cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina', International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 3/4 (2005), 649 at 662. 
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economic well-being of the region as a whole. Greater judicial intervention in such a 
case would have been wrong and might have undermined rather than promoted 
peacebuilding attempts. Therefore, while greater judicial activism can be effective in 
dealing with political unwillingness to act, it is an approach that can only be used 
relatively rarely. 
 
The final way to encourage the successful implementation of human rights decisions 
is to strengthen the civil society in the country so that it can push politicians to pass 
peace-promoting legislation or adopt a more reconciliatory stance towards the ‘other’. 
An example of such an attempt in Cyprus is an initiative taken by a group of (GC) 
human rights lawyers, known as ‘Truth Now’, to establish a bi-communal Truth 
Commission.481 Presumably in an attempt to attract support from both Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots, ‘Truth Now’ places particular emphasis on documenting violations 
with regard to missing and disappeared persons, an emotive issue for both 
communities on the island. Other examples of the civil society’s efforts to promote 
peace in Cyprus include a series of events that took place in 2004, just before the 
Annan Plan referendums, especially in the non-ROC controlled part of Cyprus. A 
number of TC civil society organisations grouped together and planned 
demonstrations, street parties and petitions in favour of a ‘Yes’ vote in the 
referendum. Among the most inspiring moments during those tense months were joint 
demonstrations at the Green Line by Cypriots of all ethnicities in favour of peace. 
Since then, a number of small civil society organisations have continued their work in 
Cyprus by organising social events and bringing Greek and Turkish Cypriots 
together.482  
 
Nevertheless, it is not the case that civil society organisations always and necessarily 
contribute to successful conflict management. To the contrary, they can sometimes 
make maximalist demands, polarise the public and undermine the peacebuilding 
process. This is again illustrated through the activities of some civil society 
organisations in Cyprus which either receive exclusively GC or exclusively TC 
                                               
481 Official website of ‘Truth Now’, http://www.truthnowcyprus.org/index.php/en/ [accessed 23 
December 2014]. 
482 A number of these civil society organisations are located in the UN buffer zone under the umbrella 
of the Home for Cooperation: http://www.home4cooperation.info/ [accessed 3 May 2014].  
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support.483 These bodies have over the years been organising events commemorating 
the suffering of their ethnic group’s members (while ignoring similar experiences of 
the other side) and pushing for laws and a peace agreement that will fully safeguard 
their interests, even if the other ethnic group considers these unacceptable. For 
instance, GC displaced peoples’ organisations have played a key role in interpreting 
Loizidou in a very specific – and largely misleading – light, which in turn has 
discouraged GC to accept a solution that does not fully safeguard restitution of their 
properties. It is noteworthy that even ‘Truth Now’, which argues for a bi-communal 
effort that will benefit both communities, is only composed of GC members. The 
mono-ethnic composition of ‘Truth Now’ or even the specific demands of displaced 
peoples’ organisations are usually not consciously directed towards the fuelling of the 
conflict. They can nevertheless have this effect, thus suggesting that civil society 
organisations, like human rights, can both help and undermine peacebuilding 
efforts.484 Yet, the presence of such a danger should not hinder attempts to strengthen 
civil society within post-conflict countries or automatically result in a ‘defensive 
formalism’ where only state institutions are trusted to participate in the peacebuilding 
process.485 Rather, it should be used as a warning, especially to international 
peacebuilders who are not deeply familiar with the society in question, to be careful 
when distinguishing between civil society organisations that can help promote peace 
and others that can have the reverse effect.  
 
Involving the international community and strengthening the judiciary and peace-
friendly civil society organisations are useful strategies that can push for the 
implementation of human rights decisions. However, the extent to which each of 
these can be used to manage a specific conflict and the contribution they can make to 
the building of peace largely depend on the context of the ethnically divided society 
in question. For instance, while the active involvement of the judiciary in the Bosnian 
name-changing case had positive consequences in the country, a similar strategy 
would possibly be detrimental for peacebuilding in Cyprus where the courts do not 
generally enjoy the same level of trust and legitimacy among the population. This 
                                               
483 Olga Demetriou and Ayla Gürel, 'Human Rights, Civil Society and Conflict in Cyprus', in Raffaele 
Marchetti and Nathalie Tocci (eds.), Civil Society, Conflicts and the Politicization of Human Rights 
(Tokyo, New York, Paris: UN University Press, 2011), 100. 
484 Ibid. 
485 Brian Gormally and Kieran McEvoy, 'Dealing with the Past in Northern Ireland ‘from below’: An 
evaluation' (Belfast: The Community Foundation for Northern Ireland, September 2009) at 12. 
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conclusion offers evidence against the liberal assumption that there is just one 
peacebuilding recipe, at the centre of which are human rights, that is appropriate and 
‘correct’ in all ethnically divided, post-conflict societies. Rather, human rights only 
become effective when certain conditions – that may vary from society to society – 
have been satisfied. Such conditions include, first and foremost, a willingness among 
the political elite to promote peace in the country and the existence of legitimate 
judicial and political bodies to push this agenda forward. Focusing on these will often 




This chapter argued that the real test of whether human rights are successful 
peacebuilding tools stems, not from judicial pronouncements, but from the effect they 
actually have on the ground. This raised two questions: first, the extent to which 
human rights decisions are actually implemented in practice and second, whether their 
enforcement can always help manage the political conflict in question. A mixed 
outcome exists on both counts: in some situations the Court’s decision will be swiftly 
implemented in ways that have positive peacebuilding consequences, while in others 
the enforcement – if that takes place – might make no contribution or even have a 
negative effect on peace. Such negative consequences suggest that even laws that are 
human rights compatible do not always and necessarily promote peace; it might be the 
case that they technically protect the interests of individual applicants, but to the 
detriment, or while ignoring the needs, of the post-conflict society as a whole. 
Nevertheless, none of the negative scenarios identified in this chapter seem to have 
been appreciated by the international community, which by and large has assumed 
that a judicial decision respecting human rights automatically translates to a good 
implementation strategy with positive peacebuilding effects.  
 
A failure to enforce human rights case law or the negative effects of a badly 
implemented decision are the results of a political elite that is unwilling to support the 
change in question and work towards peace. In the absence of such support, a number 
of alternative strategies can be tried, but their shortcomings in achieving the desirable 
result should be acknowledged. Ultimately, the political climate in the ethnically 
divided, post-conflict society is equally, if not more, important than the existence of 
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human rights institutions and judgments. With that in mind, questions are raised as to 
whether the international community should primarily be funding rule of law and 
institution-building programmes, or whether it should also turn its attention and 
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In the best-case scenarios, a divisive political conflict will be adjudicated in a Court of 
law, the human rights decision will be swiftly implemented and the legal and 
institutional changes that will result from this process will be able to contribute to the 
management of the conflict and the building of peace. Nevertheless, little attention 
has been paid to the type of changes that peace requires, the type of changes that the 
protection of human rights can induce and whether in fact, the two are the same. This 
discussion about the type of changes necessary for peace often remains unarticulated, 
which helps explain why the positive link between human rights and conflict 
management is so readily invoked, but never quite so readily explained. Arguably, the 
promotion of security, justice and reconciliation requires that holistic changes take 
place: legal, political, socio-economic and psychological changes are all equally 
important steps towards peace. However, as Section 2 argues, while human rights can 
result in amendments to the law, their implementation does not also contribute to 
other types of changes.  
 
The ability of human rights to induce only certain types of changes necessary for 
conflict management suggests that they must be supplemented by other peacebuilding 
tools as well. Yet, the popularity of human rights (explained by their moral intuitive 
appeal and their perfect fit within the dominant liberal peacebuilding project) causes 
these alternative peacebuilding tools, important as they might be, to often be 
overlooked. This is problematic because disregarding socio-economic, political or 
psychological changes due to an overemphasis on legal amendments can backfire and 
have detrimental consequences for peace. As Hamilton and Buyse put it in the context 
of political transitions more generally, ‘[t]he transitional jurisprudence of 
international human rights institutions is one among a myriad factors affecting 
transitions’.486 Among the other myriad factors that can contribute to this transition 
are peacebuilding strategies that influence the perceptions of people in post-conflict 
                                               
486 Antoine Buyse and Michael Hamilton, 'Conclusions', in Antoine Buyse and Michael Hamilton 
(eds.), Transitional Jurisprudence and the ECHR: Justice, Politics and Rights (Cambridge: CUP, 
2011), 286 at 293. 
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societies, rather than just amend the laws and institutions. Some of these strategies 
have a top-down effect, while others engage with the grassroots in an attempt to 
promote change from below. All of them however, are connected by the fact that the 
change they induce is not the result of an amended legislation or the work of a lawyer. 
Examples of these alternative strategies and their contributions to peace are discussed 
in more detail in Section 3.  
 
2. Legal, political, socio-economic and psychological changes for peace 
 
Protecting human rights is an important first step for the building of peace since their 
implementation can result in necessary changes to the law and the relevant 
institutions. However, because the law does not operate in a vacuum, such legal 
amendments should take place together with broader socio-economic and political 
changes as well. For instance, while the right to property was successfully 
implemented in both Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and South Africa (SA), the 
restitution programmes it gave rise to resulted in detrimental consequences for peace, 
not because the law itself was problematic, but due to non-legal factors that prevented 
victims from feeling truly remedied. Justice was ultimately not done because the 
continuing inter-ethnic discrimination and socio-economic differences in the two 
countries made the provision of a remedy largely illusory. Similarly, the legal changes 
introduced by protecting the right to vote, necessary as they might be for 
peacebuilding, are insufficient unless they are accompanied by more extensive 
political changes. If they are not, the law will continue to operate within a flawed 
political system and will perpetuate feelings of injustice on the ground. Due to the 
interconnectedness of the elements of peace, such disappointing outcomes in terms of 
justice are likely to have detrimental consequences for security and reconciliation as 
well.  
 
(a) The right to property 
 
The right to property has been almost perfectly implemented in BiH: despite their 
large numbers, displaced people have received restitution, the international 
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community’s preferred remedy, in a relatively short period of time.487 The Property 
Law Implementation Programme (PLIP) amended previous discriminatory laws and 
procedures and improved the institutions responsible for processing the claims. As a 
result of these legal changes, 4 years after PLIP’s inception, 93% of the displaced 
applicants in the country had been remedied.488 Nevertheless, PLIP’s statistical 
success has not been translated in the physical return of the victims: although it is 
unclear how many displaced people who regained their properties returned to live in 
them, anecdotal evidence is disappointing.489 For instance in the Republika Srpska, 
only 20-30% of those to whom property was returned actually live there.490 Most 
people obtained their property titles and then sold them so that they could buy a house 
in areas where they were in the majority. An explanation for this lies not in the 
deficiencies of the property law, but in an inability to see beyond it. Sustainable 
refugee return requires socio-economic and psychological changes on the ground, 
which the implementation of the right to property cannot induce on its own. 
 
In order for victims to feel that justice has been done, the remedy they receive must be 
meaningful; in the case of BiH, the return of the displaced population to their houses 
should have been a real option that people could use if they wished to. Important 
factors influencing the possibility of return in addition to making it legally possible, 
include the extent to which the social climate in the area of return is welcoming and 
whether the applicants have the economic resources for this move. In BiH the 
disproportionate emphasis on the law to the detriment of these additional factors often 
made the option to return merely imaginary. Especially in the early days after Dayton, 
there was an endemic problem of discrimination in all areas of life: a minority 
returnee found it difficult, if not impossible, to get a job, be served without 
discrimination by public officials and socialise with the majority of the community, 
                                               
487 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 'Principles on Housing 
and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons', (Geneva: United Nations, 11 August 
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488 Office of the High Representative, 'Statistics: Implementation of the Property Laws in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina', (Sarajevo: Office of the High Representative, 31 May 2000), on 
http://www.ohr.int/plip/pdf/PLIP5.00.PDF [accessed 10 June 2014]. 
489 International Crisis Group, 'The Continuing Challenge of Refugee Return in Bosnia & 
Herzegovina', (Sarajevo: International Crisis Group, 2002) at 11. 
490 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 'First Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina', 
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which was of a different ethnic group.491 Legal access to property was not the only, or 
even the main barrier to return, something confirmed by the fact that 20% of Bosnians 
who were unwilling to return to their houses would reconsider their decision if the job 
market improved.492 This raises questions as to whether displaced people who sold 
their returned properties and moved to areas where they were in the majority did so 
voluntarily, or because they lacked the socio-economic support to remain there. 
However, if the low number of returnees is due to socio-economic difficulties to 
resettle rather than a voluntary decision on their behalf, it is unlikely that they felt that 
justice had truly been done. 
 
In theory the importance of socio-economic factors to the return of refugees was 
acknowledged by the international community, which stated just before closing down 
PLIP that: 
 
'While property law implementation is the fundamental first step, it is only one 
among many of the elements underpinning sustainable return. Full 
implementation of Annex VII means that not only can people return to their 
homes but that they can do so safely with equal expectations of employment, 
education and social services.'493 
 
Nevertheless, despite appreciating the limitations of a purely legal solution to the 
problem of forced displacement, no other approach was seriously adopted to 
supplement it. The emphasis that was put on the legal protection of the right dwarfed 
any attention to issues of social justice, such as employment and decent education 
opportunities. As a result, in 2011, the unemployment rate in BiH was more than 
40%494 and in 2009, approximately 50% of the population in both entities lived below 
                                               
491 Ibid., at [40]-[45]. 
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the poverty line or was at risk of falling below it at any time.495 Minority returnees 
still find it harder than the rest of the population to get a job.496 The overwhelming 
importance attributed to the law led peacebuilders to ignore the basic truths that 
restitution is not the same as return, that the right does not in itself guarantee justice 
and that ‘[r]ecognition of title in a vacuum, where the conditions for return do not 
exist, will at best result in a mass sell-off of property.’497 Thus, while justice was 
originally promoted through the legal changes that took place as a result of the right’s 
implementation, this was a pyrrhic victory, since it was ultimately undermined by the 
returnees’ inability to restart their lives and their subsequent decisions to sell. 
 
The excessive emphasis on the legal nature of the right to property has not only 
undermined feelings of justice, but also reconciliation. Even in cases where people 
did return permanently to their old houses, this resulted in some co-existence and 
interaction between ethnic groups, but no genuine improvement in inter-ethnic 
relations. This is because while the right to property can induce legal and institutional 
change, it is ill suited in bringing about the psychological adjustments that are 
necessary for reconciliation. Among such psychological adjustments is the idea that 
the other might have been a victim as well as a perpetrator and that his actions – 
reprehensible as they might be – could have been motivated by fear rather than hatred. 
Stefansson makes this point through his analysis of the ‘big’ and the ‘small home’.498 
The right to property can successfully protect the latter – the return to the actual 
structure – but legal changes cannot on their own promote the former – the feeling of 
a shared community between the ethnic groups. Indicative is Stefansson’s example of 
minority returnees of Muslim origin, who avoid wearing green, a colour associated 
with their religion, in public places so that they do not provoke reactions.499 The 
implementation of property rights and overemphasis on legal changes happened to the 
detriment of other peacebuilding tools that could have more effectively induced 
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positive psychological changes. As a result, people from different ethnic groups live 
parallel lives side by side, but they do not interact meaningfully; this might be an 
improvement from being actively hostile to the other, but it is a far cry from having 
achieved reconciliation or peace more generally.  
 
The inability of the institutions in charge of the right to property to result in peace-
inducing socio-economic and psychological changes is also apparent in SA. The 
Restitution of Land Rights Act [No. 22 of 1994] created the legal framework that 
allowed the Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) to provide restitution, 
compensation or exchange to displaced victims of apartheid. In practice, 
compensation has been most popular among those who lost land in the cities and 
restitution among communities that were displaced from the countryside. The 
implementation process of the right to property has not been as effective in SA as it 
was in BiH; it has been both slower and more expensive. Twenty years after the 
passing of the Act, some applicants have still not received their remedy, while the 
cost of the whole programme is estimated as exceeding R20 billion.500 However, it is 
not these characteristics of the programme that undermined its peacebuilding 
prospects the most. Rather, the failure of the restitution programme rests on the 
CRLR’s assumption that apartheid land law is a legal evil that could be unlegislated 
and that restitution was about the reversal of a set of unjust transfers rather than the 
need to redress the deeper social and psychological impacts of displacement.501 This 
assumption discouraged and delayed the CRLR from adopting peacebuilding tools 
other than those providing a legal remedy; in turn, the non-adoption of a more holistic 
peacebuilding programme failed to induce the necessary socio-economic and 
psychological changes. 
 
The CRLR’s approach in relation to restitution has been that the implementation of 
the law and the property’s return to the displaced victims mark the end, rather than the 
beginning, of the State’s efforts to promote justice. However, this overemphasis on 
the law and lack of practical post-restitution support has left displaced communities, 
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which have returned to their lands with often no rural life experience, on their own 
and in competition with commercial farmers. The end result has often been the 
dismantling of successful farming enterprises – and the consequent losing of jobs – in 
order to replace them with the inexperienced running of the properties and barren 
fields. Confirming this is a 2006 study in which the majority of the 179 projects 
examined were dysfunctional in that little, if any, production was being pursued.502 In 
a belated attempt to deal with these shortcomings, the government started making 
restitution conditional on the existence of strategic partnerships between the displaced 
community and commercial farmers.503 These agreements, usually lasting for 10-15 
years, are expected to provide some farming and management experience for the 
community members so that they can eventually run their property on their own. 
However, privatising the State’s responsibility to provide post-settlement support has 
often been problematic since the interests of the displaced community are not always 
aligned with those of the commercial farmers.504 For example, in an attempt to 
maximise yield, the agreements prevent communities from residing on the restituted 
land or growing crops for their own personal use; as a result, community members 
become landlords of large estates on paper and remain homeless and destitute in 
practice. It is also often the case that they do not benefit from the enterprise’s profits 
since the commercial farmer might decide that it is best to reinvest all of them. 
 
The limitations of the CRLR’s excessively legalistic approach have also become 
apparent in relation to the remedy of compensation. For instance, claimants have 
raised questions about what the standardised compensation amount they were paid 
signifies, since it clearly does not reflect the value of their property.505 This has been a 
particular point of contention in cases where by paying the uniform amount, the 
CRLR ignored distinctions that were important in the eyes of the claimants, such as 
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the fact that some of them had received alternative accommodation at the time of the 
displacement, while others had not. This failure to take into account the context in 
which the legal remedy operates has not only undermined feelings of personal justice 
among the victims, but also social justice more generally. Several families, whose 
members have multiplied since their dispossession 50 or 100 years ago, might have 
been occupying a single property. When the compensation award has been shared 
between them, there is often very little money left to make any difference in people’s 
lives. Interviews with victims suggest that the compensation amount, especially when 
this was minimal, was usually used to buy everyday supplies or pay off debts rather 
than in a way that could make a long-term difference in people’s welfare.506 Thus, 
technically protecting property rights while leaving socio-economic conditions 
unchanged failed to promote feelings of justice among the displaced population. 
 
However, perhaps the biggest failure of the compensation remedy lies, not with its 
disappointing effects in relation to justice, but in relation to reconciliation. In theory, 
compensation promotes reconciliation by providing a feeling of closure to the victims, 
who can leave the past behind them and start looking towards a common future with 
their former enemies. In order for this to happen however, it is necessary to, not only 
compensate them, but also explain to the victims why compensation was paid. 
Problematically, this never happened in SA, where some of the displaced people did 
not even understand why they received money in the first place. They perceived the 
compensation as another piece of financial help from the haves (including the State) 
to the have-nots, rather than as a unique payment reflecting an acknowledgment of the 
injustices they had suffered.507 However, if they did not understand the purpose of the 
compensation, the remedy is unlikely to have helped them feel reconciled. The failure 
to convey the symbolic significance of the monetary award to the victims arguably 
stems from a misunderstanding of what the right to property can achieve: while it can 
result in legal amendments that make the payment of compensation possible, it cannot 
on its own produce the psychological changes that are necessary for reconciliation.  
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Moreover, this overly legalistic response to the problem has not only prevented the 
victims from feeling reconciled, but has arguably had similar consequences for the 
perpetrators. The lack of an apology that should have accompanied the compensation 
awards has allowed most of those who benefited from the displacement to go on with 
their lives and pretend that the geography and distribution of resources in the country 
are unrelated to its apartheid past. Evidence suggests that to the extent that land 
restitution is discussed among white South Africans, debates tend to focus on how 
much compensation has been paid and whether the displaced people have used that 
money wisely, rather than on what the remedy reflects.508 Consequently, ‘land issues 
are terribly important to black South Africans, and they are practically invisible to 
white South Africans’,509 with 77% of the former considering apartheid to be a factor 
that has influenced land inequality and only 34% of the latter agreeing.510 Perhaps 
most problematic in terms of reconciliation, is the fact that there is still a lingering 
perception among some that economic inequalities are better explained by the laziness 
of the majority, rather than the history of the country.511 It is only through 
peacebuilding tools that affect people’s personal beliefs, rather than legal status, that 
attitudes such as these can be abandoned.  
 
The interconnectedness between the three elements of peace explains why the 
restitution programme’s inability to promote justice and reconciliation has also had 
negative consequences for security. The legal changes brought about by the 
Restitution Act, which remedied the victims in a relatively organised and legally 
sanctioned process, promoted security in the short-term because they prevented the 
opportunistic and often violent, mass ad-hoc taking of properties that had been 
witnessed in neighbouring Zimbabwe. Nevertheless, if people are dissatisfied with the 
current state of affairs even after they have been promised change, and especially 
when they have used violence in the past to address similar problems, they are likely 
to revert back to their old tactics.512 The continuing socio-economic chasm between 
the racial groups in the country perpetuated feelings of injustice among the victims; 
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this, coupled with the inability of the restitution programme to reconcile the 
population are factors that undoubtedly contributed to the soaring crime levels in the 
country, and in particular the occurrence of farm attacks.513  
 
Farm attacks do not constitute a single crime, but they are the manifestation of 
housebreaking and robbery in big farms, sometimes accompanied by murder and/or 
rape of the residents. Whites are overrepresented in these attacks, making up 62% of 
the victims, while almost exclusively perpetrators are black.514 While most of these 
attacks can be explained as ‘easy robberies’, the government has been unable to 
exclude the possibility of racist motivations or the attackers’ actions being justified by 
beliefs that they were ‘making things right’.515 Other factors that could explain this 
phenomenon and high crime rates more generally include the ineffectiveness of the 
criminal justice system and the fact that the struggle against apartheid has made 
violent dispute resolution more acceptable.516 Moreover, the rapid urbanisation of the 
country has resulted in overcrowding and unemployment and has made the 
differences between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’ more obvious.517 These problems 
could have been alleviated through a more successful restitution programme: had it 
dealt with social justice more effectively, there would have been a smaller divide 
among rich and poor SA and had it paid more attention to reconciliation, violence 
could have been a less common way of resolving disputes. The claim here is not that 
the failure of the land restitution programme is the only explanation for long-term 
insecurity in the country; however, its overemphasis on legal, to the detriment of 
socio-economic and psychological, changes necessary for peace could offer a partial 
explanation.  
 
A number of factors can explain the disappointing peacebuilding effects of the SA 
restitution process: limited resources, the huge number of victims and evidentiary 
difficulties arising from the passage of time. Similarly, the uncooperativeness of 
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political elites and the vast destruction caused by the war also made the completion of 
the restitution programme more difficult in BiH. However, in both cases 
responsibility for failure to promote each of the three elements of peace lies mainly in 
the perception of the forced displacement problem, and its solution, as merely being 
the concerns of the law. This absence of ‘legal humility’ resulted in an overemphasis 
on the protection of the right to property, which in turn, shifted attention away from 
other peacebuilding strategies that could have resulted in a more holistic management 
of the conflict in question by also addressing the socio-economic and psychological 
grievances that are associated with forced displacement.518  
 
(b) The right to vote  
 
Like the right to property, which operates within a broader context, the right to vote 
only becomes meaningful if it is implemented alongside political and psychological 
changes. If the right is exercised within a problematic political framework, or if the 
voters themselves are unwilling to work towards peace, then participating in 
democratic elections will not have the peacebuilding consequences that the 
international community expects. To the contrary, it is likely that the protection of the 
right to vote will perpetuate the conflicts and political pathologies that divide the 
society in the first place. This is illustrated through examples from all three case 
studies, which suggest that changing the law – irrespective of the legislative 
amendment’s content or the reformed institution’s structure – is only one part of the 
peacebuilding process. As the UN Declaration on a Culture of Peace put it, in 
addition to new laws and processes, peace also consists of ‘a set of values, attitudes, 
traditions and modes of behaviour and ways of life’.519 It is important to acknowledge 
that while the right to vote can promote the former, it can do very little in relation to 
the latter. 
 
In Cyprus, Aziz’s swift implementation resulted in positive amendments to the 
electoral law, but merely protecting the right to vote could not in itself induce the 
changes to the country’s political culture that were also necessary for peace. This has 
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resulted in a success of liberal peacebuilding on paper, but a failure in terms of 
affecting the lives of the people on the ground. Thus, although Turkish Cypriots (TC) 
can technically participate in the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) elections, all political 
debates take place in Greek and continue remaining untranslated, thus preventing 
potential TC politicians and voters from being meaningfully involved in the political 
process. Moreover, while TC representatives can in principle be elected as MPs and 
municipal councillors, other public positions, such as Ministers and high-ranking 
technocrats, remain unavailable to them.520 Even more worryingly, approximately 
30,000 TC who intended to vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections were 
prevented from doing so because of last minute bureaucratic changes to the law.521 As 
a result, TC residing in the ROC might technically be considered as equal citizens to 
Greek Cypriots (GC), but the political arena in which they are called to participate 
sends a different message and continues making their empowerment almost 
impossible to achieve in practice. It is therefore unsurprising that although TC 
residing in the ROC-controlled areas have been exercising their right to vote since 
2006, so far no TC representative has been elected to office.  
 
Equally problematic has been the fact that Aziz’s implementation was not 
supplemented by a public discussion about the broader implications of the case, which 
in turn failed to challenge the mentality of the people in any way. A number of key 
assumptions that gave rise to the right’s violation still remain unarticulated, thus 
perpetuating decades-old prejudices that undermine peace. For example, the GC 
public’s apathy to the disenfranchisement of TC in the ROC for the last half-century 
reflects most people’s beliefs about the status of TC more generally. Considering that 
the right to vote is the badge of citizenship, Aziz should have been used to send the 
message that GC are not the only ‘true’ citizens of the Republic. The TC living in the 
government-controlled areas are a symbolically important counter-example to the 
nationalistic rhetoric that presents TC as enemies of the ROC and undermines 
reconciliation between the two communities. Only through such discussions could 
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citizens start thinking about the ethnic identities of different groups and potentially 
challenge the dominant narrative that portrays them as being in complete antithesis to 
each other. Yet, the top-down and legalistic amendments that took place in Cyprus 
were simply not up to the task of contributing to such a deeper and more 
fundamentally needed psychological change. 
 
Simply enforcing the right to vote is also unlikely to contribute to peace in BiH, a fact 
that does not seem to have been appreciated by peacebuilders in practice. The 
international community has persistently been pushing towards Sejdić’s 
implementation, without acknowledging that the disenfranchisement of ‘Others’ is a 
consequence of a series of much more important and worrisome political pathologies 
in the country. Some of these pathologies can be at least partly addressed through 
legal amendments of the Constitution, which nevertheless have to go well beyond 
what Sejdić requires. Currently there is no, or very little, alternative for Bosnians 
(whether members of the Constituent Peoples or Others) who want to vote for a non-
nationalist party. Politicians are constitutionally required to identify themselves along 
ethnic lines, which makes it unlikely that other ethnic group members will vote for 
them. Also, reserved seats for the representatives of each constituent people remove 
incentives from them to adopt moderate or non-nationalist strategies because they 
know they do not have to attract votes from members of other ethnic groups. The 
Bosnian consociational structure results in a government that is grossly inefficient in 
promoting its citizens’ interests on the one hand, and a citizenry that is increasingly 
disempowered to do something about it on the other. A first step towards the 
promotion of peace in BiH therefore, is the adoption of extensive constitutional 
amendments, which should deal with the much broader political pathologies that 
divide the country, rather than just the disenfranchisement of Others. 
 
However, even constitutional amendments that go well beyond Sejdić’s 
implementation are unable to exhaustively deal with all the political pathologies that 
are undermining peace in BiH. Among these pathologies is the rampant nationalist 
rhetoric in everyday politics,522 the absence of political inter-ethnic cooperation, the 
lack of political accountability and trust from the electorate (also due to soaring 
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corruption levels), increased electoral apathy and the overuse of the veto power.523 
These pathologies can only be dealt with through major political and psychological 
changes among the electorate and politicians, not the law. Yet, this dimension of the 
problem has remained completely unaddressed during the negotiations for Sejdić’s 
implementation. Instead of portraying the negotiations as a necessary, but only first 
step towards peace, Bosnian political elites have presented them as a painful rite of 
passage into the European club; a change they have to endorse because they have 
been told to, not because it is beneficial for the country as a whole.524 As a result, 
Sejdić has become a scaremongering device rather than a vehicle towards serious 
dialogue and reflection about the desirability of uncooperative and nationalist 
attitudes.525 Thus, despite the far-reaching effects that legal amendments can have, 
they cannot replace political maturity; in fact, too much attention on how to change 
the law can distract from the real question of how to change the attitudes of the law-
makers in the first place. Importantly, the critique here is not against specific 
legislative amendments that could be made in BiH, but against the use of the law as 
the main peacebuilding tool more broadly. 
 
SA’s political pathologies, which are quite different from those in BiH and Cyprus, 
must also be dealt with through mainly political and psychological changes rather 
than amendments to the law. The root of these pathologies lies in the fact that the 
country has been run by the African National Congress (ANC) since 1994, a trend 
that shows no signs of receding.526 The ANC’s legislative popularity has given it a 
comfortable majority in Parliament, thus allowing it to pass legislation without 
consulting or negotiating with any other party, and bringing it close to the 75% 
required for Constitutional amendments.527 SA’s status as a dominant party 
democracy over the last two decades has resulted in the fragmentation of opposition 
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parties, thus leaving them unable to offer a viable political alternative, has promoted 
the centralisation of power and led to ANC control of what should have been 
independent institutions.528 Moreover, there has been a continuous distortion of 
‘where real politics happen’ by shifting power from the parliamentary to the non-
parliamentary, and therefore not politically accountable, wings of the dominant 
political party.529 An illustration of the problem is the fact that while ANC MPs are 
allotted most of the question time in the National Assembly, they rarely take 
advantage of it, and are in fact prohibited by their party’s code of conduct from using 
parliamentary structures to undermine party policy.530  
 
Permanently dominant parties are detrimental to peace, especially in a country such as 
SA where violent uprisings occurred precisely due to the inability of the majority of 
the population to express its political convictions. On the one hand, they can 
undermine justice since they prevent, not only marginalised groups, but also the 
masses at large from challenging and meaningfully disagreeing with unpopular 
policies and decisions. An example of such a policy is Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE), which has been adopted by the ANC in order to eliminate the 
economic divisions between racial groups in the country. BEE has been the source of 
numerous provocative corruption scandals, for which no one has apologised or been 
punished, and its abuse by a small number of party insiders has left the vast majority 
of black people deriving no benefit whatsoever.531 However, despite its detrimental 
effects on justice and consequent unpopularity with the masses, BEE’s close alliance 
with the interests of the ANC suggests that it is here to stay. Even more 
problematically, the inability of the people to effectively challenge an unpopular 
decision through the ballot box, could lead to citizen frustration and undermine 
security in the country. This danger materialised in 2012-13 when, fuelled by unmet 
demands for wage increases by state-run companies, several coal miners’ strikes 
turned violent. The strikes resulted in the SA police force opening fire against the 
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protesters and killing, on one occasion, 46 people,532 while the government openly 
entertained the possibility of deploying a ‘peacekeeping force’ to increase security 
levels in the area.533 Finally, a country where feelings of justice and security run so 
low is unlikely to benefit from a willingness to cooperate between politicians and the 
public, which in turn undermines reconciliation.  
 
Despite the obvious need to deal with political pathologies stemming from the ANC’s 
dominance due to their detrimental consequences for peace, implementing the right to 
vote serves little purpose in this respect. The right is concerned with empowering 
individuals to make political choices, not with whether the outcome of such choices is 
beneficial or desirable to the country as a whole. Acknowledging the inability of 
human rights to help deal with these political pathologies, Choudhry suggests a range 
of other legal doctrines and presumptions that could restrict the ANC’s dominance.534 
For example, the Court could use the ‘non-usurpation doctrine’ in order to invalidate 
decisions that have been taken by dictation from the non-parliamentary to the 
parliamentary wing of the party. While however, such strategies might legally restrict 
the ANC from acting in specific ways, they cannot really affect the people’s political 
beliefs, which allow for the existence of a dominant party in the first place. Like with 
the political pathologies in Cyprus and BiH, the most appropriate solution to the 
continued dominance of the ANC is not the judicialisation of politics, but engaging 
with the grassroots: the public should be educated and informed about the advantages 
of having a properly functioning democracy rather than a system with democratic 
trappings and oligarchic mentalities. In order for such political and psychological 
changes to take place however, peacebuilders must also adopt a range of non-law 
related strategies that focus on the people themselves rather than the institutions. 
 
3. Complementing human rights with alternative peacebuilding tools 
 
Two broad distinctions can be made in relation to the tools and strategies that are 
currently available to peacebuilders around the world. The first separates those that 
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directly affect the people on the ground (people-centred) from those that shape laws 
and institutions and expect these changes to trickle down to the masses (institution-
focused). Human rights protection, with its emphasis on protecting fundamental legal 
interests and inducing legal amendments, falls squarely in the second category. 
However, as the examples from the previous section suggest, such institution-focused 
peacebuilding strategies, while valuable in their own right, cannot produce the broad 
political, socio-economic and psychological changes that are also necessary for peace. 
Therefore, a holistic peacebuilding recipe, that people on the ground and not just 
outsider observers consider a success, requires that institution-focused tools, such as 
human rights, be supplemented by people-centred mechanisms as well. These people-
centred mechanisms can either be imposed from the top-down or promoted from the 
grassroots up. Each of these approaches has its own strengths and both should be used 
in order to induce as broad and sustainable changes to the divided society as possible.  
 
References to a ‘holistic peacebuilding recipe’ and ‘people-centred mechanisms’ can 
justifiably raise the question: how different are these suggestions from Galtung’s, 
which have already been rejected as being too broad? Are peacebuilding strategies 
doomed to oscillate between the minimalist – and inadequate – liberal model and its 
maximalist – yet practically unachievable – alternatives? Arguably, while this danger 
is a real one, it remains possible to navigate between the two choices. On the one 
hand, implementing only legal and institutional changes is going to be easier than 
adopting a more holistic peacebuilding recipe. Different people-centred strategies 
might affect some people but not others, could be more effective in this divided 
society but not the next, or possibly only contribute during a particular period of time 
in the management of the conflict. Their greatest disadvantage in terms of attracting 
support and being adopted in practice is that they cannot be summed up in two or 
three catchphrases or laid out in a linear, easy-to-follow road map. Yet, the fact that 
they are more difficult to achieve – or even describe – does not deduct from their 
usefulness as peacebuilding strategies. Moreover, although they have more uncertain 
and long-term consequences than the liberal peacebuilding model, their objective to 
strike a balance between security, justice and reconciliation remains more feasible 
than Galtung’s positive peace. This section provides examples, rather than an 
exhaustive list, of different people-centred strategies used in the three case studies in 
order to elucidate what is meant by the term.  
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Top-down people-centred peacebuilding strategies have been suggested in the case of 
Cyprus under the heading of confidence-building measures. For instance, the two 
communities have, for years now, toyed with the idea that the town of Varosha, which 
used to be at the heart of the Cypriot tourism industry before 1974 but lies abandoned 
today on the north side of the Green Line, should be returned to its original 
inhabitants. Importantly, it has been suggested that this measure should precede the 
signing of a comprehensive peace agreement; its purpose should be to show the good 
will of the TC to reach an agreement.535 In return, the ROC could allow that Ercan 
airport, the main airport in the non-ROC controlled areas which is currently only 
connected to Turkish airports, be opened to more destinations. Such confidence-
building measures are not only likely to promote social and psychological change by 
presenting the other side as willing to give up something important in the negotiating 
process, but they can also contribute to the economic reinvigoration of the island: the 
rebuilding of Varosha will boost the economic crisis-struck building industry, while 
Ercan airport’s opening will bring more tourists to the island. Yet, despite the obvious 
socio-economic advantages of adopting confidence-building measures like these, they 
remain to date, just hopeful plans.  
 
Such top-down peacebuilding strategies could also be supplemented through 
grassroots initiatives that aim to promote change from the bottom-up. The theory 
behind this ‘peace from below’ strategy is that actually engaging with the people on 
the ground results in organic changes with more long-term beneficial effects for the 
divided society.536 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees started such 
a bottom-up peacebuilding project in 2000 in BiH; its purpose was to provide 
practical and real-life incentives for cooperation between individuals of different 
ethnicities.537 ‘Imagine Co-existence’ supported 26 projects which were jointly run by 
members of different ethnic groups and included setting up a café, running a 
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journalist club and participating in a basketball team. The projects not only improved 
relations between the participants, but also countered nationalist rhetoric by showing 
to Bosnians that inter-ethnic reconciliation was possible. Moreover, they created 
settings in which people of different ethnicities could meaningfully interact with each 
other, at the same time as generating income for the participants. The programme’s 
contribution in inducing economic change is reflected in the fact that of the 11 
income-generating projects, 10 became self-sustainable and continued to operate even 
after funding dried out in 2002.538  
 
Grassroots level reconciliation programmes have also been adopted in Cyprus, where 
participants have experienced similar positive effects. Among these programmes are a 
series of workshops, organised and funded by the Fulbright Commission, which are 
intended to bring Greek and Turkish Cypriot participants together and encourage 
them to discuss their experiences of the conflict.539 During the workshops some 
participants were surprised to discover that the other side also suffered from casualties 
and refugees, thus helping them realise that they were not the only victims in the 
conflict.540 Further, particularly before 2003 and the opening of the Green Line, the 
workshops presented the only opportunity for people to socialise with members of the 
other ethnic group. The experience was even more intense for the younger 
participants who were born after the segregation of the two communities in the 1960s 
and 1970s and therefore put a human face to the ‘enemy’ for the first time. 
Additionally to these workshops, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) has funded a number of reconciliation projects on the island, such as the 
establishment of the Cyprus Community Media Centre (CCMC) and the ‘Engage’ 
civil society umbrella organisation. The CCMC has so far helped over 25 civil society 
organisations to share untold stories of the conflict with the public and trained more 
than 100 people to make their own media across the island.541 Moreover, ‘Engage’ 
has coordinated approximately 100 Greek and Turkish Cypriot civil society 
                                               
538 Ibid., at 109. 
539 Tristan Roberts, 'Peace Camp Facilitates Reconciliation on Cyprus', (17 August 2004) on 
http://wl.convio.net/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5041 [accessed 10 June 2014]. 
540 Harry Anastasiou, 'Communication across Conflict Lines: The Case of Ethnically Divided Cyprus', 
Journal of Peace Research, 39/5 (2002), 581. 
541 UNDP, 'UNDP Action for Cooperation & Trust in Cyprus: Multicommmedia', on 
http://www.cy.undp.org/content/dam/cyprus/docs/ACT%20Publications/factsheet_ccmc_2013_Final.p
df [accessed 3 June 2014]. 
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organisations in signing public declarations of support to the two leaders for the 
ongoing peace negotiations.542 It has also launched the first ever televised island-wide 
peace campaign and sought to increase public dialogue for a peace solution through a 
series of events around Cyprus. 
 
However, although these projects and initiatives can make positive contributions to 
reconciliation, they have had very limited outreach effects in practice; the majority of 
Cypriots do not interact, let alone discuss or cooperate, with members of the other 
ethnic group at all. Thus, while cooperation programmes have taken place between 
the two communities, the general public has paid no significant attention to them. An 
example in point is the 1977 Nicosia Sewage Project, which has, quite literally, united 
the underground of the divided capital, but has generally not been spoken about. A 
more recent example is the success of the Committee of Missing Persons, a body of 
scientists from both communities who carry out excavations around the island in 
order to find missing persons from the 1963-64 and 1974 periods. Yet, despite the UN 
Secretary-General describing the Committee as ‘a model of successful cooperation 
between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities’, its achievements are 
rarely discussed among the population or acknowledged in the popular press.543 Thus, 
it is not only important that reconciliation strategies intended to induce psychological 
change are adopted, but also that they reach and engage with the people.  
 
A body that was particularly successful in this respect was the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC), which undertook the difficult, but necessary task, 
of helping South Africans ‘to come to terms with their past on a morally accepted 
basis and to advance the cause of reconciliation’.544 The TRC contributed to this 
objective not only through the final result of its efforts – a five volume account of the 
human rights violations that had taken place between 1960 and 1994 in the country – 
but also through the process that was used. Victims and perpetrators of human rights 
                                               
542 UNDP, 'UNDP Action for Cooperation & Trust in Cyprus: Engage – Civic Engagement for 
Reconciliation', on 
http://www.cy.undp.org/content/dam/cyprus/docs/ACT%20Publications/factsheet_engage_2012.pdf 
[accessed 3 June 2014]. 
543 Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus, 'Committee on Missing Persons in Cyprus', on 
http://www.cy.undp.org/content/dam/cyprus/docs/PFF%20Publications/UNDP-CY-CMPleaflet.pdf 
[accessed 3 June 2014]. 
544 Mr Dullah Omar, SA Minister of Justice, cited on the official Truth and Reconciliation website, 
http://www.justice.gov.za/Trc/ [accessed 3 June 2014]. 
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violations recounted their experiences either in writing or during public oral hearings 
with the expectation that making the truth known was necessary for reconciliation. 
Importantly, the need to engage with the public was appreciated from the start: all 
proceedings were broadcasted live on radio, while their launch and some high profile 
hearings were also televised. Moreover, the hearings took place in town halls, civic 
centres and churches around the country, thus giving the opportunity to the members 
of the public to take part in the Commission’s proceedings. It is a matter of contention 
whether the TRC was indeed successful in promoting reconciliation in the country.545 
What is undisputed however, is that its methods of communicating with the South 
African population worked; its message might not always have been agreeable, but it 
was always heard.546 This approach of the TRC is in sharp contrast to the workings of 
the CRLR, which although was charged with a similar mandate of providing ‘support 
to the process of reconciliation and development’, it perceived its role in a much more 
technical way.547 As a result, the remedies the CRLR provided to displaced South 
Africans failed to result in the same psychological changes that the TRC had helped 
induce in the country.548 
 
The TRC’s success is that it brought out in the open the brutalities of the apartheid 
regime and has made it impossible ‘for the average South African to suffer from 
selective amnesia’ about the gross human rights violations that had taken place in the 
country.549 Thus, while members of different ethnic groups consider the Commission 
more or less successful, they all agree that it helped bring out the truth.550 This should 
                                               
545 Mahmood Mamdani, 'Amnesty or Impunity? A Preliminary Critique of the Report of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa (TRC)', Diacritics, 32/3/4 (2002), 32; Rosemary Nagy, 
'Reconciliation in Post-Commission South Africa: Thick and Thin Accounts of Solidarity' Canadian 
Journal of Political Science 35 (2002), 323. 
546 One example of the TRC’s least popular conclusions was its finding that ‘the ANC and its organs 
[…] committed gross violations of human rights in the course of their political activities and armed 
struggles, for which they are morally and politically accountable.’ (Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report – Volume 5 (Pretoria: 
Government of SA, 1998) at [132].) The ANC’s response to this was to – unsuccessfully – attempt to 
block the publication of the report. (Tristan Anne Borer, 'A Taxonomy of Victims and Perpetrators: 
Human Rights and Reconciliation in South Africa', Human Rights Quarterly, 25 (2003), 1088 at 1093). 
547 Department of Land Affairs, 'White Paper on South African Land Policy 1997', (Pretoria: 
Government of SA, 1997) at 14. 
548 Roux, 'Land Restitution and Reconciliation in South Africa'. 
549 Dorothy Shea, The South African Truth Commission: The Politics of Reconciliation (Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2000) at 6. 
550 Jay A. Vora and Erica Vora, 'The Effectiveness of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission: Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner and English South Africans', Journal of Black Studies, 
34/3 (2004), 301 at 308-9. 
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be contrasted to the situation in the Balkans where the trials at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have failed to eliminate the 
perpetuation of half-truths and myths about what happened during the conflicts. 
Indicative of this is the fact that although the Tribunal concerned itself extensively 
with the Srebrenica massacre, 25% of the Serbs polled had never heard about it, half 
of them believed the allegations were not true and 57% thought that even if they were 
true, they did not constitute war crimes.551 However, while the South African TRC 
was undoubtedly much more successful in bringing out the truth than the ICTY, this 
did not always translate into a more reconciled population. Although some victims in 
SA felt that the acknowledgement of their suffering and apology by their perpetrators 
were enough to help them heal, others thought that the process opened old wounds 
that were better left untouched.552 In this respect, the TRC could itself be 
supplemented by other bottom-up peacebuilding tools, such as workshops, which 
could offer some more personal guidance and support to the victims. 
 
An additional way in which the state can engage with the public and contribute to 
reconciliation from above is through its educational system. This can be the medium 
through which younger generations are taught about their country’s history and 
reasons for its divisions, thus contributing to social and psychological change. 
Moreover, it could induce necessary political changes by explaining the importance of 
a healthy democratic system and active participation of an informed citizenry. Of 
course, an educational system is only as good as its objectives, since it can be easily 
used to perpetuate a nationalist, rather than a reconciliatory message. Therefore, when 
assessing the impact of an educational system, it is important to look beyond its stated 
aims and examine what it has actually achieved in practice. For instance, while the 
ROC’s official position is that it works towards the reunification of the island and 
reconciliation of its population, there is little in its history books that supports these 
objectives. GC history books have tended to use the term ‘Cypriot’ as equivalent to 
‘Greek’ and claim that there is a historical continuity of Hellenism on the island from 
                                               
551 Mikro Klarin, 'The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia', Journal 
of International Criminal Justice, 7 (2009), 89 at 93. 
552 Vora and Vora, 'The Effectiveness of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 
Perceptions of Xhosa, Afrikaner and English South Africans'. 
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the time of the Mycenaeans to today.553 As a result, they create the impression that 
non-Greeks have historically had no rightful place in Cyprus, thus contributing to 
negative stereotypes of TC as residing parasitically on the island.554 Moreover, history 
books rarely mention the period of 1963-1974 and the experiences of the TC 
community, while they place comparatively overwhelming emphasis on the suffering 
of the GC during the 1974 Turkish invasion.555 As a consequence of this, younger 
generations perceive themselves as the only victims and members of the other group 
as the only perpetrators and are therefore more reluctant, when compared with their 
parents, to support a potential peace agreement.556  
 
If education is to contribute to a more peaceful and reconciled Cyprus therefore, it is 
imperative that these educational practices are modified. Such a change took place in 
2004 by the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’) and although TC 
history books can still be improved, important steps have been taken in the right 
direction. The previous textbooks ‘could themselves provide textbook examples of all 
that can go wrong with a history textbook’:557 they described the war of 1974 as the 
‘Happy Peace Operation’ when the ‘Heroic Turkish Army’ came to safeguard the 
‘Turks of Cyprus’, while they completely failed to mention GC suffering during this 
period.558 The current books still refer to the 1974 war as a ‘peace operation’ (the 
adjective ‘happy’ has been dropped), but they avoid references to ‘Our Motherland 
Turkey’ and portray nationalism as a divisive and conflictual, rather than heroic, 
ideology.559 It is only by taking steps in this direction, even before a peace agreement 
has been signed, that reconciliation can be promoted and psychological change 
necessary for peace can take place. Moreover, upon the creation of the federal state, 
the ethnic groups should adopt a common educational policy and curriculum; the 
                                               
553 Yiannis Papadakis, 'History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot Schoolbooks on the ‘History of Cyprus’', (Nicosia: Peace Research Institute Oslo, 
2008) at 7. 
554 Spyros Spyrou, 'Those on the Other Side: Ethnic Identity and Imagination in Greek Cypriot 
Childrenʼs Lives,' in Helen Schwartzman (ed.), Children and Anthropology: Perspectives for the 21st 
Century (Westport: Bergin & Garvey, 2001), 167. 
555 Papadakis, 'History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot Schoolbooks on the ‘History of Cyprus’' at 9. 
556 Alexandros Lordos, Erol Kaymak and Nathalie Tocci, 'A People’s Peace in Cyprus: Testing Public 
Opinion on the Options for a Comprehensive Settlement', (Brussels: Centre for European Policy 
Studies, 2009) at 15. 
557 Papadakis, 'History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot Schoolbooks on the ‘History of Cyprus’' at 12. 
558 Ibid., at 14. 
559 Ibid., at 18. 
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refusal of Bosnian elites to agree to this must count as one of the most important 
reasons for the perpetuation of nationalist feelings among the country’s youth.560 
 
Finally, alternative peacebuilding strategies should seek to reduce socio-economic 
divisions among different groups within the population. Such divisions are 
particularly obvious in SA and Cyprus, where almost a century of apartheid policies 
in the first case and the economic and political embargo of the ‘TRNC’ in the second, 
have left one ethnic group economically considerably better off than the other. Even 
in BiH, with its recent socialist past and relative socio-economic equality, 
‘[e]conomic grievances have come to be defined in ethnic terms’ and therefore have 
to be addressed as part of the peacebuilding process.561 Economic conflicts can be 
managed either through top-down peacebuilding strategies, such as the Varosha/Ercan 
Airport suggestion in Cyprus, or from the grassroots up, as was the case with the 
‘Imagine Co-existence’ project in BiH. Additional suggestions could include fighting 
corruption, a money-draining phenomenon in any economy, or providing cheap credit 
to vulnerable and economically disempowered members of the population on the 
condition that they will use it to set up small businesses. 
 
While each society could and should adopt its own tools and strategies to deal with 
economic inequalities within its population, what is important is that these methods 
actually achieve their objectives, rather than just look good on paper. Perhaps the 
biggest disappointment in this respect is the SA BEE programme mentioned in 
Section 2.562 The ANC government had promised ‘a stable and growing economy that 
erases the inequalities of the past and draws [all South Africans] into a more 
prosperous and equitable future’.563 BEE was supposed to be a ‘poverty-fighting 
force’ that would put the black community’s economic power on a par with its 
                                               
560 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 'Second Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina', 
at [61]-[72]. 
561 Haider, '(Re)Imagining Coexistence: Striving for Sustainable Return, Reintegration and 
Reconciliation in Bosnia and Herzegovina' at 98. 
562 The term ‘black’ in Black Economic Empowerment refers to non-white populations – Africans, 
Indians and Coloured South Africans. Yet, in addition to its other deficiencies, BEE has on occasion 
been ‘advertised’ as seeking to ‘empower the black community in general and African people in 
particular’, which undoubtedly has done little to promote reconciliation among the racial groups in the 
country. (African National Congress, 'Social Transformation: Fighting Poverty and Building a Better 
Life', (Discussion paper presented at the ANC's 51st National Conference, Stellenbosch, 2002) at 5, my 
emphasis.) 
563 President Mbeki’s State of the Nation address to Parliament in February 2003, cited in Iheduru, 
'Black Economic Power and Nation-Building in Post-Apartheid South Africa' at 2. 
  206 
political one and would lessen the potential for civil strife.564 The programme has 
been given effect through several laws, which require inter alia that 2% of the 
proceeds from privatisation of state assets finance businesses owned by previously 
disadvantaged individuals565 and that bidders for government contracts allocate at 
least 40% equity shareholding to previously disadvantaged people.566 In practice 
however, BEE has ignored the fact that the majority of non-whites lack the skills or 
training to join the most lucrative sectors of the economy, especially at the executive 
management levels. This, combined with the endemic corruption that exists in SA, 
has turned a tiny number of black individuals into millionaires while most of the rest 
of the black community suffers, an outcome that is unlikely to contribute to feelings 
of justice among the population.  
 
This brief description of alternative peacebuilding strategies, whether top-down or 
bottom-up, suggests that they can only be effective in achieving their goals when 
certain conditions have been satisfied. For example, the success of the TRC in SA and 
the relative failure of the Cypriot reconciliation-promoting initiatives suggests that 
particular attention should be paid to the extent to which the measures are actually 
known by, reach and affect the people on the ground. Moreover, while ‘Imagine Co-
existence’ in BiH was a success, the programme’s limited budget, which only allowed 
it to fund a small number of projects, and its short-term span (it only lasted for 2 
years) restricted the effects it could have had both in terms of socio-economic and 
psychological changes. Admittedly, despite their advantages, people-centred 
strategies, especially bottom-up ones require a long-term commitment, which can be 
difficult for peacebuilders, both financially and in terms of personnel management. 
Finally, as the examples of the school syllabus in Cyprus and BEE in SA suggest, a 
peacebuilding strategy should not only claim to be working towards a set of 
objectives, but the way it is structured and operates should actually reflect that in 
practice. 
 
                                               
564 Speech by the President of the ANC-aligned National African Federated Chambers of Commerce in 
1996, cited in Iheduru, 'Black Economic Power and Nation-Building in Post-Apartheid South Africa' at 
2. 
565 National Empowerment Fund Act [No. 105 of 1998]. 
566 Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act [No. 5 of 2000]. 
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Human rights must be supplemented by other institution-focused, and more 
importantly, other people-centered peacebuilding strategies as well. This conclusion 
rests on the belief that the liberal peacebuilding model used today – of which human 
rights are at the centerpiece – is flawed. It creates a skewed type of peace that puts too 
much emphasis on how the structures and institutions of the society look like from the 
outside, to the detriment of how they operate and affect the people on the inside. This 
deficiency calls for the replacement of the liberal peacebuilding model with an 
alternative one, which as suggested above, uses a range of strategies in order to 
induce more holistic changes on the ground. In particular, by recognising that human 
rights can promote legal and institutional, but not other types of changes, the 
alternative strategy relies on mechanisms that will affect the divided society 
politically, socially, economically and psychologically as well. Importantly, the claim 
here is not that human rights should be abandoned; after all, they do important work. 
However, policy makers must recognise their weaknesses and in taking them off the 
pedestal, also make room for alternative peacebuilding strategies. This section has 
provided examples of such strategies, but all three case studies would benefit from 




Human rights tend to be popular solutions to political conflicts due to the intuitive 
appeal they command and because they fit well within the international community’s 
liberal peacebuilding strategy. It is unsurprising that international peacebuilders, in 
particular, have adopted such a liberal recipe of legal amendments and institutional 
improvements expecting peace to follow: the alternative peacebuilding strategy 
requires local expertise, long-term commitment and more money than the 
international community has been willing to provide so far. While liberal 
peacebuilding might be convenient however, it is ultimately faulty. The challenges 
that can emerge during the implementation of new laws and institutions can create the 
misleading impression that when this has been achieved, peace has also been built. 
This chapter has argued that, to the contrary, successfully enforcing human rights is 
only the beginning and not the end of the peacebuilding process; it can result in 
necessary legal changes, which are nevertheless insufficient on their own to build 
peace. 
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Thus, in addition to legal amendments that are undoubtedly important and which tend 
to be induced through human rights protection, peacebuilders must also pay attention 
to socio-economic, political and psychological changes that are also necessary for 
successful conflict management. In order for these changes to take place, a series of 
peacebuilding strategies that supplement human rights protection should also be 
adopted. These can be top-down peacebuilding strategies, or, they can encourage 
change from the grassroots up; in both cases however this change should be 
concerned with people on the ground, their feelings, beliefs and socio-economic 
conditions rather than with laws and institutions. The argument here is not that 
institution-building and human rights protections are not important; in fact, they are 
absolutely necessary. However, their limitations – and explanations for these 
limitations – must be understood, acknowledged and acted upon. Only then can 
liberal peacebuilding tools be strengthened through other strategies, and more 
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The increased – and largely uncontested – legitimacy of human rights has turned them 
into a ‘worldwide secular religion’ and any criticisms of how they operate into 
heresy.567 One consequence of this popularity is that their protection in ethnically 
divided, post-conflict societies is currently considered as an integral part of the 
peacebuilding package; reflective of this is the UN’s declaration that ‘the human 
rights component of a peace operation is indeed critical to effective peace-
building.’568 Yet, such declarations have rarely been justified and the specific 
contributions of human rights have never been fleshed out. As a result of this 
inadequate, or even inexistent, theoretical framework, peacebuilding on the ground 
has also suffered from major deficiencies. This thesis aims to fill the gap in 
peacebuilding theory and practice by answering a series of questions: is the legal 
protection of human rights always positively connected to the building of peace? If 
no, why and what should be done about that?  
 
It transpires that over-enthusiasm and lack of clarity as to the meaning of both ‘peace’ 
and ‘human rights’ have clouded the nuanced relationship that exists between the two 
terms. This thesis argues that human rights can indeed contribute to peace in 
important ways. In particular, their protection can send the message that the injustices 
and atrocities of the war have been left behind and can create a newfound sense of 
security among the population. The combination of these positive changes could, in 
best-case scenearios, also make members of different ethnic groups more willing to 
cooperate between themselves. At the same time as confirming the international 
community’s expectations however, a closer look at the two terms suggests that 
human rights could undermine, and not just promote, peacebuilding efforts. It is for 
instance possible that the threat of criminal trials (and punishment of perpetrators) 
                                               
567 Elie Wiesel, quoted in Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry (Princeton; Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2001) at 53. 
568 Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, 'Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations', (New York: United Nations, 2000) (henceforth, ‘Brahimi Report’) at [41]. 
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after the war disencourages armed groups to stop their fighting or that the black and 
white distinctions of the human rights language fail to reflect the subtleties of what 
happened during the conflict. Perhaps the most underexplored facet of the relationship 
between peace and human rights is the possibility that the two are not connected at all 
because the former makes much broader demands than what the latter can deliver. 
Illustrative of this is the fact that peace requires that the previously warring parties 
have reconciled their differences, something that is most effectively achieved through 
negotiations in the political arena rather than through legal battles about the protection 
of human rights. This more nuanced understanding of the relationship in question 
calls for the enrichment of the liberal peacebuilding strategy, which assumes that 
there are only positive connections between rights and peace. Instead, policy makers 
should adopt an alternative approach that relies on the strengths of human rights, 
while at the same time, acknowledging their limitations and addressing them 
accordingly.  
 
These conclusions are of practical significance in different ethnically divided, post-
conflict societies around the world, but they are particularly topical for Cyprus, the 
case study that was the inspiration for this thesis. The Cypriot conflict seems to be 
frozen in time: the last serious occurrence of violence took place on the island in 1974 
and negotiations for a peace agreement have been revolving around the same 
questions at a painstakingly slow pace ever since. The only time the parties came 
close to solving the Cypriot Rubik’s cube was in 2004 when in a referendum to the 
communities, Turkish Cypriots accepted, but Greek Cypriots resoundingly rejected 
the ‘Annan Plan’, the comprehensive peace settlement that was on the table.569 
Despite the frustrating inertia characterising the Cypriot negotiations however, 2015 
could be a year of great changes for the small Mediterranean island. The discovery of 
hydrocarbons in Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone has shaken the parties out of their 
comfortable status quo and brought to the fore the necessity of resolving the Cyprus 
problem once and for all.570 Political leaders are under increasing international 
pressure to resolve their differences and they have been warned that a failure to agree 
                                               
569 The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, finalised on 31 March 2004 and put to a 
referendum on 24 April 2004. 
570 International Crisis Group, 'Aphrodite’s Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New Dialogue?', 
(Nicosia/Instabul/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012). 
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on a peace settlement could realistically lead to a partition of the island.571 The 
consequent realisation that maintaining the status quo can be detrimental to Cyprus’ 
political and economic prospects has led to cautious optimism about the outcome of 
the negotiations. Writing this thesis while being only a few minutes away from the 
UN buffer zone separating the two Cypriot communities, I can only hope that its 
conclusions are taken seriously by the international peacebuilders and political elites 
that hold the island’s fate in their hands. 
 
2. The theoretical contribution of the thesis 
 
The precise nature of the relationship between peace and human rights is an issue of 
global importance: the international community’s rather shy and isolated 
peacebuilding attempts in the early 1990s have been succeeded by the creation of a 
permanent UN Peacebuilding Commission, the development of a ‘responsibility to 
protect’ conflict-ridden countries and the launching of ever more ambitious and 
frequent peacebuilding operations around the world. Nevertheless, this increased 
legitimacy of and confidence in peacebuilding operations has usually not been 
accompanied by equally positive results in practice: almost always the ethnic 
divisions that caused the conflict remain salient and the belief that violence will not 
resume again is absent. This state of affairs might be an improvement when compared 
to the war that destroyed these countries, but it is a far cry from peace. Undoubtedly, 
an explanation for the mixed resultes of these operations lies with the specific tools 
and methods that peacebuilders have opted to use and the assumptions they have 
employed in the process. The most popular of these methods, usually referred to as 
liberal peacebuilding, focuses on the creation or improvement of democratic and free 
market structures, both of which rely on the effective protection of human rights.572 
                                               
571 For instance, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus stated on Cypriot national 
television that ‘I think we are close to a last chance. The UN has been here for 50 years. There have 
been many negotiators. I am the 25th and I actually think, I don’t know, that I am the last one. I hope I 
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November 2014, Nicosia, Cyprus.) 
572 Reflecting the liberal peacebuilding assumptions, An Agenda for Peace states that ‘[t]here is an 
obvious connection between democratic practices […] and the achievement of true peace and security 
in any new and stable political order.’ (UN Secretary-General, 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive 
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the 
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Thus, the conclusions about the relationship in question are relevant to the broader 
debate about the effectiveness of liberal peacebuilding and could have enormous 
consequences in both human and financial terms. 
 
Peace in ethnically divided, post-conflict societies consists of three elements that 
sometimes have a mutually supportive and, at other times, a contradictory relationship 
with each other. Security exists when the conditions on the ground prevent a sense of 
fear from war, internal conflict or serious crime. The second element of peace, justice, 
demands that the injustices of the war are remedied and that they are prevented from 
being repeated in the future. Finally, reconciliation requires the creation of 
meaningful relationships of cooperation – on the personal and political levels – 
between former enemy parties. Human rights have a different relationship with each 
of the three elements since they can induce feelings of security, justice and 
reconciliation in different ways and to various extents. While for example, a law 
allowing restitution could promote feelings of justice among the displaced population, 
it would not necessarily also make the people feel secure enough to return, or 
encourage them to rebuild friendly relations with their old neighbours. Similarly, 
punishing perpetrators for human rights violations that took place during the war 
might induce feelings of security and justice among the victims, but it could 
undermine reconciliation if the criminal trials are perceived as favouring members of 
one ethnic group over the other.  
 
War often breaks out, to the detriment of the three elements of peace, when conflicts, 
which naturally exist in any diverse society, remain unaddressed, grievances build up 
and are eventually externalised in a violent manner. The continued existence of such 
seemingly unmanageable conflicts between the parties in the early stages of the 
peacebuilding process makes the balance between the elements of peace more 
difficult to strike. Such conflicts stem from fundamental disagreements, like whether 
the state should protect ethnic groups or individual citizens, which are unsusceptible 
to compromise because each side sees any step towards the other’s direction as unfair. 
A successful peacebuilding operation therefore is one that transforms these 
fundamental conflicts into smaller, more manageable ones. Conflicts of this second 
                                                                                                                                      
Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992', (New York: 
United Nations, 1992) at [59].)  
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type arise from evidentiary differences or disagreements as to interpretation and are 
more likely to be negotiated successfully because they concern more-or-less rather 
than either/or questions. The relationship between human rights and peace therefore, 
depends on the extent to which the former can make fundamental, zero-sum conflicts 
more manageable and as a result, ease the balancing between security, justice and 
reconciliation. 
 
The expectation among peacebuilders is that human rights can help manage conflicts 
but that they sometimes fail because of unimplemented judicial decisions.573 As a 
result, the usual response to the disappointing outcomes of peacebuilding operations 
is to insist on human rights protections even more and push harder for their 
enforcement. This strategy can yield results: often conflicts stay unresolved and 
policies that could contribute to peace remain unimplemented because of the political 
elites’ unwillingness to act. In such cases, addressing the issues of variable 
enforcement of human rights decisions (usually through international pressure) could 
be the fastest and most efficient way to peace. Nevertheless, non-implementation of 
human rights decisions is not the only, or indeed the most important hurdle to 
peacebuilding efforts. It is, for example, possible that a decision will be implemented, 
but that the resulting legal amendment – whilst protecting the interests of the 
individual applicant – will not have any broader positive effects on peace in the 
divided society. It is therefore not only important to exert pressure for the 
implementation of a human rights decision, but also to pay attention to the specific 
measures that will be taken to enforce it and what their effect is likely to be in 
practice. Desperate for a success story, peacebuilders will often celebrate the change 
in the letter of the law, but pay little attention to its consequences on the ground. 
 
Even more damaging to the orthodoxy of liberal peacebuilding however, are two 
additional conclusions, which suggest that sometimes ethnically divided, post-conflict 
societies need less human rights, not more. It is true to argue that human rights can 
contribute to conflict management, but this is also a generalisation. Rights are most 
well suited in dealing with those conflicts that stem from interpretive or evidentiary 
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disagreements between the parties; the most effective way of managing these is 
through a well-structured and reasoned debate and the best forum for such a debate is 
the court. At the same time however, if the conflict in question is of a more 
fundamental nature (involving, for example, a disagreement about the structures of 
the state itself), then rights adjudication is unlikely to contribute to its successful 
management. Such disagreements do not comfortably fall within the ambit of human 
rights and can therefore not be managed by Courts; rights are intended to operate 
within a given framework, not build it from scratch, which is often what fundamental 
conflicts are all about. Thus, while the right to vote made important contributions to 
the dilemma of who should be allowed to vote in SA, it has been less effective in 
providing guidance on the structure of the electoral system in Cyprus. Peacebuilders 
interested in the first question were right to use human rights provisions, but those 
seeking to answer the second should consult the political science literature instead.  
 
Even in cases where the conflict has been adjudicated (it relates in other words to a 
practical rather than a fundamental disagreement) and the Court’s decision has been 
enforced, questions still remain about the extent to which human rights can contribute 
to its successful management. The demands of security, justice and reconciliation 
suggest that a series of changes are necessary for an ethnically divided society to be 
transformed into a peaceful one; legal, political, socio-economic and psychological 
factors have to be considered and various steps have to be taken to ensure changes in 
all these directions. Human rights are ideal tools to promote some of these changes 
and in particular those that relate to the amendment of laws or the reforming of 
institutions. Illustrative of this are the amendments made to the electoral law in 
Cyprus after Aziz and the numerous legal and institutional changes that followed after 
the implementation of the right to property in BiH. At the same time however, human 
rights remain largely unable to induce the political, socio-economic and psychological 
changes that are also necessary for peace. This inability is particularly detrimental for 
reconciliation, which is most effectively promoted in psychologists’ offices, religious 
institutions and school classrooms rather than socially detached courtrooms. Thus, it 
is necessary for human rights to be supplemented by peacebuilding tools and methods 
that focus, not on the institutions and laws in the ethnically divided society, but on the 
people themselves. These can either be planned from the top-down (for example, by 
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creating a Truth and Reconciliation Commission) or emerge from the bottom-up (for 
instance, by jointly renovating a school or library in an ethnically mixed community).  
 
3. Getting from peace in the books to peace on the ground 
 
The theoretical conclusions of this thesis suggest that in addition to the positive 
connections between peace and human rights, the latter can influence negatively or 
leave unaffected the former as well. If that is the case, then peacebuilders are faced 
with a choice: continuing to use the liberal, human rights-centred peacebuilding 
strategy or adopting an alternative policy that also acknowledges the limitations of 
human rights and seeks to supplement them in other ways. Peacebuilders in the case 
studies that have been examined in Part 2 of this thesis – Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH), South Africa (SA) and Cyprus – have so far, opted for the first choice. While 
the international community’s operations in BiH offer, from beginning to end, a 
textbook example of the traditional liberal peacebuilding approach, the SA process 
started out differently. The specific context of the conflict and the history of the 
African National Congress that played a leading role in the fight against apartheid, 
caused SA to originally adopt more people-centred strategies; illustrative of this is the 
great emphasis on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. However, over the years 
and as budgetary considerations became more important, peacebuilding practices in 
the country started resembling the liberal strategy that was being implemented in BiH. 
Similarly, the architects of the (albeit underdeveloped) Cypriot peacebuilding process 
have so far failed to rethink and challenge their assumptions; as a result, the strategies 
they have adopted differ very little from those in the other two case studies.  
 
The two approaches are not antithetical to each other; the alternative policy does not 
call for the abandonment of liberal peacebuilding, but for its enrichment. 
Nevertheless, important differences do exist between them. On the one hand, liberal 
peacebuilding is characterised by a concern as to how various strategies (and their 
final outcome) look like from the outside, rather than how they are experienced from 
the inside. Its primary focus is on the legal amendments and institutional changes that 
are considered necessary for building peace and little, if any, attention is paid to how 
these affect the people in practice. Thus, the dismantling process of the International 
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is exclusively concerned with 
the number of cases that have been decided so far, the creation of a Sarajevo War 
Crimes Chamber and the transferring of cases from the international tribunal to the 
domestic courts.574 Attention has never been paid to the effects of the ICTY’s case 
law on the Balkan population, or even on how the immediate victims and perpetrators 
feel during and after the trial.575 Moreover, liberal peacebuilding is characterised by 
the tendency of peacebuilders to step back as soon as they have delivered the remedy 
and complied with the letter of the law. Their involvement is usually short-term and 
they rarely stay in the post-conflict society long enough to observe, let alone assess, 
the consequences of their practices. Perhaps the most representative example of this is 
the Bosnian Property Law Implementation Plan, which was set up, implemented and 
concluded within 3 years; its effects were a success on paper, but there was little 
acknowledgement of the fact that the remedy was in practical terms often a 
disappointment.576 Even in cases where peacebuilders realise that complying with the 
law is only the first peacebuilding step because, for example, more long-term socio-
economic changes are also necessary, they tend to avoid becoming more heavily 
involved. Reflective of this is the South African Government’s decision to offer 
displaced communities post-restitution support through strategic partnerships with 
private companies, rather than by participating in the process itself.577  
 
On the other hand, the alternative peacebuilding policy focuses not only on 
institutional and legal amendments, but also on how these are experienced by the 
people on the ground. It acknowledges that changes in the law are important for the 
building of peace, but they are only among the first steps in this process. Thus, it also 
pays close attention to the context in which these amendments are implemented and 
takes into account the political and socio-economic conditions, which will ensure that 
the legal changes are meaningful. Finally, it focuses on the general public and takes 
                                               
574 Fidelma Donlon, 'Rule of Law: From the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia to the War 
Crimes Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina', in Dina Francesca Haynes (ed.), Deconstructing the 
Reconstruction: Human Rights and Rule of Law in Postwar Bosnia and Herzegovina (London: 
Ashgate, 2008), 257. 
575 Patrice McMahon and David Forsythe, 'The ICTY’s Impact on Serbia: Judicial Romanticism Meets 
Network Politics', Human Rights Quarterly, 30 (2008), 412. 
576 Charles Philpott, 'Though the Dog Is Dead, the Pig Must Be Killed: Finishing with Property 
Restitution to Bosnia Herzegovina’s IDPs and Refugees', Journal of Refugee Studies, 18 (2005), 1. 
577 Bill Derman, Edward Lahiff and Espen Sjaastad, 'Strategic Questions About Strategic Partners', in 
Cherryl Walker et al. (eds.), Land, Memory, Reconstruction and Justice: Perspectives on Land Claims 
in South Africa (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010), 306. 
  217 
steps to ensure that the successful implementation of the remedies will also induce the 
desired psychological changes that are necessary for peace. Offering more than a 
sketch of what the alternative peacebuilding policy looks like in practice is impossible 
because it differs, by its nature, from country to country. Bearing this limitation in 
mind however, it is possible to discern certain characteristics that it should always 
possess. 
 
First, it values the contributions of different types of professionals, and not just 
lawyers – teachers, journalists, religious leaders and psychologists can also play a key 
role in the peacebuilding process. Second, the grassroots are actively involved in the 
implementation of the alternative peacebuilding policy and steps are taken to ensure 
that they understand and benefit from it as much as possible. Third, the majority of 
peacebuilders are locals because they are more in touch with the population than their 
international colleagues, they are familiar with the language(s) and culture of the 
ethnically divided society and are therefore not considered outsiders. Fourth, the 
alternative policy favours the adoption of long-term strategies over quick fixes and 
consequently tends to avoid bodies with exceptional powers, such as the High 
Representative in BiH; rather, the focus is on the organic development of a 
democratic culture and feelings of reconciliation. This offers additional arguments for 
the preference of local peacebuilders over internationals since the former are less 
likely to leave their posts and be replaced halfway through the long process by 
someone who is not familiarised with the context. Moreover, the continuous and long-
term involvement of internationals in the domestic affairs of the state can be counter-
productive, as it might be perceived as an illegitimate intervention or paternalism.  
 
The liberal and alternative peacebuilding policies vary because ultimately they aim to 
achieve different things. The former is based on the assumption that the final 
objective is the improvement of the laws and institutions in the post-conflict society. 
Feelings of security, justice and reconciliation are necessary, but they do not fall 
within the concerns of the peacebuilder because they are believed to follow 
automatically from the legal amendments. Conversely, while still relying on the three 
elements of peace, the alternative peacebuilding policy pays much closer attention to 
what its traditional counterpart ignores. It acknowledges that when the conflict 
dividing the society in question is a fundamental one, balancing security, justice and 
  218 
reconciliation becomes almost impossible. Peace, therefore, requires the 
transformation of such conflicts into simpler and more easily manageable practical 
disagreements. This conflict transformation cannot be achieved through legal and 
institutional amendments alone; it is also necessary that the very identity of the 
population changes and the people’s allegiance to their ethnic group is ultimately 
supplemented by a sense of civic nationalism. Thus, the ‘Greekness’ or ‘Turkishness’ 
of Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively, must be supplemented by their 
‘Cypriotness’, which will act as a bond holding the two groups together. Only when 
this considerably longer process is completed will the objectives of the alternative 
peacebuilding model have been achieved.  
 
4. Assessing the past: Bosnia and Herzegovina and South Africa 
 
At the moment, the peacebuilding operations in BiH and SA seem to be coming to a 
close: the remedying of displaced people has finished or will be completed soon, the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in SA has published its results, the ICTY is 
wrapping up its operations and the High Representative is becoming less and less 
actively involved in Bosnian politics. Yet, the implication of this thesis’ conclusions 
is that ending the peacebuilding processes would be a mistake because BiH, and to a 
lesser extent SA, are still divided by fundamental conflicts and, as a result, suffer 
from a lack of security, justice and reconciliation. Many of the lingering conflicts in 
the two countries are due to deficient liberal peacebuilding strategies; for instance, 
when addressing the issue of forced displacement, peacebuilders in both countries 
focused their attention on legal amendments to the detriment of other types of changes 
that had to take place. This cemented the geographical segregation of ethnic groups in 
BiH on the one hand and failed to narrow the economic divide between blacks and 
whites in SA on the other. It is of course impossible to go back and redesign these 
peacebuilding strategies using principles consistent with the alternative model. There 
should however, even today, be an attempt to adopt certain policies that can 
supplement liberal peacebuilding and manage divisive conflicts more effectively.  
 
In the case of BiH it is absolutely necessary that, before the peacebuilding process is 
completed, a common educational strategy across the three ethnic groups is adopted. 
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At the moment, Bosniac, Serb and Croat students attend monoethnic schools (and in 
cases where students from two ethnic groups have to use the same building, two 
different administrations have been set up), are taught different versions of history 
and different national languages.578 As a result, and although peace is technically 
being built in BiH for the last two decades, the younger, post-war generation is 
generally more nationalist than that of its parents.579 A common educational strategy 
would deal with this by stopping the perpetuation of myths about what happened 
during the war; eventually perceptions that only one group was the victim or the 
perpetrator of the conflict would be abandoned. Moreover, if students were taught the 
same syllabus, there would be no need to maintain the ethnically segregated school 
system that exists at the moment and which prevents young people from meeting 
members of the other ethnic groups. In the long term, adults taught in schools that 
promote reconciliatory values, would be less likely to support parties that have a 
nationalist agenda and be more receptive to the idea of a Bosnian civic nationalism.  
 
Similarly, and although fundamental conflicts have been transformed to practical 
disagreements to a much greater extent in SA than in BiH, additional steps are still 
necessary to close old apartheid wounds. South African officials should explain to the 
public what the compensation amount paid to displaced families signifies; it should be 
made clear to the public that compensation is not charity from the state to certain poor 
members of the community, but a unique material apology for past injustices. The 
Commission on Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) should also make it its priority to 
provide, even now, victims with post-restitution support in the form of training, 
funding and expertise. Moreover, in addition to providing compensation, the CRLR 
could also make available alternative forms of redress that could meaningfully change 
the victims’ lives, such as a free university education or vocational training for their 
children, priority within an established housing programme or highly subsidised 
access to credit.580 Finally, the government ought to acknowledge the failure of the 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme since, despite the emergence of a 
                                               
578 European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, 'Second Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina', 
(Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 7 December 2010) at [63]. 
579 Speech by Mr. Christopher Bennett, the Deputy High Representative, at the launch of Lord David 
Owen’s book Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ways Forward (London School of Economics, 11 June 2013). 
580 Bernadette Atuahene, 'From Reparation to Restoration: Moving Beyond Restoring Property Rights 
to Restoring Political and Economic Visibility', Southern Methodist University Law Review, 60 (2007), 
1419 at 1446. 
  220 
small middle-class, it has not influenced in any positive way the socio-economic 
position of the majority of the population. BEE, which currently favours already rich, 
non-white businesspeople, could be replaced by other initiatives, preferably run by the 
provinces and local authorities rather than the federal government, such as providing 
small loans to poor entrepreneurs. In this way, small-scale private initiatives that 
affect more people could have a greater impact in transforming the South African 
economy at large.  
 
5. Looking ahead: building peace in Cyprus 
 
However, it is in Cyprus, where the peacebuilding process is still in an embryonic 
stage, that the alternative peacebuilding approach could make the most difference. 
Recognising from the outset that human rights have an important role to play in the 
building of peace, but that they nevertheless have to be supplemented through 
additional methods and strategies, can prevent Cypriots from making the same 
mistakes that were committed in BiH and SA. A proper understanding of the 
relationship between peace and human rights can help distinguish the cases in which 
insisting on human rights protections would be to the benefit of the peacebuilding 
process, from those where it would simply be wiser to direct the, usually limited, 
peacebuilding resources in other directions. 
 
However, advocates of the alternative approach are likely to face an uphill struggle 
since signs of the traditional, liberal peacebuilding recipe – and its limitations – are 
already appearing in Cyprus. It is clear, for instance, that while the European Court’s 
remedies for property violations on both sides of the Green Line look good on paper, 
they do not really promote justice or reconciliation on the ground. The most important 
reason for this is the fact that the right of Turkish Cypriots is protected by the 
authorities of the Republic of Cyprus, while that of Greek Cypriots by Turkey. Thus, 
although both states are theoretically trying to protect the right in question, the 
mistrust between them, fuelled by the lack of a peace agreement and the ongoing 
negotiations, has resulted in less than satisfactory results on the ground. Technically 
protecting human rights therefore, is not enough; their protection must take place after 
certain conditions have been met, alongside strategies that can induce not only legal 
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and institutional amendments, but political, socio-economic and psychological 
changes as well.  
 
The condition that can boost the effectiveness of human rights in Cyprus the most and 
that should be the first priority for peacebuilders at the moment, is the signing of a 
peace agreement. This requires that politicians start behaving responsibly for the sake 
of the common good, rather than as spoilers in order to protect the vested interests 
they have acquired by maintaining the status quo over the last decades. Moreover, 
while the laws and institutions of the new Cypriot state should respect human rights, 
greater attention should be paid to other methods that can address the wariness and 
fear that exists between Cypriots of the two communities. Among such methods could 
be the adoption of a common history curriculum and the teaching of Greek and 
Turkish in schools.581 In addition to government initiated top-down strategies, media 
outlets and civil society organisations can also start engaging with the grassroots more 
effectively in order to spread a reconciliatory message from the bottom-up. It is these 
steps, which can contribute to social and psychological changes among the 
population, that make the protection of human rights real in the lives of the people 
and more meaningfully contribute to feelings of security, justice and reconciliation.  
 
At the same time however, the fact that human rights have to be supplemented by 
peacebuilding tools, should not cloud the fact that Cyprus is indeed in need of major 
legal and institutional changes. Perhaps one of the most important contributions that 
human rights can make is through the work of the Law Commission, an institution 
that currently does not exist in Cyprus. This body of independent legal experts could 
examine whether proposed legislation is compatible with human rights or other social 
objectives, such as reconciliation, and make recommendations to the legislature. 
Additionally, it could undertake the exercise of examining old legislation – some of it 
relics of Cyprus’ colonial past – in order to ensure that it promotes better inter-ethnic 
relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Bearing in mind that an increasing 
number of Turkish Cypriots are permanently residing in the areas controlled by the 
Republic of Cyprus today, this exercise could start taking place before a peace 
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agreement is signed in order to prepare the public for the changes that are going to 
take place. However, after the signing of the peace agreement, the Law Commission’s 
role could become even more important as it could pre-emptively monitor the 
legislation that is passed by the federal and constituent states in order to avoid any 
detrimental consequences for peace. In addition to the pre-emptive contribution of 
human rights to peace through the workings of the Law Commission, their judicial 
protection after the event, irrespective of the applicant’s ethnicity, could promote 




This thesis argued that there have been very few attempts to justify the existence of 
the liberal peacebuilding strategy in general or the insistence that human rights can 
help manage ethnic conflicts in particular. Consequently, the resulting peacebuilding 
practice, basing itself on little more than hunches and wishful thinking, has failed to 
achieve its goals and objectives. In light of the lessons learned from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, South Africa and Cyprus, I have argued that there is indeed a positive 
relationship between human rights and peace. However, in order for the former to 
help promote the latter, rights must be supplemented by other peacebuilding tools 
which focus on political, socio-economic and psychological changes, in addition to 
legal amendments.  
 
This conclusion, in favour of an alternative peacebuilding approach, is not intended to 
be revolutionary; the traditional, liberal peacebuilding policy should merely shift its 
emphasis, not abandon it altogether. Unavoidably, the specific directions in which the 
emphasis will be shifted and the context-specific peacebuilding strategies that will 
supplement human rights vary from one ethnically divided, post-conflict society to 
the other. While only a general sketch of the alternative peacebuilding policy can be 
outlined however, it is clear that it will be more time-consuming and require greater 
resources and attention to detail than any liberal, human rights-focused peacebuilding 
process that has been tried so far. These are significant hurdles, yet it is only by 
adopting a more holistic peacebuilding approach that conflict transformation can be 
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achieved. The alternative policy might make peacebuilding more challenging, but it 
also makes it more real.  
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Appendix: Background information on the three case studies 
 
1. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a small Balkan country with a population of about 4 
million people. From 1922 and up until the Balkan wars, it was, together with Serbia, 
Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro, one of the six republics making up the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the end of the 1980s, with the 
communist ideology losing its hold, Serbian and Croatian nationalisms, which had 
been repressed during Tito’s regime, surged back to life. This led Slovenia and 
Croatia to declare their independence in 1991 and, being concerned about its 
territorial integrity from Serbian and Croatian expansionism, BiH followed suit in 
March 1992.582 Claiming that Bosnian independence contravened with the Yugoslav 
Constitution, Serbia sought to prevent it through military force. This led to the swift 
polarisation between the three large minorities that make up most of BiH’s 
population. The last census, which had taken place in 1990 before the war, showed 
that there were 43% Bosniacs, 31% Bosnian Serbs and 17% Bosnian Croats in the 
country and it is among these groups that the war was fought.583 The main 
distinguishing characteristic between the three groups is their religion, with Bosniacs, 
Croats and Serbs generally being Muslims, Catholics and Christian Orthodox 
respectively.  
 
Serbs attacked BiH in March 1992 and by June 1992 the Serb-controlled Yugoslav 
Peoples Army, with the help of Bosnian Serbs, controlled more than 60% of the 
country.584 By that time, Croatia also joined the fighting and declared the creation of 
Herceg-Bosna, an independent Bosnian Croat state, making up about 20% of BiH.585 
The war had become a three-cornered conflict with Serbia claiming, and getting, the 
lion’s share of the country’s territory. After a series of failed peace attempts, Serb 
                                               
582 For a history of the Balkan wars, see Sabrina P. Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of 
Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosević (4th edn.; Boulder: Westview Press, 2002). 
583 Census, 1991, ‘Ethnic Composition of Bosnia-Herzegovina Population, By Municipalities and 
Settlements, 1991’, Zavod za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine, Bilten no. 234, Sarajevo. (Cited in 
Ramet, Balkan Babel at 241.) Most of the remaining 9% described itself as ‘Yugoslav’, a category that 
is today obsolete. 
584 Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of 
Milosević at 207. 
585 Ibid., at 209. 
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advances were curbed in March 1994 when the Washington Agreement was signed;586 
this was an agreement between the Bosniacs and Croats, who joined forces to fight off 
the Serbs.587 In addition to military cooperation, the Washington Agreement also 
brought the two ethnic groups together politically in the form of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is one of the two entities making up the country 
today. The final chapter of the war was written in August 1995 when NATO began a 
sustained bombing campaign against strategic targets to force the withdrawal of 
Bosnian Serb forces from around Sarajevo. Under the continuing threat of further 
bombings, the leaders of the three ethnic groups were summoned to Dayton, Ohio to 
negotiate a peace agreement. The General Framework or Dayton Agreement, signed 
on 14 December 1995 in Paris, marked the end of the war and the independence of the 
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Before the war, the three ethnic groups had been living in ethnically heterogeneous 
areas throughout Bosnia, so the creation of ethnically cleansed areas, a key objective 
of the combatants, had required the mass killing and displacement of members of all 
ethnic groups. The estimated number of casualties of the Bosnian war has ranged 
considerably because of political bias, the varying methodologies used in different 
studies and the lack of access to accurate information. Initial estimations suggested 
that there were more than 200,000 dead as a result of the Bosnian war,588 but more 
recent and well-documented research puts the number closer to 100,000 with a 
minimum of 97,207 deaths.589 Moreover, an estimated 2,632,928 people – more than 
half of the pre-war population – had been displaced either in BiH or abroad by the end 
of the conflict.590 As a result of these tactics, by 1995, the separatists had largely 
achieved their objectives and BiH was divided into three largely ethnically 
homogeneous areas. It is as a response to this mass displacement and change in BiH’s 
                                               
586 Washington Agreement, signed on 18 March 1994. 
587 These Bosniac-Croat advances were aided by economic and morale problems that were being faced 
by the Serbs from 1994 onwards. Moreover, and despite the ongoing UN arms embargo, by that time 
both Bosniacs and Croats had managed to numerically and technologically improve their weaponry 
considerably (Ramet, Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the 
Fall of Milosević at 230). 
588 Ibid., at 239. 
589 Patrick Ball, Ewa Tabeau and Philip Verwimp, 'The Bosnian Book of Dead: Assessment of the 
Database', (Sussex: Households in Conflict Network, 2007). 
590 Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 'Special 
Report: Musical Chairs: Property Problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina', (Sarajevo: Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1996) at 45-46. 
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demographics that the protection of the right to property became a hugely important 
peacebuilding tool in the country. The right was expected to not only promote 
feelings of justice, but also reconciliation; the assumption was that empowering 
people to return to their pre-war houses would recreate ethnically mixed 
neighbourhoods and promote inter-ethnic communication on the ground level.591 The 
extent to which this strategy was successful, is examined in more detail in Chapters 6 
and 7 of this thesis. 
 
The signing of the Dayton Agreement in 1995 created a new state of affairs in BiH. 
The Constitution is included in Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement, while the 
remaining Annexes deal with other important issues concerning the ending of the war; 
among them, are the military implementation of the peace agreement and 
disarmament (Annex 1A and 1B respectively), the agreement concerning the first 
elections in the country (Annex 3), provisions for the return of the displaced people 
(Annex 7) and the civilian implementation of the peace agreement (Annex 10).592 The 
Constitution provides that the three ethnic groups will exist under a unitary state, 
which operates as a loose federation. The federation consists of two entities: the 
Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina (FBiH), which had been established by the 
Washington Agreement in 1994, and the Republika Srpska. The FBiH consists of 10 
cantons, 5 of which are primarily inhabited by Bosniacs and 5 by Croats, while the 
population in the Republika is mainly Serb. The Constitution is strictly consociational 
in character: the three ethnic groups – referred to in the Constitution as Constituent 
Peoples – have a predetermined number of seats in the executive,593 legislature,594 and 
the judiciary.595 Moreover, as a further protection of the three ethnic groups, each has 
been granted the veto power, which it can use to block legislative and executive 
decisions.596 Nevertheless, these characteristics have made Bosnian politics very 
ethnocentric and the country particularly difficult to govern. 
                                               
591 Anders H. Stefansson, 'Homes in the Making: Property Restitution, Refugee Return and Senses of 
Belonging in a Post-War Bosnian Town', International Migration, 44/3 (2006), 115. 
592 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed on 14 December 
1995 (henceforth, Dayton Agreement). 
593 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4 of the General Framework Agreement signed on 
14 December 1995 (henceforth, BiH Constitution), Article V. 
594 BiH Constitution, Article IV.1 and IV.2. 
595 BiH Constitution, Article VI.1.a. 
596 BiH Constitution, Article V.2.c (in relation to the executive) and IV.3.e (in relation to the 
legislature). 
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It is in this political context that the right to vote is expected to result in political 
changes and contribute to peacebuilding attempts in the country. The right and the 
concept of democracy it is drawing inspiration from, have been used to challenge both 
entities’ Constitutions,597 to regulate the frequent use of the veto power,598 to clarify 
whether there should be allocated seas for different ethnic groups in municipal 
elections599 and, most controversially, to ask for the amendment of the country’s 
Constitution itself.600 The extent to which the right has contributed to the 
peacebuilding process is mixed and varies depending on which political conflict one 
chooses to focus on. However, the very existence of so many salient and – 20 years 
after Dayton – still unresolved conflicts points to a much larger political failure in the 
country. The unwillingness of the political elite to compromise in any meaningful 
way raises the question of whether the protection of the right, no matter how 
vigorous, can replace a healthy political culture.  
 
One final preliminary point that must be made concerns the level of international 
intervention in BiH. The Dayton Agreement was based on the idea that the three 
ethnic groups would require significant assistance during the peacebuilding process. 
As a result, it made provisions for the presence of high numbers of internationals that 
are directly involved in the running of the country.601 By far the most powerful among 
them is the High Representative, who was appointed responsible for the civilian 
implementation of the Agreement and is still operating under that mandate in BiH 
today.602 The High Representative’s powers were expanded considerably in 1996, 
when the appointed (and unaccountable) international official was empowered to pass 
any legislation he considered necessary in the two Entities and the federal level and 
dismiss elected officials if their actions were contrary to peacebuilding attempts.603 
                                               
597 U-5/98 (3rd Partial Opinion) (1 July 2000, BiH CC). 
598 U-8/04 (25 June 2004, BiH CC); U-10/05 (22 July 2005, BiH CC). 
599 U-4/05 (22 February 2005, BiH CC); U-7/05 (27 January 2006, BiH CC). 
600 AP-2678/06 (26 May 2006, BiH CC); Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2009) 28 
B.H.R.C. 201. 
601 These include military personnel (Annexes 1A and 1B), judiciary (Annexes 4 and 6) and other 
policy makers (Annex 10). 
602 Dayton Agreement, Annex 10. 
603 The changes in the High Representative’s powers were authorised by the Peace Implementation 
Council in Bonn in December 1996. For a summary of the Bonn Conference’s conclusions, see Office 
of the High Representative, 'PIC Bonn Conclusions: Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: Self-Sustaining 
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He has used these powers extensively, especially in the early stages of the 
peacebuilding process and as a response to the unwillingness of the nationalist elected 
politicians to cooperate and make the country operational. This unprecedented 
presence and involvement of international officials in the country makes BiH a 
particularly interesting country to study because it allows us to observe at their barest 
the peacebuilding strategies and assumptions of the international community. While 
these are also present in the other two case studies, they are not as prevalent there 
because in South Africa the peacebuilding project is more domestically owned and in 
Cyprus it is still underdeveloped due to the lack of a peace agreement; it is thus BiH 





Cyprus is an island in the Mediterranean Sea with a population of approximately 1.5 
million, about 80% of whom are estimated to be Greek Cypriots (GC) and 18% 
Turkish Cypriots (TC).604 Greek and Turkish Cypriots speak different languages and 
practice different religions: Greek and Christian Orthodox and Turkish and Muslim 
respectively. As a result of these differences, the two ethnic groups have historically 
had different aspirations for the future of the island. In 1955 GC started an armed 
struggle against the British colonial forces on the island with the objective of enosis 
(or unification) with Greece. Soon after, TC declared their preferred vision for 
Cyprus, that of taskim, or division of the island in a Greek and a Turkish part. In 1960 
a compromise solution was signed between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey, 
which left Cypriots on both sides dissatisfied. It granted Cyprus its independence, 
prevented the two groups from uniting with their respective motherlands or dividing 
the island in any way and brought the two communities together under a 
consociational system of government. Similarly to the Dayton Agreement in BiH 35 
years later, the Constitution of Cyprus provided for quotas for participation in the 
                                                                                                                                      
Structures', (10 December 1997) on http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182 [accessed 6 
June 2014]. 
604 Department of Statistics and Research, 'Census of Population and Agriculture 1960 (Volume III - 
Demographic Characteristics)', (Nicosia: Department of Statistics and Research, 1963) at 1. The 
remaining 2% is made up of Maronites, Armenians and Latinos. Since 1963 and with the different birth 
rates between the two communities, the demographics on the island are likely to have changed.  
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three branches of government,605 the police force,606 civil service607 and the army608 
and granted both sides a veto power for important governmental decisions.609 The 
1960 Constitution had never been completely operational before the events of 1963 
took place.  
 
In 1963 all TC officials left their governmental positions en masse and the 
community, which had been living in mixed villages and towns around the island, 
uprooted and organised itself in ethnically homogeneous enclaves. On the one hand, 
GC argue that this was a voluntary population movement, a well-organised attempt to 
destroy the Republic of Cyprus from within so that TC could achieve taksim.610 On 
the other, TC contend that this was a desperate attempt to protect themselves from the 
attacks that had started taking place against their community by nationalist GC.611 As 
a result, TC perceive this as the first instance of forced displacement on the island and 
the beginning of the Cyprus conflict. After 1963 and until 1974, the situation stayed 
tense but largely unchanging with GC remaining in control of all governmental 
institutions.612 Then, in the summer of 1974 a group of GC right-wing paramilitaries, 
together with the Junta government that controlled Greece at the time, organised an 
unsuccessful coup d’état in order to overthrow the President and achieve enosis. A 
few days later, Turkey, claiming that it was protecting the TC, invaded Cyprus.613 
Around 2000 people went missing between 1963-1974, mostly during the 1974 
Turkish invasion.614 Turkey still militarily occupies 36% of the island, in violation of 
a number of UN resolutions.615 Moreover, the war has resulted in a population 
                                               
605 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, signed on 16 August 1960 (henceforth, ROC Constitution), 
Article 1 (for the executive), Article 62 (for the legislature) and Article 133 (for the judiciary). 
606 ROC Constitution, Article 130(2). 
607 ROC Constitution, Article 123(1). 
608 ROC Constitution, Article 129(1). 
609 ROC Constitution, Article 183(1), 49(d) and 49(f).  
610 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus, ‘Historical Review’, 
http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/cyprus01_en/cyprus01_en?OpenDocument [accessed 2 
September 2014]. 
611 Michális Stavrou Michael, Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009) at 27. 
612 International Crisis Group, 'The Cyprus Stalemate: What Next?', (Nicosia/Instabul: International 
Crisis Group, 2006) at 1. 
613 Ibid. 
614 International Crisis Group, 'Reunifying Cyprus: The Best Chance Yet', (Nicosia/Instabul/Brussels: 
International Crisis Group, 2008) at 8. 
615 UNGAR 3212 (1 November 1974); UNSCR 550 (11 May 1984). 
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transfer, with GC almost exclusively living in the south and TC in the north of 
Cyprus.  
 
Turkey has been arguing that it was legally entitled to militarily intervene in Cyprus 
because of the ‘Treaty of Guarantee’ that was signed with the United Kingdom and 
Greece alongside the Constitution in 1960.616 Article 2 of the Treaty allows the three 
countries to prohibit ‘any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either 
union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island’ and it is this provision 
that Turkey relies on. However, Article 4 also provides that before the Guarantor 
Powers can take any action, they must consult each other, which Turkey failed to do 
in 1974. This disagreement about the legality of the 1974 events has led to different 
interpretations of the war by the two communities: GC perceive this as the beginning 
of the conflict that will only be resolved through a peace agreement that will remove 
all Turkish forces from the island, while TC consider the invasion to have ended their 
troubles which started in 1963 and provided them with security. As a result, they see 
the peace agreement as something that will mainly confirm the status quo, while 
potentially also returning some land back to the GC. 
 
The major disagreements between the two ethnic groups boil down to two questions: 
how do we deal with the forced displacements of the 1960s and 1970s and how do we 
structure our political institutions in order to achieve a workable on the one hand, yet 
ethnically representative government on the other? Thus, the right to property, in 
relation to the first question and the right to vote, in relation to the second have 
important roles to play in the peacebuilding process in the country. Cyprus however, 
also shows in the clearest terms that these two rights specifically, and human rights 
more generally, cannot begin to express, let alone address, the conflicts that are 
characterising ethnically divided societies. Both sides agree that the displaced people 
should be remedied and there is a consensus that the right to vote should be protected. 
Yet, they remain divided as to which is the most appropriate way to remedy the 
victims and how exactly political institutions will be structured. The extent to which 
human rights have successfully dealt with these disagreements is examined in detail 
in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
                                               
616 No. 5475 Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee signed on 16 August 1960. 
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Not much has happened since 1974, with the two communities staying until relatively 
recently physically separated by the UN buffer zone (what is known on the island as 
the Green Line). The Republic of Cyprus still operates according to the provisions of 
the 1960 Constitution, which have however, been interpreted using the doctrine of 
necessity in order to accommodate for the absence of TC.617 There has been almost no 
violence between the two communities since the war and political negotiations for the 
resolution of the conflict are continuing until today.618 One of the most significant 
developments to the Cypriot conflict saga took place in 1983 when the Turkish-
controlled north declared its independence from the Republic and named itself the 
‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’). The ‘TRNC’ is not recognised by 
any other State apart from Turkey, which has led to its political and economic 
isolation, but it operates as a second de facto state on the island. In 2003 and on the 
brink of economic collapse, the ‘TRNC’ suddenly and unexpectedly opened 
checkpoints on the Green Line, thus allowing inter-ethnic interaction for the first time 
since 1963. Members of both ethnic groups visited old friends and their houses on the 
‘other side’ without any violence being recorded. However, while more checkpoints 
have opened since then, this has not resulted in any massive changes in political or 
popular perceptions: the two communities continue living parallel lives, with each 
being mostly distrustful and fearful of the other.  
 
The negotiations between the two sides, which have been taking place on the island 
for the last 40 years, have not yielded any positive results either. It was agreed in 
1977, and confirmed numerous times since then, that any peace settlement will be 
based on a ‘bizonal, bicommunal federation’ between the two groups.619 Nevertheless, 
disagreements as to the exact definition of this phrase have further complicated the 
proceedings of the negotiations.620 On the one hand, GC argue that the term refers to a 
simple federation consisting of two communities and two territorial entities or zones; 
on the other, TC contend that the northern zone should always have a TC majority 
with any GC living there having permanently restricted property and voting rights. 
                                               
617 The Attorney-General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim and Others (1964) CLR 195 (CA) (ROC 
Supreme Court). 
618 International Crisis Group, 'Divided Cyprus: Coming to Terms on an Imperfect Reality', 
(Nicosia/Instabul/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014). 
619 UNSCR 1251 (29 June 1999) at [11]. 
620 For an excellent discussion of the Cyprus negotiations, see Michális Stavrou Michael, Resolving the 
Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History. 
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The only proposal for a comprehensive settlement of the problem to be put to the vote 
of the public was the Annan Plan in 2004, which was however accepted by TC and 
overwhelming rejected by GC.621 Since then, politicians have committed to negotiate 
another agreement, but progress has been slow. The recent discovery of hydrocarbons 
in the area had sparked hopes that a peace agreement would follow soon.622 A new 
round of negotiations – believed by many to be the last opportunity that Cypriots will 
have to reunify their country – started in February 2014, but has already been put on 
hold due to Turkey’s illegal interferences with Cyprus’ exclusive economic zone.623  
 
This 40-year old stagnation, tragic as it is for the inhabitants of the island, makes 
Cyprus an interesting case study to examine because it raises two seminal questions. 
The first one invites the reader to consider what contributions, if any, human rights 
can make to peacebuilding operations in the absence of a political agreement. The 
rich case law that the Cyprus conflict has given rise to (mostly at the European Court 
of Human Rights level) suggests that both the applicants and the judges believe that – 
positive – contributions can indeed be made. Nevertheless, even a cursory analysis of 
the European Court’s judgments and their consequences, suggests otherwise.624 The 
second and more controversial question asks whether striking a balance between 
security, justice and reconciliation, and therefore building peace, necessarily has to 
take place within a united Cyprus. Or could it be argued instead, that peace has greater 
chances of success if the two ethnic groups legalise the status quo and remain 
separate? This question, for decades a taboo in Cyprus, has recently started receiving 
the attention of academics,625 non-governmental organisations626 and has even been 
hinted at by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus.627 It will 
                                               
621 UN Secretary-General, 'Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus', 
(New York: United Nations, 28 May 2004). 
622 International Crisis Group, 'Aphrodite’s Gift: Can Cypriot Gas Power a New Dialogue?', 
(Nicosia/Instabul/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2012). 
623 European Parliament, Resolution on Turkish actions creating tensions in the exclusive economic 
zone of Cyprus (2014/2921(RSP)), (Brussels: European Union, 13 November 2014). 
624 For a more detailed analysis of these judgments, see Chapter 5. 
625 James Ker-Lindsay, Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution (London: I.B. Tauris 
& Co, 2014). 
626 International Crisis Group, 'Divided Cyprus: Coming to Terms on an Imperfect Reality', 
(Nicosia/Instabul/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2014). 
627 The UN Secretary-General’s Special Adviser on Cyprus, Espen Barth Eide, warned that ‘If the two 
sides do not agree on a solution soon, the Cyprus problem might be resolved in other ways on its own.’ 
(Opening speech given by Espen Barth Eide at PRIO Annual Conference, ‘Conflict in Europe - Europe 
in Conflict: The Changing Nature of Conflict in Europe and its Neighbourhood’, (Nicosia, 28 
November 2014)).  
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nevertheless not be pursued further here because both sides are, in principle at least, 
only committed towards negotiating a peace agreement that will reunite, rather than 
permanently divide, the island.  
 
3. South Africa  
 
The third case study discussed in this thesis is South Africa (SA), which according to 
its 2011 census, has a population of just less than 52 million.628 Of that 52 million, 
80% are black (sometimes also referred to as Africans); coloured and white people 
make up about 9% of the population each and Asians are approximately 2%.629 The 
main distinguishing feature between the groups is, due to SA’s apartheid history, race. 
It has been argued that racially divided societies are different from ethnically divided 
ones – thus making SA an inappropriate case study – because skin colour is 
something that is always obvious, while ethnic characteristics such as language or 
religion are less apparent. However, for the insiders to the conflict, ethnic differences 
are as easy to identify as external characteristics; in fact, a person’s accent, surname, 
political party or place of socialisation can be more accurate indications of her 
identity than her skin colour. Moreover, despite race being the main distinguishing 
factor between South Africans, decades of segregation have also resulted in 
differences in religion, language, culture and socio-economic status.  
 
South Africa became a British colony in 1795 and acquired its dominion status in 
1910. From that time onwards a series of segregationist laws were passed, which 
culminated in the rise of the National Party (NP) and the establishment of apartheid in 
1948. During this period and until the early 1990s when apartheid started breaking 
down, laws were passed that included the disenfranchisement of non-whites, the 
segregation of all areas of life, including the provisions of education and healthcare, 
and the restriction of non-whites’ property rights to 7% and subsequently to 13% of 
South African land. This resulted in a mass displacement of South Africans – 
                                               
628 Statistics South Africa, 'Census 2011: Statistical Release (Revised)', (Pretoria: Statistics South 
Africa, 2012) at 14. 
629 These are referred to as ‘racial’, rather than ‘ethnic groups’ because their main distinguishing 
characteristics are external (such as skin colour), not internal (such as religion or language). There are 
also ethnic divisions in SA between different tribal groups, but these will not be examined here in any 
detail.  
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affecting approximately 1.29 million people between 1960 and 1983630 – and huge 
socio-economic imbalances between the different racial groups. On the one hand, it 
was recognised in the negotiations that led to the democratisation of the country, that 
there was a need to address these consequences of apartheid. On the other, this had to 
be balanced against the competing objective of maintaining a stable economy and, as 
a result, interfering as little as possible with the existing property situation in the 
country. It is this balancing exercise that made the right to property among the most 
controversial provisions of the SA Constitution and the Commission on Restitution of 
Land Rights, which is tasked with enforcing it, one of the most important 
peacebuilding actors in the country.  
 
The apartheid was strongly resisted by a number of parties, most prominently the 
African National Congress (ANC), which advocated the creation of a non-racial SA 
and the redistribution of wealth to its people. The ANC, the Pan Africanist Congress 
and the South African Communist Party were among the parties that were banned by 
the apartheid regime, with their leaders being imprisoned until just before the 
beginning of the democratic transition.631 Such violence and gross human rights 
violations were not just characteristics of the apartheid regime; rather, they continued 
during the transitionary period to democracy as well. Thus, despite the absence of a 
full-blown war in SA, the country is still an appropriate example of a post-conflict 
society. Illustrative of this is the fact that the South African Institute of Race Relations 
indicates that 3,706 people were killed between 1993-1994; 2,434 between 1994-95 
and 1,004 between 1995-96.632 During March 1994, when the first election campaign 
was in full swing, 537 deaths were recorded, an average of 17.3 per day.633 
 
Change towards democracy started in SA when in 1990 the newly elected Prime 
Minister, F.W. de Klerk announced the lifting of the ban of the three parties and 
released Nelson Mandela, the leader of the ANC from prison. This marked the first 
irreversible commitment to a negotiated settlement, with the first negotiation round of 
the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) taking place in December 
                                               
630 Surplus People Project, 'Forced Removals in South Africa' (Cape Town: Surplus People Project, 
1983). 
631 David Welsh, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009). 
632 James L. Gibson and Amanda Gouws, Overcoming Intolerance in South Africa: Experiments in 
Democratic Persuasion (Cambridge: CUP, 2003) at 18. 
633 Welsh, The Rise and Fall of Apartheid at 535. 
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1991 and the second in May 1992. Both rounds broke down due to the continuation of 
violence in the streets, which the ANC felt was orchestrated by the NP in order to 
undermine its negotiating potential, and because of the disagreements about how the 
constitutional negotiations would move forward.634 The ANC insisted that only a 
universally elected body could draft the Constitution and that allowing the NP to stay 
in power while the negotiations were taking place would be unfair. On the other hand, 
the NP argued that it would be practically impossible and chaos would ensue if 
elections took place before the drafting of a Constitution. It was eventually agreed 
that the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum, which first met in April 1993, would draft an 
Interim Constitution;635 this would be followed by elections and the newly elected 
Parliament could decide on the Final Constitution, which would have to be certified 
by the Constitutional Court as complying with a number of predetermined 
constitutional principles. The first democratic elections took place in South Africa in 
April 1994 and by 1996 the Final Constitution had been adopted.  
 
The Interim Constitution provided that during the first five years of democratic 
government there would be a Government of National Unity. This meant that the 
party with most seats in the National Assembly would choose the President of the 
country, while every party holding at least 80 out of the 400 seats could designate an 
Executive Deputy President. The Cabinet members would be appointed by the 
President in consultation with the Executive Deputy Presidents, who had to operate 
with a ‘consensus seeking spirit’ bearing in mind ‘the need for effective 
government.’636 Since 1999 and the dissolution of the Government of National Unity, 
the legislature is elected through proportional representation and there are no 
guaranteed seats for any party in the executive. Five sets of democratic elections have 
taken place, all of which have resulted in the ANC acquiring more than 60% of the 
votes.637 Moreover, the ANC controls 8 out of SA’s 9 provinces, thus raising 
questions about the quality of democracy in the country due to the pathologies that 
                                               
634 Adrian Guelke, 'South Africa: The Long View on Political Transition', Nationalism & Ethnic 
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635 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act [No. 22 of 1994]. 
636 Ibid., Section 89(2). 
637 For the results, see the Electoral Commission of South Africa website: 
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generally accompany dominant party democracies.638 These include, among 
others, the use of public resources, the changing of the rules to distort electoral 
competition and the feeling among the public that there is no other viable alternative 
to the dominant party.639 It is these challenges that democratic SA will have to face as 
it is moving from its childhood into adolescent years and which the right to vote is 
called to address. Much like the other two case studies however, questions arise about 
the capacity of human rights to deal with such broad political questions. Chapters 5 
and 7, which examine this issue in more detail, offer a mixed answer: while the South 
African Constitutional Court has – very successfully – addressed these political 
conflicts by using the right to vote, merely inducing legal amendments rather than 
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